Suchergebnisse

Our goal is to examine the income inequality and welfare effects of the direct distribution of resource rents and subsequent taxation in Iran. We use rich micro survey data covering more than 36,000 Iranian households in 2009. Our micro-simulations show that the direct distribution of resource rents among all citizens and the imposition of an additional direct income tax have a significant negative effect on the household GINI index and on poverty. We also examine three alternative policies to the resource dividend (RD) policy. The results show that the RD policy is the most successful policy for addressing rents-induced inequality.

A demographic transition resulting from an increase in the size of the young working age population can be a blessing or a curse for economic performance. We focus on the political stability effects of a larger youth population and hypothesize that corruption matters in this nexus. Using panel data covering the period of 2002 - 2012 for more than 150 countries, we find a negative interaction effect between the relative size of the youth population (17 - 25 years old) within the total working age population (15 - 64 years old) and corruption on political stability. This finding is robust, controlling for country and time fixed effects and a set of control variables that may affect stability. The negative interaction term between corruption and the youth population remains robust when we control for the persistency of political stability and the possible endogeneity of the main variables of interest through dynamic panel data estimations. Our findings shed more light on the political turmoil in the Arab world, with the so-called Arab Spring.

We study how natural-resource rents affect the risk of internal conflict within countries and how the federal structure of countries influences this relationship. Natural-resource abundance may induce excessive rent-seeking and thus increase the risk of internal conflict. Fiscal and political decentralization as an institutional arrangement for rent-sharing and political codetermination of regions within a country may limit the destructive effect of the natural-resource rents on internal stability. Using cross-country and panel data covering the period 1984-2004 from more than 90 countries, we find evidence that natural-resource rents indeed increase the risk of internal conflict, but this relationship is significantly mitigated by decentralization.

This study examines the causal joint effect of a new political regime and war against Iraq on life expectancy of Iranians for the period 1978–1988 during the revolution and war. I use a synthetic control approach to construct a synthetic Iran based on a weighted average of other Middle East and North Africa ('MENA') and Organization of the Petroleum Exporting ('OPEC') countries. The synthetic Iran matches the average level of key pre-revolution life expectancy correlates and the evolution of the factual Iranian life expectancy during the post-revolution period through the end of the war. I find a sizable negative effect of the joint treatment. The results show that in total, an average Iranian has lost an accumulated 62 years of life during the post-revolution period until the end of war with Iraq in 1988. The average annual years of life lost is approximately six years. In other words, in the absence of the revolution and war, an average Iranian's life expectancy could be approximately six years longer.

We use the synthetic control method to estimate the effect of international banking and energy sanctions from 2012 to 2015 on military spending of Iran. We create a synthetic control group that mimics the socioeconomic characteristics of Iran before the international sanctions of 2012. We then compare the military spending of the counterfactual Iran without sanction to the factual Iran with sanction for the period of 2003-2015. Over the entire 2013–2015 period, per capita military spending was reduced by about 119 US$ per year on average, which amounts to approximately 54% of the 2012 baseline level. Our findings are robust to a series of tests, including placebo tests.

This study shows that the level of corruption matters in how oil rents affect the military spending within countries. Using panel data covering the 1984–2014 period for the Middle East and North Africa countries, we find that the effect of oil rents on military budget depends on the extent of political corruption. Oil wealth boosts military spending when corruption (measured by the re-scaled ICRG index) exceeds a critical score of 5 (out of 6) in the MENA region.

This study provides the first empirical investigation to test one of transmission channels of resource curse, i.e., marginalized entrepreneurship activities. Our panel data analysis of 65 countries from 2004 to 2011 shows a negative and statistically significant association between oil rents dependency and entrepreneurship indicator. This finding is robust to control of other major drivers of entrepreneurship, unobservable country and time fixed effects and a different measurement of oil rents dependency. Additionally our main results show that government effectiveness among other dimensions of good governance has a statistically significant moderating effect in entrepreneurship-oil rents nexus.