Suchergebnisse

Government contracting has experienced an explosion of available data in the last decade, marked by the rise of the global Open Contracting Data Standard. However, it remains largely under-utilized for Big Data analytics and embedding findings in policy making. In order to address this gap and promote the use of government administrative data for policy making, this paper provides a review on the availability, scope and quality of datasets in government contracting in 35 European countries and highlights prominent use cases to inspire policy makers and civil society. State of the art findings come from the ongoing Horizon2020-funded research project led by the University of Cambridge, called DIGIWHIST, which benchmarks, standardizes, and republishes public procurement data across Europe while also providing key performance indicators directly relevant for policy. Use cases demonstrate how civil society can use Big Data to hold governments accountable; and how governments can use advanced market analytics for detecting collusive competitors and safeguarding public spending.

Government contracting has experienced an explosion of available data in the last decade, marked by the rise of the global Open Contracting Data Standard. However, it remains largely under-utilized for Big Data analytics and embedding findings in policy making. In order to address this gap and promote the use of government administrative data for policy making, this paper provides a review on the availability, scope and quality of datasets in government contracting in 35 European countries and highlights prominent use cases to inspire policy makers and civil society. State of the art findings come from the ongoing Horizon2020-funded research project led by the University of Cambridge, called DIGIWHIST, which benchmarks, standardizes, and republishes public procurement data across Europe while also providing key performance indicators directly relevant for policy. Use cases demonstrate how civil society can use Big Data to hold governments accountable; and how governments can use advanced market analytics for detecting collusive competitors and safeguarding public spending. ; Not peer-reviewed

Résumé Les études d'impact sont devenues un outil majeur et novateur en matière de politiques publiques en Europe au cours de la dernière décennie. Ce phénomène est apparu au côté d'autres instruments, comme les indicateurs, en lien avec le développement de la culture de l'évaluation des politiques publiques ainsi que de la production normative. Bien que l'existence d'une grande variété de pratiques et d'interprétations rende difficile tout effort pour en donner une définition précise, cette contribution dresse une typologie des études d'impact en Europe fondée sur une analyse empirique de sa pratique par l'Union européenne dans 25 de ses États membres, tout en apportant une réflexion théorique portant sur l'interaction de cette forme d'expertise avec la politique.

Electronic reverse auctions are the most used competitive method for procurement of goods and non-consulting services by the Federal Government of Brazil. These auctions are closed randomly, which perfectly satisfies fairness considerations but may be suboptimal from an efficiency perspective. There are concerns that tenders are closed too early and randomness favors bidders with algorithmic bidding software, leading to high prices. Hence, this paper investigates what would happen if the random closing rule was replaced by another rule. The paper uses the complete data set of completed electronic actions in 2015–17 comprising 112 million bids for 0.9 million items purchased. Exploiting the random closing rule, simple OLS models are run with a wide set of fixed effects as well as covariates capturing competition. The findings point at alternative strategies to optimize auction design: simple actions such as increasing the average and minimum length of the random phase can result in 2.8 and 0.6 percent price savings, respectively, or R$540 million and R$116 million per year; or more complex designs such as setting the length to the maximum for the random phase if there are 15 bidders or more can yield 2.6 percent or R$ 500 million a year in price savings, or doing the same if a large discount is placed within three minutes to closing can yield 1.1 percent lower prices or R$ 210 million a year in savings.