Drug trafficking is the most visible part of the profits of organized crime, which have grown considerably since the end of the cold war. The mirror of history shows us the impact of the drug trade in the colonization of Asia. The post cold war geopolitical context reproduces elements of the past, with new opportunities for drug trafficking in the globalization process, as can be seen in the example of China, and the lasting impunity in terms of money laundering. With the growing role of offshore locations in the global financial system, criminal prosperity has even affected the economic stabi
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Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse : https://www.addletonacademicpublishers.com/search-in-jsme/2818-xi-jinping-s-challenge-what-is-behind-china-s-anti-corruption-campaign ; International audience ; The unprecedented campaign against corruption appears as an answer to the erosion of the state party legitimacy, following the extent of social polarization, much higher in detailed representative surveys than in the official statistics. As the new blueprint for reform defined by the 3rd Plenum of September 2013 implies a huge transfer of resources from the party-state and elites to households and small and medium enterprises, vested interests groups tend to defend their privileges. Based on the analysis of the sociologist Sun Liping (Tsinghua University) and on extensive data, from Chinese as well as international sources, this article demonstrates that the anti-corruption campaign aims to destabilize the wall of vested interest groups which, in the name of stability, defend the anti-redistribution status quo. In the same time, anti-corruption is used as an institutional battle horse to strengthen the authority of the new secretary general and president, and to eliminate his political rivals. The recentralization of justice is supposed to control local protectionism and the foot-dragging of the local bureaucracy, which feels threatened. But this authoritarian and top-down policy tends to alienate wealthy Chinese and intellectuals, without succeeding to forge a real social coalition based on the redistribution of income, the condition for higher growth.
Article disponible en ligne à l'adresse : https://www.addletonacademicpublishers.com/search-in-jsme/2818-xi-jinping-s-challenge-what-is-behind-china-s-anti-corruption-campaign ; International audience ; The unprecedented campaign against corruption appears as an answer to the erosion of the state party legitimacy, following the extent of social polarization, much higher in detailed representative surveys than in the official statistics. As the new blueprint for reform defined by the 3rd Plenum of September 2013 implies a huge transfer of resources from the party-state and elites to households and small and medium enterprises, vested interests groups tend to defend their privileges. Based on the analysis of the sociologist Sun Liping (Tsinghua University) and on extensive data, from Chinese as well as international sources, this article demonstrates that the anti-corruption campaign aims to destabilize the wall of vested interest groups which, in the name of stability, defend the anti-redistribution status quo. In the same time, anti-corruption is used as an institutional battle horse to strengthen the authority of the new secretary general and president, and to eliminate his political rivals. The recentralization of justice is supposed to control local protectionism and the foot-dragging of the local bureaucracy, which feels threatened. But this authoritarian and top-down policy tends to alienate wealthy Chinese and intellectuals, without succeeding to forge a real social coalition based on the redistribution of income, the condition for higher growth.
As we have seen in a previous working paper (« The lion's share : What's behind China's economic slowdown ? »), China's elite have largely benefited from control of state assets and manipulation of the factors market (land, labor and capital) during the first decade of this century. Along with strong growth and social mobility, the accumulation of wealth has created some of the most flagrant social polarization worldwide, much higher than the official statistics. Instead of taking concrete measures to correct these inequalities, according to the new blueprint of reforms launched by the 3rd Plenum in November 2013, the new direction has focused on a gigantic campaign against corruption. The choice of the « tigers » targeted at the highest level reflect an aspect of political infighting. The top-down method as well as the creation of numerous « Central Leading Groups », allows the new secretary general and chairman Xi Jinping to concentrate power on a scale unprecedented since Deng Xiaoping. Behind these political stakes, the real goal of the campaign seems to destabilise vested interest groups in favor of the statuquo, but the social coalition supporting the power is still fragile, with the passive resistance of the local bureaucraties, the alienation of intellectuals and the uncertainties concerning the gains of the private sector. ; Comme nous l'avons vu dans un précédent document de travail (« La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement économique chinois »), l'élite chinoise a largement bénéficié du contrôle des actifs publics et de la manipulation du marché des facteurs (terrain, travail et capital), durant les années 2000. L'accumulation de richesses qui a suivi la forte croissance et la mobilité sociale, a créé l'une des plus fortes polarisation sociale au monde, bien supérieure aux chiffres officiels. Au lieu de prendre des mesures concrètes pour corriger ces inégalités, selon le plan de réformes lancé par le 3ème Plenum de novembre 2013, la nouvelle direction s'est concentrée sur une gigantesque campagne contre la corruption. Le choix des « tigres » visés au plus haut niveau n'est pas étranger à des règlements de compte politique. La méthode très hiérarchique et la création de nombreux « Groupes de direction centraux », permettent au nouveau secrétaire général et président de concentrer le pouvoir sur une échelle sans précédent depuis Deng Xiaoping. Au delà des ces enjeux politiques, le vrai but de la campagne semble être de déstabiliser les groupes d'intérêts en faveur du statu quo, mais la coalition sociale soutenant le pouvoir reste encore fragile, avec la résistance passive des bureaucraties locales, l'aliénation des intellectuels et les incertitudes concernant les bénéfices des réformes pour le secteur privé.
