Wages and Recruitment: Evidence from External Wage Changes
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4078
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4078
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Working paper
In: American economic review, Band 101, Heft 3, S. 460-465
ISSN: 1944-7981
This paper utilizes a Norwegian experiment with exogenous wage changes to study teachers' turnover decisions. Within a completely centralized wage setting system, teachers in schools with a high degree of teacher vacancies in the past got a wage premium of about 10 percent during the period 1993–94 to 2002–03. The empirical strategy exploits that several schools switched status during the empirical period. In a fixed effects framework, I find that the wage premium reduces the probability of voluntary quits by six percentage points, which implies a short run labor supply elasticity of about 1¼.
In: Journal of labor economics: JOLE, Band 28, Heft 2, S. 237-266
ISSN: 1537-5307
In: The Manchester School, Band 72, Heft 4, S. 515-534
ISSN: 1467-9957
This paper compares union wage bargaining outcomes across different types of employers. Five different employer objectives are discussed: profit, welfare and output maximization, and two specifications of a Leviathan. The model shows that the ordering of the union wage level across employer types depends on the functional form of product demand. With constant elasticity of product demand wage tends to be lowest in the output maximization case, while with a linear product demand wage tends to be lowest under welfare maximization.
In: European journal of political economy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 75-99
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: European journal of political economy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 75-99
ISSN: 0176-2680
This paper considers collective bargaining in a public-sector institutional setting. The model demonstrates how budget constraints & hierarchical structure affect the bargaining outcome. A trade union bargains over wage & employment either with an output-maximizing bureau or the bureau's sponsoring institution. The slope of the contract curve depends on the bargaining level because the budget constraints differ. Various assumptions are made about the timing of the sponsor's decision concerning the budget of the bureau. Local bargaining & budget determination between the wage & employment bargains can be optimal for the sponsor because it yields a low wage. 1 Table, 2 Figures, 39 References. Adapted from the source document.
In: Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning: TfS = Norwegian journal of social research, Band 54, Heft 4, S. 438-462
ISSN: 1504-291X
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 3313
SSRN
In: Economics of education review, Band 24, Heft 6, S. 611-631
ISSN: 0272-7757
In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 1629
SSRN
In: The journal of policy reform, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 195-227
ISSN: 1477-2736
In: Economics of education review, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 361-373
ISSN: 0272-7757
In: European Journal of Political Economy, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 299-314
In: European journal of political economy, Band 13, Heft 2, S. 299
ISSN: 0176-2680
In: CESifo working paper 2383
In: Labour markets
Student achievement has been identified as important contributor to economic growth. This paper investigates the relationship between redistributive government activities and investment in human capital measured by student performance in international comparative tests in Mathematics and Science during the period 1980 to 2003. In fixed effects panel models, government consumption, government social expenditures, and the progressivity of the income tax system have negative effects on student achievement. We report results from a variety of model specifications and social expenditure components, and our best estimate indicates that increased government size by 10 percent reduces student achievement by 0.1 standard deviations.