Suchergebnisse

ARTICLE INVESTIGATES MICRO LEVEL ASPECTS OF THE FRANCHISEMENT PROCESS IN A SYSTEMATIC WAY. THE SUFFRAGE DECISIONS OF INDIVIDUAL ELITES ARE FORMALIZED AS CONSTITUENCY DESIGN PROBLEMS AND THEN SHOWN TO DEPEND ON THE INFORMATION THE DECISION MAKER POSSESSES REGARDING THE LIKELIHOOD OF BEING REELECTED TO THE RESPECTIVE REPRESENTATIVE BODY UNDER ALTERNATIVE REFORMS.

IN CONTEMPORARY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES IT IS DIFFICULT TO DISTINGUISH THE PRIVATE FROM THE PUBLIC SECTOR BEACAUSE THE STATE IS SO BOUND UP WITH THE PROCESSES OF PRODUCTION & CONSUMPTION. A COMPREHENSIVE THEORETICAL ARGUMENT ABOUT THIS PHENOMENON, THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE IN THE CONTEXT OF MODERN DEPENDENCY IS OUTLINED & SCHEMATICALLY REPRESENTED.

IN THIS PAPER FORECASTING & PREDICTION ARE DISTINGUISHED, AND SEVERAL ILLUSTRATIONS OF EACH TYPE OF ACTIVITY ARE PRESENTED. CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING THE SOUNDNESS OF SCIENTIFIC FORECASTS THEN ARE OFFERED, AND THE PROSPECTS FOR CONSTRUCTING SOUND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS FORECASTS ARE ASSESSED.

State entrepreneurship is a policy by which productive enterprises are owned as public agencies but operated according to standard business criteria. State intervention of this kind is increasingly common in the Third World, where this policy is a response to the entrepreneurial capabilities of local private & multinational enterprise. Accounts of the interrelationship of state, local, & multinational entrepreneurship are studied & found to have theoretical shortcomings. These deficiencies are eliminated by isolating the central tenets of the explanations & deducing the generic from entrepreneurship histories. Insights emerge concerning the prospects for survival of the alliance of state, local, & multinational capital. The groundwork is laid for an in-depth study of selected political & economic determinants of state entrepreneurship. 2 Figures. Modified HA.

A COMMON CHARACTERISTIC OF DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES IS A SUBSTANTIAL DIRECT ENTREPRENEURIAL ROLE FOR THE STATE. ONE EXPLANATION FOR THIS IS THAT IN DEPENDENT INDUSTRIALIZING COUNTRIES THE SYSTEM OF ALLOCATION AND PRODUCTION HAS BEEN CAPTURED BY A KEY GROUP, THE TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC ELITE. THE ARGUMENT IS THAT THIS ELITE LENDS ITS POLITICAL SUPPORT TO THE STATE, IN RETURN FOR THE STATE SUBSTITUTING AS ENTREPRENEUR IN THE INDUSTRIALIZATION PROCESS. IN THIS ARTICLE THE AUTHORS ANALYZE THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS OF THIS EXPLANATION OF THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE. A FORMAL MODEL IS CONSTRUCTED OF THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP, MATERIAL CONSEQUENCES FOR THE TECHNO-BUREAUCRATIC ELITE, AND IMPORTANT DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL CONSTRAINTS. THEY THEN USE DEDUCTIVE METHODS TO ANALYZE THE LOGIC OF STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THEY SHOW HOW CYCLICAL FLUCTUATIONS IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY ARE REFLECTED IN CONSTANTLY CHANGING LEVELS OF STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP, AND THEY INVESTIGATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF ALTERNATIVE KINDS OF DEPENDENCY SYNDROMES FOR HISTORIES OF ENTREPRENEURIAL SUBSTITUTION AND FOR STREAMS OF BENEFITS TO THE TECHNOBUREAUCRATIC ELITE. IT IS DEMONSTRATED THAT THERE IS AN INVERSE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE TENDENCIES TO REACH STABLE LEVELS OF STATE ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND THE LONG-TERM POTENTIAL FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH.

THE RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN THE WORKINGS OF DEMOCRATIC INSTITUTIONS AND CURRENCY MARKETS ARE STUDIED. SEVERAL COMPETING PROPOSITIONS ABOUT HOW POLITICAL (RE)EQUILIBRATION AFFECTS CURRENCY MARKETS ARE DERIVED AND TESTED. THE RESULTS SUPPORT THE VIEW THAT DEMOCRATIC POLITICS AFFECTS CURRENCY MARKETS. EXPECTATIONS AND UNCERTAINTY ABOUT ELECTORAL OUTCOMES AND GOVERNMENT SURVIVAL AFFECT THE PROBABILITY OF SWITCHING BETWEEN CURRENCY-MARKET EQUILIBRIA. ADDITIONALLY, OPINION POLLS ABOUT CHIEF EXECUTIVE PERFORMANCE HAVE A DIRECT EFFECT ON THE PROBABILITIES OF SWITCHES BETWEEN CURRENCY REGIMES SUGGESTING THAT THESE POLLS CAUSE CURRENCY TRADERS TO REVISE THEIR EXPECTATIONS ABOUT THE STABILITY OF GOVERNMENTS AND THE CONTENTS OF PUBLIC POLICIES. POLITICAL EFFECTS ARE WEAKER IN COUNTRIES WITH PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTORAL SYSTEMS THAN IN COUNTRIES WITH MAJORITY-PLURALITY SYSTEMS. THERE IS LESS EVIDENCE THAT CENTRAL-BANK INDEPENDENCE, CONSENSUAL-CORPORATIST SYSTEMS, OR "POLITICAL COHERENCY" REDUCES THE EFFECT OF POLITICS ON CURRENCY MARKETS.