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This paper argues that the key issue for defining and solving the Eurozone's (EZ) difficulties lies in readjusting the relationship between the centre and the periphery of the EZ. Our argument proceeds in two steps. Firstly, the basic finance problem of a centre-periphery system is captured by a threat game with perfect but incomplete information. To get close to the essence of today's crisis we analyze to what extent a "troubled" periphery EZ member can negotiate a bailout from the center due to the existence of a negative externality arising from its potential default. Secondly, we analyze how establishing "exit rules", which have recently also been advocated by Jacques Delors, would shift the centre-periphery relationship in a way that safeguard the stability of the EZ. We demonstrate that such rules may help limiting the scope for brinkmanship whereby fiscal problems in one member create a negative externality for the rest of the EZ. We show that such rules will strengthen the EZ through at least four channels. -- sovereign debt crisis ; Eurozone ; Euro ; exit rules ; bail-out ; political economics ; game theory

In diesem Beitrag werfen wir einen Blick auf die 'TARGET2-Debatte', die insbesondere durch die Beiträge von Hans-Werner Sinn (exemplarisch: 2011a-d), John Whittaker (2011), und Ende letzten Jahres bereits durch Peter Garber (2010) initiiert worden ist. Die fachliche Auseinandersetzung hat auf internationaler Ebene vor allem im Anschluss an Sinn (2011c) und den darauf folgenden Reaktionen von Buiter et al. (2011) und Whelan (2011) reichlich Fahrt aufgenommen. In der deutsch¬sprachigen Öffentlichkeit findet eine Diskussion vor allem in der Frankfurter Allgemeinen Zeitung (z.B. Ruhkamp 2011) und dem Handelsblatt (z.B. Storbeck 2011) statt. Wir betrachten die 'TARGET2-Debatte' aus dem Blickwinkel der intertemporalen Zahlungsbilanztheorie unter beson¬derer Berücksichtigung realwirtschaftlicher Zusammenhänge. In dieser Hinsicht tragen wir nicht nur zu einer stärkeren Systematisierung der einzelnen Argumente in der Debatte bei. Vielmehr verhilft diese Betrachtung dazu, die hinter den gegenwärtig relative hohen Salden im Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross settlement Express Transfer system (TARGET2) stehenden fundamentalen Konstruktionsfehler im Eurosystem zu verstehen und angemessene Politik¬impli¬kationen abzuleiten. Aus unserer Sicht zeigen die jetzigen Verwerfungen im Eurosystem nur das Fehlen eines wirksamen, marktkonformen Preisanpassungsmechanismus im Euroraum auf, das in einen nach wie vor fortlaufenden Aufbau nicht nachhaltiger Nettovermögenspositionen bzw. Netto¬auslandsschulden mündet. Ein von uns favorisierte Lösungsansatz zielt deshalb auf eine Einführung von Verschuldungs- bzw. Ziehungsrechten insbesondere für Zentralbankkredite ab. Ein derartiger 'Kreditemissionshandel' würde eine marktkonformer Bepreisung der von Sinn (2011b) als 'Kredit¬ersatzpolitik' apostrophierten Verschuldung erlauben und damit zu einer effizienteren realwirt¬schaft¬lichen Allokation im Eurosystem bzw. Euroraum beitragen.

This article deals with the macro-economics of the Trans-European Automated Real-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). It is shown that TARGET2 contrib-utes to a misallocation of real resources. The discussion high-lights that there are no tendencies for rebalancing TARGET2 claims and liabilities, but rather a dynamic towards infinite and prolonged TARGET2 imbalances in the form of hysteresis.

This article deals with the macro-economics of the Trans-European Automated Re- al-time Gross Settlement Express Transfer System (TARGET2). Originally, the TARGET2 was in-tended to solely function as a monetary arrangement for liquidity issues. It is shown that the TARGET2 contributes to a substantial misallocation of real resources within the Eurozone (EZ). The discussion highlights that there are no tendencies for rebalancing TARGET2-claims and liabilities, but rather a dynamic towards infinite and prolonged TARGET2-imbalances in the form of hysteresis.

The Greek bail-out was highly controversial. An oft-heard assessment is that i) the bail-out was a mistake, ii) the political haggling over it was irrational and iii) the bail-out will create a moral hazard problem. Contrary to this view, our analysis suggests that, given EMU's present political-economic set-up, i) the bail-out was unavoidable, ii) the lengthy process of political haggling leading to it was understandable, and iii) the bail-out does not have to be necessarily associated with a future moral hazard problem. Based on our analysis, we suggest that the EMU's institutional design could be improved by establishing 'exit rules' and that bail-outs should be made rule-based. We have based our analysis on a political-economic, game-theoretic model that helps to understand why and how the parties involved in the Greek crisis arrived at the bail-out and on what conditions the final solution depended. The model allows tracing analytically the dynamics of the negotiation processes as well as the conditions and parameters on which the scope and limits of fiscal redistribution in EMU depends. In doing so, we formally take account of the 'negative externality' problem that has been central to policy debates related to the EMU's institutional design and has played an important role in the Greek crisis. However, contrary to the existing literature, we do not only focus on the economic aspects of such negative externality, but also look at where they emanate from and interact with political factors, in particular the dynamics of the political negotiation process within the EMU. -- Greek crisis ; bail-out ; negative externality ; political economics ; game theory ; euro ; EMU

