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Unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia has consistently been governed by centre-right or right- wing political parties. The absence of political space for the Left in this country allowed governments to portray protests as subversive and criminal. However, starting in 2008, right-wing politicians have embraced, supported and used the protest as a tactic; undertaking, calling for, and giving support to various protest movements across the country. This has had an unexpected consequence: right-wing parties, government institutions, and even some sectors within the security and armed forces now see protests as valid and normal. Drawing on a brief historical analysis of protest movements in Colombia since 1948, and particularly after 2002, this article argues that to understand the recent normalization of this form of political expression we should look at changes in the dynamics of competition within the right.

The history of Colombia has been defined by the paradox of the coexistence of violence and economic growth. While the economy of the country has grown almost uninterruptedly since the middle of the 20th century, the state is still not fully capable of reasserting its presence nor of providing justice or security for all of its citizens across its territory. This chapter analyses the paradox of the coexistence of armed violence and economic growth in Colombia as an emerging property of a political economy of violence in which segments within the elites of the country benefit by the lack of security and justice. Violence is good for business, although not good for statehood.

It is argued that civil war and protests are mutually exclusive processes. However, the prevalence of protests and their proximity with or simultaneity to armed conflict contradicts this idea. Conflict and confrontation involve different types of interactions between the state and its opponents, which can involve protests, mass mobilization, clashes, and even armed conflict. Thus, we can understand conflict as existing in a continuum. Analyzing protests and protestors as related to armed conflict may serve to widen our understanding of conflict. This chapter presents the case for linking protest with a wider understanding of conflict, considering its links with other categories of contestation such as arme conflict. We can thus envision different types of contestation as being related. If we consider this possibility, we can then analyze processes of escalation and de-escalation between different expresions of contestation. This chapter reflects on the similarities and differences between different categories used to understand contestation, focusing on the categories of protests, civil conflict, and civil war. I claim that while a distinction between protests and armed violence is often made on the basis of the degree of violence involved in these processes, this in itself does not mean that these forms of conflict are disconnected. Through focusing on the nature of their political claims, we can understand these processes of contestation as related to each other. Thus, we can analyze how mass mobilization escalates into armed conflicts, and we also observe cases of post agreement scenarios where mass mobilization follows the signature of peace agreements (a de-escalation process). Evidence from the case of South Africa is presented to illustrate this.

This article investigates the military approach as a means of solving protracted civil conflicts, in particular focusing on the cases of Sri Lanka and Colombia in comparison. The approach adopted is to study the emergence of these military options within the context of each country's history and to assess whether the call for war was merely a consequence of the international 'war on terror', or driven by internal elements. The article explores the epistemological groundings and pitfalls of the all-out war theory informing this approach, before reassessing the significance and validity of the theory in relation to Sri Lanka and Colombia.

Latin America was in turmoil in 2019. Protests raged across different countries and against governments across the political spectrum. Widespread mobilisation from social organisations denounced corruption and voiced various demands, including greater political freedoms, better and affordable public services, and the urgent need to tackle corruption and inequality. The region ended 2019 with unfulfilled promises of a new social pact, and the promise of intensified mobilisations. With COVID-19, Latin American governments can rewrite the region's socioeconomic path, engaging different actors and recovering the legitimacy of their social contracts above the interests of particular elites and international stakeholders. Failing to do so will be the preamble to period of instability and conflict. ; Pre print of the forthcoming chapter to be published as part of the The Europa Regional Surveys of the World

The signing of the peace agreements between the FARC-EP and the Colombian Government in late November 2016 has generated new prospects for peace in Colombia, opening the possibility of redressing the harm inflicted on Colombians by Colombians.Talking about peace and transitional justice requires us to think about howto operationalize peace agreements to promote justice and coexistence for peace. This volume brings together reflections by Colombian academics and practitioners alongside pieces provided by researchers and practitioners in other countries where transitional justice initiatives have taken place (Bosnia and Herzegovina, South Africa, Sri Lanka and Peru). This volume has been written in the south, by the south, for the south. The book engages with the challenges ahead for the coming generations of Colombians. Rivers of ink have dealt with the end goals of transitional justice, but victims require us to take the quest for human rights beyond the normative realm of theorizing justice and into the practical realm of engaging how to implement justice initiatives. The tension between theory—the legislative frameworks guaranteeing human rights—and practice—the realization of these ideas—will frame Colombia's success (or failure) in consolidating the implementation of the peace agreements with the FARC-EP.

Unlike other Latin American countries, Colombia has consistently been governed by centre-right or right-wing political parties. The absence of political space for the Left in this country allowed governments to portray protests as subversive and criminal. However, starting in 2008, right-wing politicians have embraced, supported and used the protest as a tactic; undertaking, calling for, and giving support to various protest movements across the country. This has had an unexpected consequence: right-wing parties, government institutions, and even some sectors within the security and armed forces now see protests as valid and normal. Drawing on a brief historical analysis of protest movements in Colombia since 1948, and particularly after 2002, this article argues that to understand the recent normalization of this form of political expression we should look at changes in the dynamics of competition within the Right. ; A diferencia de otros países Latinoamericanos, Colombia ha sido gobernada tradicionalmente por partidos de derecha o centro-derecha. La ausencia de espacio político para la izquierda, permitió que los gobiernos presentaran a la protesta como subversiva y criminal. Sin embargo, a partir de 2008, políticos de derecha han adoptado, apoyado y usado la protesta como una táctica; organizando, convocando y dando sustento a varios movimientos de protesta. Esto ha tenido una consecuencia inesperada: partidos de derecha, el gobierno, e incluso sectores de las fuerzas armadas y de seguridad ven ahora a las protestas como algo válido y normal. A partir de un breve análisis histórico de los movimientos de protesta en Colombia desde 1948, y en especial después de 2002, este artículo sostiene que, para entender la reciente normalización de esta forma de expresión política, debemos prestar atención a cambios en las dinámicas de competencia política dentro de la derecha.