As we have seen in a previous working paper (« The lion's share : What's behind China's economic slowdown ? »), China's elite have largely benefited from control of state assets and manipulation of the factors market (land, labor and capital) during the first decade of this century. Along with strong growth and social mobility, the accumulation of wealth has created some of the most flagrant social polarization worldwide, much higher than the official statistics. Instead of taking concrete measures to correct these inequalities, according to the new blueprint of reforms launched by the 3rd Plenum in November 2013, the new direction has focused on a gigantic campaign against corruption. The choice of the « tigers » targeted at the highest level reflect an aspect of political infighting. The top-down method as well as the creation of numerous « Central Leading Groups », allows the new secretary general and chairman Xi Jinping to concentrate power on a scale unprecedented since Deng Xiaoping. Behind these political stakes, the real goal of the campaign seems to destabilise vested interest groups in favor of the statuquo, but the social coalition supporting the power is still fragile, with the passive resistance of the local bureaucraties, the alienation of intellectuals and the uncertainties concerning the gains of the private sector. ; Comme nous l'avons vu dans un précédent document de travail (« La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement économique chinois »), l'élite chinoise a largement bénéficié du contrôle des actifs publics et de la manipulation du marché des facteurs (terrain, travail et capital), durant les années 2000. L'accumulation de richesses qui a suivi la forte croissance et la mobilité sociale, a créé l'une des plus fortes polarisation sociale au monde, bien supérieure aux chiffres officiels. Au lieu de prendre des mesures concrètes pour corriger ces inégalités, selon le plan de réformes lancé par le 3ème Plenum de novembre 2013, la nouvelle direction s'est concentrée sur une gigantesque ...
As we have seen in a previous working paper (« The lion's share : What's behind China's economic slowdown ? »), China's elite have largely benefited from control of state assets and manipulation of the factors market (land, labor and capital) during the first decade of this century. Along with strong growth and social mobility, the accumulation of wealth has created some of the most flagrant social polarization worldwide, much higher than the official statistics. Instead of taking concrete measures to correct these inequalities, according to the new blueprint of reforms launched by the 3rd Plenum in November 2013, the new direction has focused on a gigantic campaign against corruption. The choice of the « tigers » targeted at the highest level reflect an aspect of political infighting. The top-down method as well as the creation of numerous « Central Leading Groups », allows the new secretary general and chairman Xi Jinping to concentrate power on a scale unprecedented since Deng Xiaoping. Behind these political stakes, the real goal of the campaign seems to destabilise vested interest groups in favor of the statuquo, but the social coalition supporting the power is still fragile, with the passive resistance of the local bureaucraties, the alienation of intellectuals and the uncertainties concerning the gains of the private sector. ; Comme nous l'avons vu dans un précédent document de travail (« La part du lion : les dessous du ralentissement économique chinois »), l'élite chinoise a largement bénéficié du contrôle des actifs publics et de la manipulation du marché des facteurs (terrain, travail et capital), durant les années 2000. L'accumulation de richesses qui a suivi la forte croissance et la mobilité sociale, a créé l'une des plus fortes polarisation sociale au monde, bien supérieure aux chiffres officiels. Au lieu de prendre des mesures concrètes pour corriger ces inégalités, selon le plan de réformes lancé par le 3ème Plenum de novembre 2013, la nouvelle direction s'est concentrée sur une gigantesque ...
Following the global crisis, the stimulus package of 2009-2010, with its huge expansion of credit, marked the end of " Cheap China ", with the underpricing of labor, capital, land, energy and currency, and disproportionally shifted growth in favor of the public sector and real estate, the lion's share of the State-Party system. The present process of deleveraging must adress the unprecedented inequities which stem from distortions in the allocations of resources and the respective functions of the central and local governments. ; Le plan de relance qui a suivi la crise globale, en 2009-2010, avec une expansion considérable du crédit, a marqué la fin de la " Chine bon marché ", avec la sous-évaluation du travail, du capital, du terrain, de l'énergie, et de la monnaie, tout en déséquilibrant fortement la croissance au profit du secteur public et de l'immobilier, la part du lion de l'État-Parti. Le processus actuel de désendettement doit régler les problèmes d'inégalités majeures qui dérivent des distorsions dans l'allocation de ressources et des fonctions respectives du gouvernement central et des gouvernements locaux.
Following the global crisis, the stimulus package of 2009-2010, with its huge expansion of credit, marked the end of " Cheap China ", with the underpricing of labor, capital, land, energy and currency, and disproportionally shifted growth in favor of the public sector and real estate, the lion's share of the State-Party system. The present process of deleveraging must adress the unprecedented inequities which stem from distortions in the allocations of resources and the respective functions of the central and local governments. ; Le plan de relance qui a suivi la crise globale, en 2009-2010, avec une expansion considérable du crédit, a marqué la fin de la " Chine bon marché ", avec la sous-évaluation du travail, du capital, du terrain, de l'énergie, et de la monnaie, tout en déséquilibrant fortement la croissance au profit du secteur public et de l'immobilier, la part du lion de l'État-Parti. Le processus actuel de désendettement doit régler les problèmes d'inégalités majeures qui dérivent des distorsions dans l'allocation de ressources et des fonctions respectives du gouvernement central et des gouvernements locaux.
