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Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 85, Heft 3, S. 1107-1122
ISSN: 1468-2508
SSRN
Working paper
Committee Decision-Making under the Threat of Leaks
Leaks are pervasive in politics. Hence, many committees that nominally operate under secrecy de facto operate under the threat that information might be passed on to outsiders. We study theoretically and experimentally how this possibility affects the behavior of committee members and the decision-making accuracy. Our theoretical analysis generates two major predictions. First, a committee operating under the threat of leaks is equivalent to a formally transparent committee in terms of the probabilities of project implementation as well as welfare (despite differences in individual voting behavior). Second, the threat of leaks causes a committee to recommend rejection of a project whenever precise information has been shared among committee members. As a consequence, a status-quo bias arises. Our laboratory results confirm these predictions despite subjects communicating less strategically than predicted.
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Choosing a Partner for Social Exchange: Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness
People benefit from being perceived as trustworthy. Examples include sellers trying to attract buyers, or candidates in elections trying to attract voters. In a laboratory experiment using exchange games, in which the trustor can choose the trustee, we study whether trustees can signal their trustworthiness by giving to charity. Our results show that donors are indeed perceived as more trustworthy and they are selected significantly more often as interaction partners. As a consequence of this sorting pattern, relative payoffs to donors and non-donors differ substantially with and without partner choice. However, we do not find donors to be significantly more trustworthy than non-donors. Our findings suggest that publicly observable generosity, such as investments in corporate social responsibility or donations to charity during a political campaign, can induce perceptions of trustworthiness and trust.
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How Transparency Kills Information Aggregation: Theory and Experiment
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9027
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Negotiating Cooperation Under Uncertainty: Communication in Noisy, Indefinitely Repeated Interactions
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 11897
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Working paper
Choosing a Partner for Social Exchange: Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 9998
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Charitable Giving as a Signal of Trustworthiness: Disentangling the Signaling Benefits of Altruistic Acts
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7148
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Can You Trust the Good Guys? Trust within and between Groups with Different Missions
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 7411
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Pro-Social Missions and Worker Motivation: An Experimental Study
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6460
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Committee Decision-Making Under the Threat of Leaks
In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 13746
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Working paper
Buying Supermajorities in the Lab
Many decisions taken in legislatures or committees are subject to lobbying efforts. A seminal contribution to the literature on vote-buying is the legislative lobbying model pioneered by Groseclose and Snyder (1996), which predicts that lobbies will optimally form supermajorities in many cases. Providing the first empirical assessment of this prominent model, we test its central predictions in the laboratory. While the model assumes sequential moves, we relax this assumption in additional treatments with simultaneous moves. We find that lobbies buy supermajorities as predicted by the theory. Our results also provide supporting evidence for most comparative statics predictions of the legislative lobbying model with respect to lobbies' willingness to pay and legislators' preferences. Most of these results carry over to the simultaneous-move set-up but the predictive power of the model declines.
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