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I was much struck, in reading the interesting editorial comment on the " Interpretation of the General Pact for the Renunciation of War" in the April issue of this Journal by the observations made regarding the admissibility of extraneous evidence for the purpose of construing treaties. The learned writer expresses the view that the intent of the parties may be sought outside the text of the agreement, not only in specific reservations, but also in " interpretations, clarifications, understandings, constructions, qualifications or actual conditions set forth during the negotiations prior to the ratification." This position is assumed to have the clear sanction of international law and also to be intrinsically desirable. In venturing to make the following observations I am not moved by the effect of the application of this principle to the particular case of the Kellogg Pact. My own view is that, broadly speaking, the interpretations contained in the diplomatic correspondence are implicit in the text of the Pact itself and, therefore, it is not of much practical moment to determine their precise legal effect. But the broader question of the method of construction of treaties in general is, in my opinion, not only important, but one of the most vital in international law at the present time. It goes to the root of international life today, which is so largely and increasingly based upon conventional provisions, involving asit does the issue whether states are to be bound by the engagements they have embodied in a ratified written instrument, or by supposed intentions which may be sought elsewhere.

Accompanied by "A supplement by Alexander P. Fachiri." (82 p. 24 cm.) Published: London, Sweet and Maxwell, limited, 1927. ; Mode of access: Internet.