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Using a large administrative dataset and methods of survival analysis, I analyze for the period 1994-2008 whether new establishments' survival chances differ between East and West Germany and whether they converged over time. I find that new establishments in East Germany had relatively good survival chances between 1994 and 1997, with no big differences between East and West Germany. In 1998 and 1999 the exit hazard increased strongly in East but not in West Germany, which is likely to be due to a change in the subsidy policy affecting East Germany. Since 2000 the difference in establishments' exit hazard between East and West Germany has become smaller and towards the end of the observation period it is not statistically significant anymore. ; Anhand umfangreicher administrativer Daten untersucht diese Studie für die Jahre 1994 bis 2008 mit Methoden der Verweildaueranalyse, ob sich die Überlebenschancen neu gegründeter Betriebe zwischen West- und Ostdeutschland unterscheiden und ob sie sich im Zeitablauf angenähert haben. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Betriebe in Ostdeutschland von 1994 bis 1997 relativ gute Überlebenschancen aufweisen, die sich kaum von denen westdeutscher Betriebe unterscheiden. In den Jahren 1998 und 1999 steigt die Schließungswahrscheinlichkeit in Ostdeutschland stark an, in Westdeutschland jedoch nicht, was vermutlich auf eine Änderung der Subventionspolitik für Betriebe in Ostdeutschland zurückzuführen ist. Seit dem Jahr 2000 haben sich die Schließungswahrscheinlichkeiten von Betrieben in West- und Ostdeutschland angenähert und unterscheiden sich gegen Ende des Beobachtungszeitraums nicht mehr signifikant voneinander.

Using German survey data, we investigate the relationship between involuntary job loss and regional mobility. Our results show that job loss has a strong positive effect on the propensity to relocate. We also analyze whether the high and persistent earnings losses of displaced workers can in part be explained by limited regional mobility. Our findings do not support this conjecture as we find substantial long lasting earnings losses for both movers and stayers. In the short run, movers even face slightly higher losses, but the differences between the two groups of displaced workers are never statistically significant. This challenges whether migration is a beneficial strategy in case of involuntary job loss.

Using survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), this paper analyses to what extent alternative income sources, reactions within the household context, and redistribution by the state attenuate earnings losses after job displacement. Applying propensity score matching and fixed effects estimations, we find high individual earnings losses after job displacement and only limited convergence. Income from selfemployment slightly reduces the earnings gap and severance payments buffer losses in the short run. On the household level, we find substantial and rather persistent losses in per capita labour income. We do not find that increased labour supply by other household members contributes to the compensation of the income losses. Most importantly, our results show that redistribution within the tax and transfer system substantially mitigates income losses of displaced workers both in the short and the long run whereas other channels contribute only little.

Why does job displacement, e.g., following import competition, technological change, or economic downturns, result in permanent wage losses? The job displacement literature is silent on whether wage losses after job displacement are driven by lost firm wage premiums or worker productivity depreciations. We therefore estimate losses in wages and firm wage premiums. Premiums are measured as firm effects from a two-way fixed-effects approach, as described in Abowd, Kramarz, and Margolis (1999). Using German administrative data, we find that wage losses are, on average, fully explained by losses in firm wage premiums and that premium losses are largely permanent. We show that losses in wages and premiums are minor for workers displaced from small plants and strongly increase with pre-displacement firm size, which provides an explanation for the large and persistent wage losses that have been found in previous studies mostly focusing on displacement from large employers.

To assess to what extent collective job displacements can be regarded as unanticipated exogenous shocks for affected employees, we analyze plant-level employment patterns before bankruptcy, plant closure without bankruptcy, and mass layoff. Utilizing administrative data covering all West German private sector plants, we find no systematic employment reductions prior to mass layoffs, a strong and long-lasting reduction prior to closures, and a much shorter shadow of death preceding bankruptcy. Our analysis of worker flows underlines that bankruptcies seem to struggle for survival while closures follow a shrinking strategy. We conclude that the scope of worker anticipation of upcoming job loss is smallest for mass layoffs and largest for closures without bankruptcy.

Flexibilitätspotenziale von Individuen, Betrieben und Gesellschaften bestimmen, inwieweit Herausforderungen, wie die Covid-19-Pandemie, zu überbelastenden Krisen werden. Flexibilität als Potenzial zu begreifen, vermeidet einerseits eine vorschnelle Zustimmung oder Ablehnung der Analysekategorie "Flexibilität" und lenkt anderseits den Blick auf Ressourcen als Basis flexibler Anpassungsmöglichkeiten. Der Beitrag verdeutlicht die pandemiebedingten Veränderungen für Erwerbstätige und arbeitet die zutage getretenen Ungleichheiten in der sozialen Absicherung und der Beschäftigungssicherheit heraus. Neben sozialversicherungspflichtigen Insidern, die etwa von Kurzarbeit oder auch Arbeit im Homeoffice profitierten, sind andere Gruppen durch mangelnde Flexibilitätspotenziale gekennzeichnet, darunter Personen in ungeschützteren Erwerbsformen, arbeitslose Outsider und Jüngere. Aus bildungs-, arbeitsmarkt- und sozialpolitischer Sicht besteht die Herausforderung darin, vorausschauende Investitionen in flexibilitätsfördernde Ressourcen zum Wohle beider Seiten des Arbeitsmarktes – für Arbeitgeberinnen und Arbeitgeber sowie für Arbeitnehmerinnen und Arbeitnehmer – zu gestalten.