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"This book analyzes Chinese nationalism from the perspective of social economics. It posits a conceptual framework in which national status is treated as a "luxury" while material consumption is considered as a "necessity" in people's preferences, which implies that popular nationalism tends to increase with economic development. The book extensively uses the tools of game theory and behavioral economics to analyze inter-ethnical and international conflicts in historical and contemporary China. The author's economic approach to the subject of nationalism brings fresh and critical insights into the Chinese historical events and relations with foreign countries. For example, it helps resolve the following puzzles: Why did most Chinse support an ethnic minority, the Manchus, to be their ruler after the collapse of the Ming Dynasty? In the Boxer Rebellion, why did the Qing Dynasty declare war against more than eight foreign powers when it knew well that any of the countries could defeat China easily? What are the fundamental causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War? Who is responsible for the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade? This book attempts to answer the questions based on the theories of social economics and rational choice, which will interest those researching on nationalism, China studies, international relations, history and political economy. This book may be interesting to the readers of international relations and, China studies"--

This book analyzes Chinese nationalism from the perspective of social economics. It posits a conceptual framework in which national status is treated as a "luxury" while material consumption is considered as a "necessity" in people's preferences, which implies that popular nationalism tends to increase with economic development. The book extensively uses the tools of game theory and behavioral economics to analyze inter-ethnical and international conflicts in historical and contemporary China. The author's economic approach to the subject of nationalism brings fresh and critical insights into the Chinese historical events and relations with foreign countries. For example, it helps resolve the following puzzles: Why did most Chinese support an ethnic minority, the Manchus, to be their ruler after the collapse of the Ming dynasty? In the Boxer Rebellion, why did the Qing dynasty declare war against more than eight foreign powers when it knew well that any of the countries could defeat China easily? What are the fundamental causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War? Who is responsible for the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade? This book attempts to answer the questions based on the theories of social economics and rational choice, which will interest those researching on nationalism, China studies, international relations, history and political economy.

This book analyzes Chinese nationalism from the perspective of social economics. It posits a conceptual framework in which national status is treated as a "luxury" while material consumption is considered as a "necessity" in people's preferences, which implies that popular nationalism tends to increase with economic development. The book extensively uses the tools of game theory and behavioral economics to analyze inter-ethnical and international conflicts in historical and contemporary China. The author's economic approach to the subject of nationalism brings fresh and critical insights into the Chinese historical events and relations with foreign countries. For example, it helps resolve the following puzzles: Why did most Chinese support an ethnic minority, the Manchus, to be their ruler after the collapse of the Ming dynasty? In the Boxer Rebellion, why did the Qing dynasty declare war against more than eight foreign powers when it knew well that any of the countries could defeat China easily? What are the fundamental causes of the 1962 Sino-Indian War and the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War? Who is responsible for the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade? This book attempts to answer the questions based on the theories of social economics and rational choice, which will interest those researching on nationalism, China studies, international relations, history and political economy.

Abstract.  This paper provides a model of involuntary unemployment by combining the insights of the sticky wage theory and the efficiency wage theory. It implies that employed workers tend to supply more effort in response to economic downturns. Thus, a negative shock to an economy has intriguing impacts on the unemployment. The model also shows that a negative demand shock may have a relatively small effect on output since changes in work effort serve to partially mitigate the effects of the shock. Moreover, it yields some implications that complement the existing 'work sharing' literature.

This paper examines the roles of quality and increasing returns in trade. It implies that there is intense intra‐industry trade among economies with similar levels of per capita income, which increases both the quality and the quantity of consumption. However, there may be no trade in manufactured goods between rich and poor countries because of the disparity in their optimal qualities of consumption and the high complementarity of the qualities of intermediate goods in production. Thus, it helps explain the observed trade patterns. Moreover, the model shows that a smaller country is more likely to engage in international trade.

An increase in the probability of work abroad, where the returns to schooling are higher than at home, induces more individuals in a developing country to acquire education, which leads to an increase in the supply of educated workers in the domestic labor market. Where there is a sticky wage-rate, the demand for labor at home will be constant. With a rising supply and constant demand, the rate of unemployment of educated workers in the domestic labor market will increase. Thus, the prospect of employment abroad causes involuntary 'educated unemployment' at home. A government that is concerned about 'educated unemployment' and might therefore be expected to encourage unemployed educated people to migrate will nevertheless, under certain conditions, elect to restrict the extent of the migration of educated individuals.

An increase in the probability of work abroad, where the returns to schooling are higher than at home, induces more individuals in a developing country to acquire education, which leads to an increase in the supply of educated workers in the domestic labor market. Where there is a sticky wage-rate, the demand for labor at home will be constant. With a rising supply and constant demand, the rate of unemployment of educated workers in the domestic labor market will increase. Thus, the prospect of employment abroad causes involuntary educated unemployment at home. A government that is concerned about educated unemployment and might therefore be expected to encourage unemployed educated people to migrate will nevertheless, under certain conditions, elect to restrict the extent of the migration of educated individuals.

Abstract This paper analyzes the interaction between firms' investment in general skills training and workers' incentives. It shows that when a firm has an informational advantage over its workers, its provision of free general skills training can serve as a signal that there will be a long‐term relationship between the firm and its workers. This signal induces the workers to exert more effort in learning firm‐specific skills, which enhances the firm's profits. In contrast with most of the existing literature, the model implies that firms may provide free general skills training even if there is no labour market friction.

A new general-equilibrium model that links together rural-to-urban migration, the externality effect of the average level of human capital, and agglomeration economies shows that in developing countries, unrestricted rural-to-urban migration reduces the average income of both rural and urban dwellers in equilibrium. Various measures aimed at curtailing rural-to-urban migration by unskilled workers can lead to a Pareto improvement for both the urban and rural dwellers. In addition, the government can raise social welfare by reducing the migration of skilled workers to the city. Moreover, without a restriction on rural-to-urban migration, a government's efforts to increase educational expenditure and thereby the number of skilled workers may not increase wage rates in the rural or urban areas.

AbstractExtending both the 'harmful brain drain' literature and the 'beneficial brain gain' literature, this paper analyzes both the negative and the positive impact of migration by skilled individuals in a unified framework. The paper extends the received literature on the 'harmful brain drain' by showing that in the short run, international migration can result in 'educated unemployment' and overeducation in developing countries, as well as a brain drain from these countries. A simulation suggests that the costs of 'educated unemployment' and overeducation can amount to significant losses for the individuals concerned, who may constitute a substantial proportion of the educated individuals. Adopting a dynamic framework, it is then shown that due to the positive externality effect of the prevailing, economy‐wide endowment of human capital on the formation of human capital, a relaxation in migration policy in both the current period and the preceding period can facilitate 'take‐off' of a developing country in the current period. Thus, it is suggested that while the migration of some educated individuals may reduce the social welfare of those who stay behind in the short run, it improves it in the long run.