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Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Notes on Contributors -- List of Abbreviations and Acronyms -- Part I Conceptual Foundations -- Part II Recognition among States -- Part III Recognition of States andGovernments -- Part IV Recognition among States andNon-State Actors -- Part V Concluding Reflections -- Index

The United States has achieved an unrivalled power position in the post-Cold War world, yet at the same time has been reluctant to accept new multilateral treaty commitments. This book sheds new light on the long-standing theoretical debate about the relationship between hegemony and international cooperation.

Since being founded in 2002, the International Criminal Court has frequently intervened in ongoing conflicts and alongside other forms of coercive intervention, specifically sanctions and military measures. In this article, I argue that this pattern has been enabled by governments engaging in strategic norm linkage. To justify their positions on both judicial and non-judicial interventions, governments have discursively linked international prosecutions to the protection of civilians – in specific ways that have favoured joint judicial and non-judicial crisis responses. My argument, which I test through qualitative and quantitative content analyses of UN Security Council debates, contributes not only to debates on the politics of international criminal justice, but also to general theory-building on international norm dynamics. Adding to recent research on norm complexity and norm interactions, my study underlines and disaggregates the potential for discursive agency at the intersection of multiple international norms.

IR scholars have recently paid increasing attention to unequal institutional orders in world politics, arguing that global governance institutions are deeply shaped by power inequalities among states. Yet, the literature still suffers from conceptual limitations and from a shortage of empirical work. The article addresses these shortcomings through a study of the historical evolution of global arms control institutions since 1945. It shows that in this important policy area, the global institutional order has not been marked by a recent trend toward deeper inequality, as many writings on unequal institutions suggest. Instead, the analysis reveals a pattern of institutional mutation whereby specific forms of institutional inequality are recurrently replaced and supplemented by new forms. This process, the article argues, is driven by states' efforts to adapt the regime to a changing material and normative environment within the constraints of past institutional legacies. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractIR scholars have recently paid increasing attention to unequal institutional orders in world politics, arguing that global governance institutions are deeply shaped by power inequalities among states. Yet, the literature still suffers from conceptual limitations and from a shortage of empirical work. The article addresses these shortcomings through a study of the historical evolution of global arms control institutions since 1945. It shows that in this important policy area, the global institutional order has not been marked by a recent trend toward deeper inequality, as many writings on unequal institutions suggest. Instead, the analysis reveals a pattern of institutional mutation whereby specific forms of institutional inequality are recurrently replaced and supplemented by new forms. This process, the article argues, is driven by states' efforts to adapt the regime to a changing material and normative environment within the constraints of past institutional legacies.

"Die wissenschaftliche und politische Debatte um die Schutzverantwortung konzentrierte sich in der Vergangenheit stark auf die militärische Umsetzung der Norm und damit verbundene Dilemmata, behandelte ihre zivile Dimension dagegen eher am Rande und als weitgehend unproblematisch. Dieser Beitrag unterzieht dagegen nicht-militärische Praktiken, die häufig im Dienste der R2P herangezogen werden, einer kritischen Untersuchung, insbesondere Wirtschaftssanktionen und internationale Strafverfolgungen. Er argumentiert, dass diese Instrumente häufig nicht rational mit Blick auf ihre praktische Wirksamkeit ausgewählt werden, sondern eine rein symbolische, dem öffentlichen Druck geschuldete Ersatzhandlung für riskante Militärinterventionen darstellen." (Autorenreferat)