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World Affairs Online
In: Working papers 32
In: WPM
The crucial position that Saudi Arabia has in global oil markets cannot be overstated. In 2019 its proven crude oil reserves stood at 297.6 billion barrels, representing 17 per cent of the world's total. In the same year Saudi Arabia produced 11.8 million barrels per day (mb/d) of crude, blended, and unblended condensates, and natural gas liquids. The country produces a wide array of crudes, ranging from Arab Super Light all the way to Arabian Heavy. Despite rising domestic demand in the past few decades, Saudi Arabia exports the bulk of its crude production and thus has a dominant position in international trade. It is the only country that has an official policy of maintaining spare capacity that can be utilized within a relatively short time at a low cost. Saudi Arabia's reserves are also among the cheapest in the world to find, develop, and produce. In contrast to some neighbouring countries and other OPEC members, such as Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela, Saudi Arabia has not experienced conflict or political instability and has not been subject to international sanctions. It has thus been able to invest heavily in its energy sector and integrate the upstream sector with refining and downstream assets, both in the kingdom and overseas. The oil and gas sectors are also heavily integrated, given the large volumes of associated gas produced. Saudi Arabia also has also a dominant position in OPEC and historically the organization's key decisions have been shaped by the kingdom, either those related to cutting output to balance the market or increasing output to offset output disruption within OPEC and elsewhere. Although Saudi Arabia's output has not been impacted by political or military shocks it has nonetheless been highly variable reflecting the kingdom's flexibility to increase and decrease output in response to shocks. Given its size and large margins, the oil sector also plays a key role in the Saudi economy. Despite new revenue sources, the government remains highly reliant on oil revenues for its current and capital spending. Also, government spending is a key driver of growth in non-oil and private-sector activity through infrastructure investment, public sector wage bills, and social transfers. All the aforementioned features, from the size of the kingdom's reserve base and production to the high reliance of government finances on oil revenues, have shaped Saudi oil policy choices and its relations with other producers over the years. The main purpose of this paper is to analyse a range of these policy choices and relations, their determinants, and the evolving role of the oil sector in the context of an energy transition, the speed of which remains highly uncertain and its impact uneven across the globe.
BASE
The main purpose of this report is to analyse the main features of the current crude oil pricing system; to describe the structure of the main benchmarks currently used namely Brent West Texas Intermediate (WTI) and Dubai-Oman; to clearly identify the various financial layers that have emerged around these physical benchmarks; to analyse the links between the different financial layers and between the financial layers and the physical benchmarks; and then to evaluate how these links influence the price discovery and oil price formation process in the crude oil market. The report finds that the assumption that the process of identifying the price of benchmarks in the current oil pricing system can be isolated from financial layers is rather simplistic. The different layers of the oil market are highly interconnected and form a complex web of links, all of which play a role in the price discovery process. The report also calls for broadening the empirical research to include the trading strategies of physical players; any analysis limited to non-commercial participants in the futures market and their role in the oil price formation process is incomplete. The report also emphasises the distinction between trade in price differentials and trade in price levels and finds that the level of the oil price, which consumers producers and their governments are most concerned with is not the most relevant feature in the current pricing system. Instead the identification of price differentials and the adjustments in these differentials in the various layers underlie the basis of the current oil pricing system.
BASE
The oil sectors in the North African countries of Algeria, Libya, Egypt and Sudan have witnessed major transformations in the past decade or so. In Algeria, government reforms in the mid 1980s resulted in the entry of a wide range foreign oil companies to an oil sector previously dominated by the state-owned oil company. In Libya, the lift of US sanctions and the opening of the oil sector to foreign investment through a series of licensing rounds created a new dynamism not seen since the mid 1950s when the country's oil industry kicked off. Egypt's oil policy of building partnerships with foreign oil companies makes it one of the most attractive countries for foreign investment despite its mature oilfields. In Sudan, Asian national oil companies transformed the prospects of the country's oil sector. Since 1999, Sudan's oil production has been rising steadily enabling the country to join the club of oil exporters.
BASE
World Affairs Online
Intro -- Half-Title Page -- Title Page -- Contents -- List of Illustrations -- List of Contributors -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- Size of the Reserves -- 1 Estimating the Size of the Levantine East Mediterranean Hydrocarbon Basin -- Governance of the Sector -- 2 Carving Out a Role for Parliament in the Lebanese Oil and Gas Sector -- 3 Spoils of Oil? Assessing and Mitigating the Risks of Corruption in Lebanon's Emerging Offshore Petroleum Sector -- 4 Establishing a National Oil Company in Lebanon -- Management and Licensing -- 5 Licensing and Upstream Petroleum Fiscal Regimes: Assessing Lebanon's Choices -- 6 Lebanon's Gas Trading Options -- 7 Managing Oil and Gas Revenues in Lebanon -- 8 Investing Resource Wealth in a Sovereign Development Fund -- Impact and Implications -- 9 Macroeconomic Implications of Windfall Oil and Gas Revenues in Lebanon -- 10 How Will Oil Affect Lebanon's Export Opportunities? -- 11 Strengthening Environmental Governance of the Oil and Gas Sector in Lebanon -- Public Input -- 12 What Do Lebanese Citizens Want From Oil and Gas Revenues? -- Index -- Copyright.
In: The Palgrave Handbook of the International Political Economy of Energy, p. 73-94
In: The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, p. 81-97
In: The Handbook of Global Energy Policy, p. 81-97
SSRN
Working paper
While higher fuel specifications and regulatory changes in the bunkers market are most likely to have a big impact on long-term fuel oil demand, a structural shift of a similar magnitude on the supply side is already taking place, particularly in Russia, the largest exporter of fuel oil. The Russian government's firmly stated commitment to the regeneration of its country's refining industry and its determination to ensure that domestic demand for higher quality products is met would suggest that, although the exact timing of a reduction in fuel oil production may be unclear, a sharp decline in fuel oil exports by 2016 seems inevitable. We show that in the past, price relationships between high sulphur and low sulphur fuel oil and between heavy fuel oil and crude oil and diesel have been subject to structural breaks, but price movement did not increase or decrease without bounds as the refining industry continued to adjust to increasing demand for petroleum products and changing global demand patterns towards cleaner products. Looking ahead, as investment in refining capacity expands and as upgrading of refining units accelerates in Russia and elsewhere, price spreads are likely to exhibit similar behaviour to that in the past few years. This does not imply that structural breaks in the price relationships will not occur. For instance, governments' desire to implement more stringent requirements without ensuring that the refining infrastructure is ready for such a shift or delays in refining projects will most likely destabilise the behaviour of price differentials, though the timing and the nature of such potential breaks (abrupt of gradual) remain highly uncertain.
BASE
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Volume 27, Issue 1
ISSN: 1460-2121
In: Oxford review of economic policy, Volume 27, Issue 1
ISSN: 1460-2121