Abstract: It is argued that civil war and protests are mutually exclusive processes. However, the prevalence of protests and their proximity with or simultaneity to armed conflict contradicts this idea. Conflict and confrontation involve different types of interactions between the state and its opponents, which can involve protests, mass mobilization, clashes, and even armed conflict. Thus, we can understand conflict as existing in a continuum. Analyzing protests and protestors as related to armed conflict may serve to widen our understanding of conflict. This chapter presents the case for linking protest with a wider understanding of conflict, considering its links with other categories of contestation such as armed conflict. We can thus envision different types of contestation as being related. If we consider this possibility, we can then analyze processes of escalation and de-escalation between different expressions of contestation. This chapter reflects on the similarities and differences between different categories used to understand contestation, focusing on the categories of protests, civil conflict, and civil war. I claim that while a distinction between protests and armed violence is often made based on the degree of violence involved in these processes, this in itself does not mean that these forms of conflict are disconnected. Through focusing on the nature of their political claims, we can understand these processes of contestation as related to each other. Thus, we can analyze how mass mobilization escalates into armed conflicts, and we also observe cases of post agreement scenarios where mass mobilization follows the signature of peace agreements (a de-escalation process). Evidence from the case of South Africa is presented to illustrate this.

When we study civil wars and conflicts we tend to conceptualise them as occurring in stages: starting from domestic political disagreements, to demonstrations and protests escalating into violence and war. How armed conflicts end is often seen as the reverse process, moving from high intensity armed interaction, to a drawing down, war weariness, negotiations and termination, followed by a transition to peace. This contribution argues that this is a faulty understanding of conflict, which obscures rather than illuminates. More attention to the processes of aggravation of conflict and the many leaps and bounds of the use of pressure and coercion is warranted. Similarly, the drawing down of conflict is not necessarily linked to a linear progression of de-escalation. Sometimes armed conflicts end at the pinnacle of violence. This article focuses on the state of the art in the field of escalation and de-escalation in the study of civil war and conflict. Moreover, it will offer an invitation to scholars to focus more on these phenomena by outlining where our present knowledge and insights fall short.

AbstractMobility is a multifaceted concept with social, economic and political implications. This article reflects on the role of mobility and its relation to precarity in the emergence of protests in both Quito (Ecuador) and Santiago (Chile) in 2019 by examining the interplay between mobility and inequality. It argues that the announced increases in transport and fuel costs in Chile and Ecuador exposed obstacles to spatial and social mobility and existing inequalities. Although the protests arose in response to the announced reduction in fuel subsidies and possible increases in transport costs, we propose that they reflect a deeper issue, relating to the vulnerability of the livelihoods of significant segments of the population, despite the fact that both Quito and Santiago have seen improvements in several poverty and inequality indicators in recent years. We discuss how mobility and geography relate to patterns of structural marginalisation that are not necessarily evident from aggregate economic indicators, and how understanding inequality in terms of the 'right to the city' and access to public services explain the protests in both countries as a response to existing segregation and deep‐seated inequalities.

Mobility is a multifaceted concept with social, economic and political implications. This article reflects on the role of mobility and its relation to precarity in the emergence of protests in both Quito (Ecuador) and Santiago (Chile) in 2019 by examining the interplay between mobility and inequality. It argues that the announced increases in transport and fuel costs in Chile and Ecuador exposed obstacles to spatial and social mobility and existing inequalities. Although the protests arose in response to the announced reduction in fuel subsidies and possible increases in transport costs, we propose that they reflect a deeper issue, relating to the vulnerability of the livelihoods of significant segments of the population, despite the fact that both Quito and Santiago have seen improvements in several poverty and inequality indicators in recent years. We discuss how mobility and geography relate to patterns of structural marginalisation that are not necessarily evident from aggregate economic indicators, and how understanding inequality in terms of the 'right to the city' and access to public services explain the protests in both countries as a response to existing segregation and deep‐seated inequalities.

One of the most valuable features of Capital and Ideology is its concern to take history seriously and consider how the emergence of different political and economic regimes relate to discourses about fairness and justice across time. This paper pushes this agenda further by acknowledging that the experience of a few developed nations should not be taken as the template for the generalized study of inequality dynamics across time and space. In this paper, we interrogate Piketty's analysis and policy proposals against specificities that are central to understanding the production and reproduction of inequalities within South Africa. We reflect on the South African case, the structure of inequality and its changes since 1994. We review a battery of policy interventions that have been implemented to address inequality in the last 25 years. We emphasize that the long shadow cast by centuries of colonialism and various forms of apartheid strongly affirm Piketty's emphasis on understanding history. But this is both affirmation and critique given the foundational, imbedded impact that this specific legacy has had on post‐apartheid society and its policies. Piketty is aware that the levels of inequality in South Africa are so high that this is "unknown territory." We map out some of this territory to reveal how these extreme initial wealth and racial inequities inform the reproduction of inequalities in all dimensions and undermine well intentioned policies. We claim that understanding extractive histories, imbedded wealth inequalities, and complex social and political institutions allows us to understand and confront some of the reasons why even in light of progressive policies, many of which are in line with the proposals from Piketty, government interventions have thus far failed to reduce inequality.