Suchergebnisse

This assessment of the "policy-academy" gap is part of a special forum stimulated by Michael Desch's book, Cult of the Irrelevant. Those who write about the academy–policy gap worry that the gap is too narrow, resulting in ethical compromise, or too wide, resulting in marginalization of key academic voices. I argue both concerns are overdrawn. In particular, I argue that there is a healthy exchange between academic specialists and the policy community, at least as healthy as any during a mythical golden era. Moreover, quantitative methods are not a bogeyman exacerbating the gap; high-quality quantitative scholarship can make important contributions. Finally, claims that academic realists face unfair disadvantages in contributing to policy are not well-supported by the evidence. In truth, there is a fairly healthy marketplace of ideas in the policy community, at least as healthy as what prevails in the academy.

In Thanks for Your Service, Peter D. Feaver shows that the public's high confidence in the military is based partly on deservedness and partly based on an underlying partisan gap and social desirability bias: extremely high confidence levels among self-identified Republican respondents but much less among Democrats and still weaker confidence among Independents. Not only does Feaver helps us understand how and why the public has confidence in the military, but he also exposes problems that policymakers need to be aware of. Specifically, he elucidates how confidence or over-confidence in the institution shapes public attitudes on the use of force and may not support the best practices in democratic civil-military relations.

Advocates of cultivating a resignation-in-protest ethic understate the costs and exaggerate the benefits. Military officers who believe that the policymaking process is heading in a bad direction already have ample recourse in the form of advising within the chain of command. If their advice is not heeded, it is exceedingly unlikely that the country would be better served by senior officers provoking a civil–military crisis to advertise their policy differences with civilian leaders.