Search results

Cet article analyse l'impact du cumul des mandats sur les subventions que les communes françaises reçoivent des conseils départementaux, et apporte de nouveaux éléments sur l'économie politique des subventions allouées entre différents échelons de collectivité territoriale. Les résultats montrent que les maires ayant un poste de conseiller départemental et faisant partie de la majorité politique au sein de ce conseil obtiennent en moyenne 28 % de subventions supplémentaires par rapport aux autres élus municipaux. Une analyse de l'hétérogénéité de cet effet suggère que ce phénomène est le résultat d'un comportement électoraliste de la part des conseillers départementaux. Classification JEL : D72, D73, H27, H77.

This paper brings new evidence on the impact of income inequality on public decisions. Using a new panel database on French municipalities' accounts, and on households' income distribution at the local level, I estimate the impact of income distribution on municipal policy. This paper is the first to investigate this issue by simultaneously using a high number of comparable observations and identifying deciles of the income distribution which matter. After controlling for municipal fixed effects and for the dynamics of municipal incumbents' decisions, I find no impact of income inequality on operating spending, but a strong positive impact on municipal infrastructures. Evidence suggests that an increase in income inequality by 1% leads on average to an increase in the value of municipal infrastructures between 0.06% and 0.18%. Importantly, I find that this result is driven by variations in bottom and top deciles. There is clear evidence that additive public facilities associated to more inequality are due to higher tax rates. When poorest individuals get poorer, or when richest ones get richer, municipal incumbents decide to increase the amount of infrastructures by increasing local taxation. These results suggest that what matter in public decisions are the extreme parts of voters' income distribution, and that lower bottom incomes and higher top ones both lead to a higher size of government.

This paper brings new evidence on the impact of income inequality on public decisions. Using a new panel database on French municipalities' accounts, and on households' income distribution at the local level, I estimate the impact of income distribution on municipal policy. This paper is the first to investigate this issue by simultaneously using a high number of comparable observations and identifying deciles of the income distribution which matter. After controlling for municipal fixed effects and for the dynamics of municipal incumbents' decisions, I find no impact of income inequality on operating spending, but a strong positive impact on municipal infrastructures. Evidence suggests that an increase in income inequality by 1% leads on average to an increase in the value of municipal infrastructures between 0.06% and 0.18%. Importantly, I find that this result is driven by variations in bottom and top deciles. There is clear evidence that additive public facilities associated to more inequality are due to higher tax rates. When poorest individuals get poorer, or when richest ones get richer, municipal incumbents decide to increase the amount of infrastructures by increasing local taxation. These results suggest that what matter in public decisions are the extreme parts of voters' income distribution, and that lower bottom incomes and higher top ones both lead to a higher size of government.

This paper brings new evidence on the impact of income inequality on public decisions. Using a new panel database on French municipalities' accounts, and on households' income distribution at the local level, I estimate the impact of income distribution on municipal policy. This paper is the first to investigate this issue by simultaneously using a high number of comparable observations and identifying deciles of the income distribution which matter. After controlling for municipal fixed effects and for the dynamics of municipal incumbents' decisions, I find no impact of income inequality on operating spending, but a strong positive impact on municipal infrastructures. Evidence suggests that an increase in income inequality by 1% leads on average to an increase in the value of municipal infrastructures between 0.06% and 0.18%. Importantly, I find that this result is driven by variations in bottom and top deciles. There is clear evidence that additive public facilities associated to more inequality are due to higher tax rates. When poorest individuals get poorer, or when richest ones get richer, municipal incumbents decide to increase the amount of infrastructures by increasing local taxation. These results suggest that what matter in public decisions are the extreme parts of voters' income distribution, and that lower bottom incomes and higher top ones both lead to a higher size of government.

This paper brings new evidence on the impact of income inequality on public decisions. Using a new panel database on French municipalities' accounts, and on households' income distribution at the local level, I estimate the impact of income distribution on municipal policy. This paper is the first to investigate this issue by simultaneously using a high number of comparable observations and identifying deciles of the income distribution which matter. After controlling for municipal fixed effects and for the dynamics of municipal incumbents' decisions, I find no impact of income inequality on operating spending, but a strong positive impact on municipal infrastructures. Evidence suggests that an increase in income inequality by 1% leads on average to an increase in the value of municipal infrastructures between 0.06% and 0.18%. Importantly, I find that this result is driven by variations in bottom and top deciles. There is clear evidence that additive public facilities associated to more inequality are due to higher tax rates. When poorest individuals get poorer, or when richest ones get richer, municipal incumbents decide to increase the amount of infrastructures by increasing local taxation. These results suggest that what matter in public decisions are the extreme parts of voters' income distribution, and that lower bottom incomes and higher top ones both lead to a higher size of government.

