"In this book, Benjamin Farrer explains how activists can influence the policies they care about, even when they are outnumbered and their issues are ignored. The solution lies in a surprising place: organizational choice. Different types of organizations will be more influential under particular democratic institutions. If they choose the optimal type of organization - given their institutional context - then even minority groups can be influential. Environmentalists are a key example of how small groups can sometimes punch above their weight. Environmentalists in different countries have made different organizational choices. These choices explain whether or not they succeeded in influencing policy. In the empirical chapters that follow, Farrer shows that environmentalists can sometimes be more influential if they form interest groups, but under other institutions, political parties are the optimal organizational choice. Although interest groups are often easier to create, national institutions can sometimes insulate mainstream politicians from niche interest groups. When institutions deny access to interest groups, activists are forced to send the stronger signal of party entry. Using a variety of methods, including a formal model, an experiment, and a wealth of empirical data from a variety of settings, Farrer proves that this theory of organizational choice adds to our understanding of several crucial phenomena. First, it helps explain patterns of political participation, by showing the importance of instrumental, rather than purely expressive, motivations for activism. Second, it provides an important modification to Duverger's (1954) law, by showing that new party entry is a function not only of electoral rules but also of the rules that govern interest groups. Third, it extends research on the role of institutions in determining policy outputs, by showing that policy outcomes are a function of the interaction between organizational choices and institutional context."--Provided by publisher.
"In this book, Benjamin Farrer explains how activists can influence the policies they care about, even when they are outnumbered and their issues are ignored. The solution lies in a surprising place: organizational choice. Different types of organizations will be more influential under particular democratic institutions. If they choose the optimal type of organization - given their institutional context - then even minority groups can be influential. Environmentalists are a key example of how small groups can sometimes punch above their weight. Environmentalists in different countries have made different organizational choices. These choices explain whether or not they succeeded in influencing policy. In the empirical chapters that follow, Farrer shows that environmentalists can sometimes be more influential if they form interest groups, but under other institutions, political parties are the optimal organizational choice. Although interest groups are often easier to create, national institutions can sometimes insulate mainstream politicians from niche interest groups. When institutions deny access to interest groups, activists are forced to send the stronger signal of party entry.?Using a variety of methods, including a formal model, an experiment, and a wealth of empirical data from a variety of settings, Farrer proves that this theory of organizational choice adds to our understanding of several crucial phenomena. First, it helps explain patterns of political participation, by showing the importance of instrumental, rather than purely expressive, motivations for activism. Second, it provides an important modification to Duverger's (1954) law, by showing that new party entry is a function not only of electoral rules but also of the rules that govern interest groups. Third, it extends research on the role of institutions in determining policy outputs, by showing that policy outcomes are a function of the interaction between organizational choices and institutional context."--Provided by publisher.
In this article, we argue that many contemporary challenges to democracy can be traced back to how political organizations compete for attention. We begin with the idea that these organizations appeal for attention both by mobilizing their own members, and also through media that reaches a wider audience, such as social media and mass media. But since many organizations are competing for the limited attention of this wider audience, they all have an incentive to send "too many" and "too sensational" messages. This overwhelms the audience and leads to polarization and populism. Our article describes the conditions necessary for this "tragedy of the commons" to occur and also reviews empirical evidence demonstrating that these conditions are met. We find that social media is not a necessary condition for the model, but does accelerate it. We conclude that Elinor Ostrom's theories of the commons are important for understanding political communication.
Existing research explains pro-environmental behavior as being motivated by personal values. In this article I extend this framework to examine not just the choice of whether to engage in pro-environmental behavior but also the choice between different pro-environmental behaviors. I argue that if several different pro-environmental behaviors all express the same personal values, and carry the same material costs, then individuals choose between them on the basis of their expected policy consequences. I report the results of a survey experiment showing that priming individuals to consider instrumental utility will cause over-reporting of some forms of environmental activism—those with the greatest expected policy impact. This prime will have no effect on over-reporting of other forms of activism. I conclude that instrumental utility is an important part of how individuals choose between types of pro-environmental political activism.
This article argues that niche party formation is only one of several substitutable strategies for niche activists seeking policy influence. Other organizational mechanisms are argued to be superior to political parties under certain institutional conditions. I introduce a formal model of how activists achieve policy influence by choosing to support the formation of whichever type of organization will optimally send a signal of electoral threat to mainstream politicians. Institutions determine the different access costs for the various organizational mechanisms that can be used to send this signal, and also determine the associated response costs to mainstream politicians of making concessions to different organizational mechanisms. Therefore under particular institutional circumstances that affect these two cost parameters, interest group entry may surpass party entry as the optimal strategy for activists. The predictions of the model are assessed via a nested logit model using cross-national survey data on how activists have allocated their individual support to different organizational mechanisms. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]
This article argues that niche party formation is only one of several substitutable strategies for niche activists seeking policy influence. Other organizational mechanisms are argued to be superior to political parties under certain institutional conditions. I introduce a formal model of how activists achieve policy influence by choosing to support the formation of whichever type of organization will optimally send a signal of electoral threat to mainstream politicians. Institutions determine the different access costs for the various organizational mechanisms that can be used to send this signal, and also determine the associated response costs to mainstream politicians of making concessions to different organizational mechanisms. Therefore under particular institutional circumstances that affect these two cost parameters, interest group entry may surpass party entry as the optimal strategy for activists. The predictions of the model are assessed via a nested logit model using cross-national survey data on how activists have allocated their individual support to different organizational mechanisms.
This report examines accuracy and bias in national and state‐level preelection polls conducted during the 2012 general election cycle. Overall, polls in 2012 were somewhat less accurate than in previous cycles, and especially as compared to 2008, and tended to overestimate Republican support at the polls. Nevertheless, these biases were generally statistically insignificant, suggesting significant bias in preelection polls was scarce in 2012. This was generally true of polls for all national and statewide contests, survey modes, sample types, time period, and survey organizations.
In: International political science review: the journal of the International Political Science Association (IPSA) = Revue internationale de science politique, Volume 40, Issue 4, p. 518-534
In this article, we argue that a deeper understanding of citizen satisfaction with democratic elections requires a global perspective. Regional research found that a gap in satisfaction with democracy emerges after an election, between those who supported winning parties and those that did not, and also, crucially, that this gap can be reduced under proportional electoral institutions. In this article we argue instead that these theories of the winner–loser gap actually apply to only a narrow set of countries. We use a comprehensive global dataset to show that the predictions of this theory about the effects of proportional institutions are accurate for Western Europe, but not outside it. Beyond a small cluster of established democracies in Western Europe, the electoral environment is characterized by more fundamental uncertainty. This uncertainty alters the incentives created by proportional institutions. We conclude that the winner–loser gap and 'losers' consent' are concepts that vary systematically around the world. We discuss the implications of this for democratic stability.
In this article we assess the electoral effects of the nomination of ethnic minority candidates. We argue that descriptive representation is an important factor in how parties in SMD systems establish their coalitions over multiple elections. We demonstrate this by showing that descriptive representation has a consistent effect on voting behavior, and thus that parties can rely on descriptive representation to win over specific segments of the voting population. Previous studies have been limited to single election years and single countries, but we collect original data from multiple election cycles in Australia and the UK to test our argument. We find that descriptive representation is consistently associated with a 10-percentage point bump in support from ethnic minority independents and Labour supporters. We conclude by highlighting the importance of this finding for party competition.