Suchergebnisse

After almost 50 years in existence in a variety of different forms, the EU finally has an express proposal on the table dealing with the potential withdrawal of a Member State. Article 59 of the draft Constitution states that any Member State may now 'decide to withdraw from the European Union in accordance with its own constitutional requirements'.1The Member State would have to formally notify the European Council of this decision. The Council and the Member State would then enter into negotiations on a mutually agreeable basis for withdrawal, including a framework for the future relationship between the EU and the Member State. The results of this negotiation would require approval by a qualified majority of the Council after obtaining the consent of the European Parliament.2In any event, withdrawal would occur not later than two years following the notification unless extended by agreement between the Member State and the European Council.3

peer-reviewed ; This paper shows that the traditional equitable doctrine, which protected the rights of a prepaid buyer of future or unascertained goods, was wrongly perceived as being overruled by the judgment of a single Court of Appeal judge. What followed, however, was considerable judicial reluctance by English courts to remedy this error. The article examines various legislative and judicial approaches from major common law jurisdictions around the world that purport to lessen the potential for injustice created by this judicial caution. Yet despite legislative intervention in England to provide limited remedies, there has been a marked reluctance elsewhere to produce the necessary radical reform suggested by the Law Reform Commission of Ontario. The position in Ireland is examined and the authors note that the time may be ripe for a reconsideration of the current statutory provisions in that jurisdiction. ; PUBLISHED ; peer-reviewed

In general, a functioning liability and insurance framework should ensure an adequate level of third party claimant protection and a reasonable and adequate final allocation of liability costs for the involved parties. This research examines whether the liability and insurance framework resulting from the amendment to German Road Traffic Act meets these two central objectives. The article shows that a reasonable and adequate allocation of liability costs is inhibited because of several barriers that hinder the shift of liability costs from the owner of the vehicle to the manufacturer. In particular, it is highly dependent on the practical application of subrogation claims. The ability and the motivation of motor insurers to conduct subrogation claims could be negatively affected because of a lack of required technical and engineering know-how and because a market-wide conduction of subrogation claims would erode the business model of motor insurance. This article proposes changes to the current framework particularly by removing specific exclusions of product liability and by easing the burden of proof of a product defect.