This paper brings new evidence on the impact of income inequality on public decisions. Using a new panel database on French municipalities' accounts, and on households' income distribution at the local level, I estimate the impact of income distribution on municipal policy. This paper is the first to investigate this issue by simultaneously using a high number of comparable observations and identifying deciles of the income distribution which matter. After controlling for municipal fixed effects and for the dynamics of municipal incumbents' decisions, I find no impact of income inequality on operating spending, but a strong positive impact on municipal infrastructures. Evidence suggests that an increase in income inequality by 1% leads on average to an increase in the value of municipal infrastructures between 0.06% and 0.18%. Importantly, I find that this result is driven by variations in bottom and top deciles. There is clear evidence that additive public facilities associated to more inequality are due to higher tax rates. When poorest individuals get poorer, or when richest ones get richer, municipal incumbents decide to increase the amount of infrastructures by increasing local taxation. These results suggest that what matter in public decisions are the extreme parts of voters' income distribution, and that lower bottom incomes and higher top ones both lead to a higher size of government.

This thesis aims at bringing new knowledge on political factors and processes affecting local governments. This investigation is made through an empirical analysis of French municipalities' accounts. The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of links between politicians of different tiers of government on the territorial allocation of public investment funds. The analysis focuses on discretionary investment grants received by municipalities. Evidence shows an important impact of multiple office-holding, and a significant influence of top national politicians' career in local councils on the allocation of these transfers. The third chapter of this thesis aims at studying the impact of local income inequality on local public decisions. This work contributes to an important literature in Political Economy on the impact of income distribution on political processes. Evidence suggests a significant role of income inequality on local public investment and local taxation. ; Cette thèse a pour but de contribuer à la connaissance des facteurs et processus politiques agissant sur les finances des collectivités locales. Cette problématique est étudiée à partir d'une analyse empirique des comptes des communes françaises. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse visent à étudier les liens entre décideurs politiques de différents échelons de pouvoir public et leur impact sur l'allocation territoriale de fonds publics d'investissement. L'analyse se concentre sur les subventions d'investissement reçues par les municipalités, et montre un impact important du cumul des mandats ainsi que de la carrière d'élu local des responsables politiques nationaux sur l'allocation de ces transferts. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse vise à évaluer l'impact des inégalités de revenu au niveau municipal sur les décisions de finance publique locale. Cette analyse s'inscrit dans une abondante littérature en Économie Politique visant à déterminer l'impact de la distribution des revenus sur les processus de décision publique. Les résultats montrent un rôle significatif des inégalités de revenu sur les niveaux d'infrastructure publique municipale et de taxation locale.

This paper brings new evidence on the politics of intergovernmental grants. I focus on multiple office-holding (i.e. whether a local incumbent who has concurrently a seat at an upper layer of government gets more funds from this layer). By using a new panel database on French local governments' accounts, I focus on grants counties allocate to municipalities. For identification, I rely on close electoral races. I find that aligned multiple office-holders (mayors who also have a seat in the majority group of the county council) get on average 28% more grants for their municipality than other municipal incumbents. Evidence on the heterogeneity of this effect suggests that grantors' information on potential recipients, as well as local incumbents' access to upper layers politicians, are key determinants in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.

This thesis aims at bringing new knowledge on political factors and processes affecting local governments. This investigation is made through an empirical analysis of French municipalities' accounts. The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of links between politicians of different tiers of government on the territorial allocation of public investment funds. The analysis focuses on discretionary investment grants received by municipalities. Evidence shows an important impact of multiple office-holding, and a significant influence of top national politicians' career in local councils on the allocation of these transfers. The third chapter of this thesis aims at studying the impact of local income inequality on local public decisions. This work contributes to an important literature in Political Economy on the impact of income distribution on political processes. Evidence suggests a significant role of income inequality on local public investment and local taxation. ; Cette thèse a pour but de contribuer à la connaissance des facteurs et processus politiques agissant sur les finances des collectivités locales. Cette problématique est étudiée à partir d'une analyse empirique des comptes des communes françaises. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse visent à étudier les liens entre décideurs politiques de différents échelons de pouvoir public et leur impact sur l'allocation territoriale de fonds publics d'investissement. L'analyse se concentre sur les subventions d'investissement reçues par les municipalités, et montre un impact important du cumul des mandats ainsi que de la carrière d'élu local des responsables politiques nationaux sur l'allocation de ces transferts. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse vise à évaluer l'impact des inégalités de revenu au niveau municipal sur les décisions de finance publique locale. Cette analyse s'inscrit dans une abondante littérature en Économie Politique visant à déterminer l'impact de la distribution des revenus sur les processus de décision publique. ...

This paper brings new evidence on the politics of intergovernmental grants. I focus on multiple office-holding (i.e. whether a local incumbent who has concurrently a seat at an upper layer of government gets more funds from this layer). By using a new panel database on French local governments' accounts, I focus on grants counties allocate to municipalities. For identification, I rely on close electoral races. I find that aligned multiple office-holders (mayors who also have a seat in the majority group of the county council) get on average 28% more grants for their municipality than other municipal incumbents. Evidence on the heterogeneity of this effect suggests that grantors' information on potential recipients, as well as local incumbents' access to upper layers politicians, are key determinants in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.