Mit dem anstehenden Staatsanleihen-Kaufprogramm 'Outright Monetary Transactions' (OMT) der Europäischen Zentralbank (EZB) in Verbindung mit dem kürzlich eingesetzten Europäischen Stabilitätsmechanismus (ESM) hat das Thema 'monetäre Staatsfinanzierung' viel Aufmerksamkeit erfahren (z.B. Vaubel 2012). Im Folgenden wird aus geldtheoretischer Sicht unter besonderer Berücksichtigung rechtswissenschaftlicher Überlegungen (s. Ohler 2008 mit einem ähnlichen Ansatz) diskutiert, inwieweit die beiden jüngsten europäischen Krisenmechanismen im Verbund miteinander eine monetäre Staatsfinanzierung begünstigen. Im Mittelpunkt der Betrachtung stehen dabei elementare Anforderungen an eine nachhaltige Geldord nung. Dabei wird Geld als wirtschaftliche Institution betrachtet und die Funktionen 'Kreditgeber der letzten Hand' und 'Garant der letzten Instanz' voneinander unterschieden. Diese wesentlichen Aspekte einer nachhaltigen Geldordnung werden in den aktuellen Debatten häufig durcheinander gebracht (z.B. De Grauwe 2012). Es wird aufgezeigt, dass insbesondere Interventionen via OMT aus geldtheoretischer Sicht eine bedenkliche Form monetärer Staatsfinanzierung darstellen. Diese legen nicht nur den Grundstein für eine zukünftige Nachfrageinflation, sondern läuten wohl auch das Ende der bisherigen europäischen Geld(un)ordnung ein.

This work examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the context of the eastward enlargement of the eurozone. The analysis shows that prospective members of the EMU are likely to pass on some of the incurred Maastricht costs of convergence to the current EMU-members. The transmission mechanism is an altered exchange-rate policy that is carried out utilizing a ""threaten-thy-neighbour""-strategy. The nature of the arising conflict between current and prospective EMU-members originates form both parties' admitted inclination to complete the enlargement process, complicated by their disinclination to bear the costs. The ensuing moral-hazard behaviour of the CEECs proves to be one of brinkmanship. The subsequent bargaining game results in a robust outcome most likely in terms of providing extra European funding. This may then ensure a stabilization of the CEECs' convergence toward the EMU, and a successful completion of eastward enlargement of the eurozone.

Following entrance into the European Union, Central Eastern European Countries (CEECs) are expected to join the European Monetary Union (EMU). These countries may incur considerable costs over the course of their passing through the required Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM-II). However, with enough bargaining leverage CEECs may be able to pass some of these costs on to current EMU-members. In turn, a CEEC's leverage depends on their ability to wield successful brinkmanship via an exchange-rate policy characterized by a 'threaten-thy-neighbor' strategy. A two-stage Nash-threat game captures the essentials of the CEECs' phase of ERM-II pass through.

Exchange-rate policies of Central Eastern European Countries (CEEC) have often been a subject matter. Yet, some new insights in terms of political economy considerations upon exchange-rate policy are provided. It is pointed out that it is more appropriate to analyse exchange-rate policy in course of Exchange Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) with regard to a changing incentive structure. In doing so, considerable moral hazard problems become apparent. ERM II shall provide for an adequate level of convergence between prospective and current members of European Monetary Union (EMU). However, this institutional arrangement and, particularly, its impact on the incentives for exchange-rate policy making might enable CEEC to load considerable costs of convergence onto current members. Accordingly, the phase of ERM II is considered to be a bargaining on the distribution of costs of convergence between prospective and current members of EMU. In return, accession countries would offer to maintain public support for European integration. The CEEC' leverage in this bargaining rests on brinkmanship, i.e. putting exchange-rate regimes at risk, thus possibly undermining the according public support. This paper delineates the basic assumptions and conditions for successful brinkmanship, points out the specific transmission mechanisms, and characterises this kind of exchange-rate policy as 'threaten-thy-neighbour'. Overall analysis results in a cautious outlook on probable effects of such strategic exchange-rate policies on European institutional and economic matters.

This work examines the political economy of exchange-rate policies in the eastward expansion of the eurozone. Analysis shows that prospective members of the EMU are likely to pass on some costs of convergence to the current EMU members. The mechanism is an altered exchange-rate policy that utilizes a 'threaten-thy-neighbour' strategy. This could ensure a stabilization of the CEECs' convergence toward the EMU, and a successful eastward enlargement of the eurozone.

The Exchange-Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) is a Maastricht convergence criterion with which Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) must comply before they are admitted to the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, EMU accession is not a 'free lunch' as it entails so-called costs of convergence. Starting from the point of view that these new members of the European Union (EU) are in fact credibly committed to joining the EMU for political reasons - that is, ensuring political stability in CEECs - it is demonstrated that CEECs are able to pass some costs of convergence on to current EMU members: CEECs will under identifiable conditions threaten to halt the entire enlargement process by putting their exchange-rate regimes and, as a result, political stability at risk. In line with this rationale, the entire process of transition within ERM II, can be modelled as a two-stage threat game, which may be solved by a Rubinstein bargaining solution.

The Exchange-Rate Mechanism II (ERM II) is a Maastricht convergence criterion with which Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) must comply before they are admitted to the European Monetary Union (EMU). However, EMU accession is not a 'free lunch' as it entails so-called costs of convergence. Starting from the point of view that these new members of the European Union (EU) are in fact credibly committed to joining the EMU for political reasons -- that is, ensuring political stability in CEECs -- it is demonstrated that CEECs are able to pass some costs of convergence on to current EMU members: CEECs will under identifiable conditions threaten to halt the entire enlargement process by putting their exchange-rate regimes and, as a result, political stability at risk. In line with this rationale, the entire process of transition within ERM II, can be modelled as a two-stage threat game, which may be solved by a Rubinstein bargaining solution. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright 2007.]