Suchergebnisse

We work with a newly developed method to empirically assess whether a specified new-Keynesian business cycle monetary model estimated with U.S. quarterly data is consistent with a unique equilibrium or multiple equilibria under rational expectations. We conduct classical tests to verify if the structural model is correctly specified. Conditional on a positive answer, we formally assess if such model is either consistent with a unique equilibrium or with indeterminacy. Importantly, our full-system approach requires neither the use of prior distributions nor that of nonstandard inference. The case of an indeterminate equilibrium in the pre-1984 sample and of a determinate equilibrium in the post-1984 sample is favored by the data. The long-run coefficients on inflation and the output gap in the monetary policy rule are found to be weakly identified. However, our results are further supported by a proposed identification-robust indicator of indeterminacy.

This article explores the meanings and uses of the term sem terra (landless) in relation to the social movement MST and tries to provide provisory answers to the following questions: What is the relationship between small landholders, rural workers, and the term sem terra ? Is the idea of sem terra class-based or does it stretch beyond "class"? Which rural populations use the term sem terra to identify themselves? Does sem terra continue to be a useful tool for MST participants who have already obtained stable access to land? Finally, do different (and conflicting) meanings of sem terra exist for the leaders of the MST and the rank-and-file members? The sources for the present article are the interviews collected during field research, some texts published by the MST, and general sources about the matter.

To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

To unveil the strategic interaction between the government and the labour union in a unionised economy, a policy-game model is estimated by cointegrated Vector Autoregressive system using Italian quarterly data (1960-2009) on government budget surplus (fiscal efforts), hours not worked (strikes), unemployment and real wages. The long-run cointegration relationships are interpreted as the players' reaction functions and the long-run equilibrium as the equilibrium of the game. The identification of the long-run cointegration relationships allows indeed to determine if efforts and strikes are strategic complements or strategic substitutes. Finally, speed of long-run adjustment provides insights about the effectiveness of government and labour union strategies.

How large are government spending and tax multipliers? The fiscal proxy-SVAR literature provides heterogenous estimates, depending on which proxies - fiscal or non-fiscal - are used to identify fiscal shocks. We reconcile the existing estimates via a flexible vector autoregressive model that allows to achieve identification in presence of a number of structural shocks larger than that of the available instruments. Our two main findings are the following. First, the estimate of the tax multiplier is sensitive to the assumption of orthogonality between total factor productivity (non-fiscal proxy) and tax shocks. If this correlation is assumed to be zero, the tax multiplier is found to be around one. If such correlation is nonzero, as supported by our empirical evidence, we find a tax multiplier three times as large. Second, we find the spending multiplier to be robustly larger than one across different models that feature different sets of instruments. Our results are robust to the joint employment of different fiscal and non-fiscal instruments.

How large are government spending and tax multipliers? The fiscal proxy-SVAR literature provides heterogenous estimates, depending on which proxies - fiscal or non-fiscal - are used to identify fiscal shocks. We reconcile the existing estimates via a flexible vector autoregressive model that allows to achieve identification in presence of a number of structural shocks larger than that of the available instruments. Our two main findings are the following. First, the estimate of the tax multiplier is sensitive to the assumption of orthogonality between total factor productivity (non-fiscal proxy) and tax shocks. If this correlation is assumed to be zero, the tax multiplier is found to be around one. If such correlation is non-zero, as supported by our empirical evidence, we find a tax multiplier three times as large. Second, we find the spending multiplier to be robustly larger than one across different models that feature different sets of instruments. Our results are robust to the joint employment of different fiscal and non-fiscal instruments.