This thesis aims at bringing new knowledge on political factors and processes affecting local governments. This investigation is made through an empirical analysis of French municipalities' accounts. The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of links between politicians of different tiers of government on the territorial allocation of public investment funds. The analysis focuses on discretionary investment grants received by municipalities. Evidence shows an important impact of multiple office-holding, and a significant influence of top national politicians' career in local councils on the allocation of these transfers. The third chapter of this thesis aims at studying the impact of local income inequality on local public decisions. This work contributes to an important literature in Political Economy on the impact of income distribution on political processes. Evidence suggests a significant role of income inequality on local public investment and local taxation. ; Cette thèse a pour but de contribuer à la connaissance des facteurs et processus politiques agissant sur les finances des collectivités locales. Cette problématique est étudiée à partir d'une analyse empirique des comptes des communes françaises. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse visent à étudier les liens entre décideurs politiques de différents échelons de pouvoir public et leur impact sur l'allocation territoriale de fonds publics d'investissement. L'analyse se concentre sur les subventions d'investissement reçues par les municipalités, et montre un impact important du cumul des mandats ainsi que de la carrière d'élu local des responsables politiques nationaux sur l'allocation de ces transferts. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse vise à évaluer l'impact des inégalités de revenu au niveau municipal sur les décisions de finance publique locale. Cette analyse s'inscrit dans une abondante littérature en Économie Politique visant à déterminer l'impact de la distribution des revenus sur les processus de décision publique. ...

This thesis aims at bringing new knowledge on political factors and processes affecting local governments. This investigation is made through an empirical analysis of French municipalities' accounts. The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of links between politicians of different tiers of government on the territorial allocation of public investment funds. The analysis focuses on discretionary investment grants received by municipalities. Evidence shows an important impact of multiple office-holding, and a significant influence of top national politicians' career in local councils on the allocation of these transfers. The third chapter of this thesis aims at studying the impact of local income inequality on local public decisions. This work contributes to an important literature in Political Economy on the impact of income distribution on political processes. Evidence suggests a significant role of income inequality on local public investment and local taxation. ; Cette thèse a pour but de contribuer à la connaissance des facteurs et processus politiques agissant sur les finances des collectivités locales. Cette problématique est étudiée à partir d'une analyse empirique des comptes des communes françaises. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse visent à étudier les liens entre décideurs politiques de différents échelons de pouvoir public et leur impact sur l'allocation territoriale de fonds publics d'investissement. L'analyse se concentre sur les subventions d'investissement reçues par les municipalités, et montre un impact important du cumul des mandats ainsi que de la carrière d'élu local des responsables politiques nationaux sur l'allocation de ces transferts. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse vise à évaluer l'impact des inégalités de revenu au niveau municipal sur les décisions de finance publique locale. Cette analyse s'inscrit dans une abondante littérature en Économie Politique visant à déterminer l'impact de la distribution des revenus sur les processus de décision publique. Les résultats montrent un rôle significatif des inégalités de revenu sur les niveaux d'infrastructure publique municipale et de taxation locale.

This paper brings new evidence on the politics of intergovernmental grants. I focus on multiple office-holding (i.e. whether a local incumbent who has concurrently a seat at an upper layer of government gets more funds from this layer). By using a new panel database on French local governments' accounts, I focus on grants counties allocate to municipalities. For identification, I rely on close electoral races. I find that aligned multiple office-holders (mayors who also have a seat in the majority group of the county council) get on average 28% more grants for their municipality than other municipal incumbents. Evidence on the heterogeneity of this effect suggests that grantors' information on potential recipients, as well as local incumbents' access to upper layers politicians, are key determinants in the allocation of intergovernmental transfers.

This thesis aims at bringing new knowledge on political factors and processes affecting local governments. This investigation is made through an empirical analysis of French municipalities' accounts. The first two chapters of this thesis investigate the impact of links between politicians of different tiers of government on the territorial allocation of public investment funds. The analysis focuses on discretionary investment grants received by municipalities. Evidence shows an important impact of multiple office-holding, and a significant influence of top national politicians' career in local councils on the allocation of these transfers. The third chapter of this thesis aims at studying the impact of local income inequality on local public decisions. This work contributes to an important literature in Political Economy on the impact of income distribution on political processes. Evidence suggests a significant role of income inequality on local public investment and local taxation. ; Cette thèse a pour but de contribuer à la connaissance des facteurs et processus politiques agissant sur les finances des collectivités locales. Cette problématique est étudiée à partir d'une analyse empirique des comptes des communes françaises. Les deux premiers chapitres de cette thèse visent à étudier les liens entre décideurs politiques de différents échelons de pouvoir public et leur impact sur l'allocation territoriale de fonds publics d'investissement. L'analyse se concentre sur les subventions d'investissement reçues par les municipalités, et montre un impact important du cumul des mandats ainsi que de la carrière d'élu local des responsables politiques nationaux sur l'allocation de ces transferts. Le troisième chapitre de cette thèse vise à évaluer l'impact des inégalités de revenu au niveau municipal sur les décisions de finance publique locale. Cette analyse s'inscrit dans une abondante littérature en Économie Politique visant à déterminer l'impact de la distribution des revenus sur les processus de décision publique. Les résultats montrent un rôle significatif des inégalités de revenu sur les niveaux d'infrastructure publique municipale et de taxation locale.