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The aim of this paper is to highlight the relevance of a geographical multilevel technology policy within the European Union. At the present time the European policy of innovation is a "community" policy, in other words it involves a sharing of skills. In this paper we argue that outside the problems that this situation inherently poses, this territorial organisation may be considered as an asset. We use the central concept of technology externalities, taken in its traditional shape and in its renewals, to provide theoretical justifications for a "territorialised technology policy", that is to say a policy of innovation designed and implemented on several territorial levels. Three levels are here taken into account : regional, national, European.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the relevance of a geographical multilevel technology policy within the European Union. At the present time the European policy of innovation is a "community" policy, in other words it involves a sharing of skills. In this paper we argue that outside the problems that this situation inherently poses, this territorial organisation may be considered as an asset. We use the central concept of technology externalities, taken in its traditional shape and in its renewals, to provide theoretical justifications for a "territorialised technology policy", that is to say a policy of innovation designed and implemented on several territorial levels. Three levels are here taken into account : regional, national, European.

The aim of this paper is to highlight the relevance of a geographical multilevel technology policy within the European Union. At the present time the European policy of innovation is a "community" policy, in other words it involves a sharing of skills. In this paper we argue that outside the problems that this situation inherently poses, this territorial organisation may be considered as an asset. We use the central concept of technology externalities, taken in its traditional shape and in its renewals, to provide theoretical justifications for a "territorialised technology policy", that is to say a policy of innovation designed and implemented on several territorial levels. Three levels are here taken into account : regional, national, European.

The "Geography of Innovation" is based on the desire to give empirical foundations to the explanations behind the pronounced spatial polarisation of the innovation activities. It focuses on an attempt to measure the spatial dimension of knowledge externalities, in order to reveal their role in the organisation of research systems. The aim of this paper is to survey this empirical literature in order to highlight the main results interesting for the innovation policy. This analysis emphasises one main role of technology policy : supporting the institutions which generate knowledge and learning. These are found at various territorial levels, especially within the European Union. Here attention is drawn to the regional intervention level.

The "Geography of Innovation" is based on the desire to give empirical foundations to the explanations behind the pronounced spatial polarisation of the innovation activities. It focuses on an attempt to measure the spatial dimension of knowledge externalities, in order to reveal their role in the organisation of research systems. The aim of this paper is to survey this empirical literature in order to highlight the main results interesting for the innovation policy. This analysis emphasises one main role of technology policy : supporting the institutions which generate knowledge and learning. These are found at various territorial levels, especially within the European Union. Here attention is drawn to the regional intervention level.

The "Geography of Innovation" is based on the desire to give empirical foundations to the explanations behind the pronounced spatial polarisation of the innovation activities. It focuses on an attempt to measure the spatial dimension of knowledge externalities, in order to reveal their role in the organisation of research systems. The aim of this paper is to survey this empirical literature in order to highlight the main results interesting for the innovation policy. This analysis emphasises one main role of technology policy : supporting the institutions which generate knowledge and learning. These are found at various territorial levels, especially within the European Union. Here attention is drawn to the regional intervention level.

Résumé Cet article confronte l'explication en terme d'agence des restrictions verticales aux données empiriques caractérisant les réseaux de franchises. Nous étudions l'influence des comportements potentiels de passager clandestin sur la structure des contrats, plus précisément sur la présence et l'intensité de certaines clauses. Dans les systèmes de franchise, l'opportunisme des distributeurs dégrade la réputation du réseau. Les tests économétriques menés sur données françaises permettent d'apprécier l'impact de ce problème sur l'organisation contractuelle des relations fournisseurs-détaillants. Les résultats mettent en évidence la pertinence globale du cadre analytique, mais s'avèrent contrastés selon les clauses analysées. Ils suggèrent également l'influence d'autres problématiques que les coûts d'agence dans la détermination du contenu des contrats de franchise.

Les restrictions verticales se définissent comme des clauses contractuelles imposées par un producteur, qui limitent la liberté d'action d'un ou plusieurs distributeurs. L'économétrie des contrats représente une voie de recherche intéressante pour analyser ces accords, en particulier pour mettre en évidence ce qui les motive. Elle permet de repérer les situations dans lesquelles les contraintes sont mises en place dans le but de neutraliser les externalités relatives aux relations fournisseurs-distributeurs, conformément aux enseignements de la théorie des incitations et du paradigme principal-agent. Cet article reprend les principales justifications théoriques concernant l'utilisation de restrictions verticales, puis développe un test économétrique sur un échantillon de 439 réseaux français. Les résultats sont en partie compatibles avec l'argument théorique.

Existing literature on franchising has extensively studied the presence of plural form distribution networks, where two types of vertical relationships-integration versus franchising-co-exist. However, despite the importance of monetary provisions in franchise contracts, their definition in the case of plural form networks had not been addressed. In this paper, we focus more precisely on the " share parameters " in integrated (company-owned retail outlet) and decentralized (franchised outlet) vertical contracts, respectively the commission rate and the royalty rate. We develop an agency model of payment mechanism in a two-sided moral hazard context, with one principal and two heterogenous agents distinguished by different levels of risk aversion. We define the optimal monetary provisions, and demonstrate that even in the case of segmented markets, with no correlation between demand shocks, the two rates (commission rate, royalty rate) are negatively interrelated.

This empirical article deals with the location strategy and performance outcomes of franchised chains in Brazil. Brazilian franchising has experienced vertiginous process of expansion in recent years, being present in different regions of this country of continental size, including the most remote and less developed. Based on the background literature in economics and management regarding location choices and spatial competition in retailing, we use a new and unique dataset to distinguish several behavior categories in spatial strategies of franchising chains in Brazil, via a two-step cluster analysis. The performance outcomes are then studied with econometric estimations on panel data. Our results provide evidence that the choice for agglomeration, and the location in areas with a high population and a high human development index, lead to higher chain performances.