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http://www.springerlink.com/content/1432-217X/ ; International audience ; Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

http://www.springerlink.com/content/1432-217X/ ; International audience ; Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

http://www.springerlink.com/content/1432-217X/ ; International audience ; Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

http://www.springerlink.com/content/1432-217X/ ; International audience ; Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

http://www.springerlink.com/content/1432-217X/ ; International audience ; Even, and in fact chiefly, if two or more players in a voting game have on a binary issue independent opinions, they may have interest to form a single voting alliance giving an average gain of influence for all of them. Here, assuming the usual independence of votes, we first study the alliance voting power and obtain new results in the so-called asymptotic limit for which the number of players is large enough and the alliance weight remains a small fraction of the total of the weights. Then, we propose to replace the voting game inside the alliance by a random game which allows new possibilities. The validity of the asymptotic limit and the possibility of new alliances are examined by considering the decision process in the Council of Ministers of the European Union.

An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions will permit it to escape from political deadlocks each time a question is at stake. Two studies [Baldwin, Felsenthal1] suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting behavior, that the EU could only take a decision in 2% of the cases with its current voting mechanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been criticized from a theoretical point of view [Feix], a political one [Moberg] and does not fit with experimental data [Gelman]. The generalized Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we consider in this paper is an improvement of this first model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, first for the asymptotic case (reached when the number of countries $N$ goes to infinity), and next with computer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with 27 members. We consider both the Treaty of Nice and some proposals for the European Constitution.

An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions will permit it to escape from political deadlocks each time a question is at stake. Two studies [Baldwin, Felsenthal1] suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting behavior, that the EU could only take a decision in 2% of the cases with its current voting mechanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been criticized from a theoretical point of view [Feix], a political one [Moberg] and does not fit with experimental data [Gelman]. The generalized Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we consider in this paper is an improvement of this first model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, first for the asymptotic case (reached when the number of countries $N$ goes to infinity), and next with computer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with 27 members. We consider both the Treaty of Nice and some proposals for the European Constitution.

An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions will permit it to escape from political deadlocks each time a question is at stake. Two studies [Baldwin, Felsenthal1] suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting behavior, that the EU could only take a decision in 2% of the cases with its current voting mechanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been criticized from a theoretical point of view [Feix], a political one [Moberg] and does not fit with experimental data [Gelman]. The generalized Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we consider in this paper is an improvement of this first model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, first for the asymptotic case (reached when the number of countries $N$ goes to infinity), and next with computer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with 27 members. We consider both the Treaty of Nice and some proposals for the European Constitution.

An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions will permit it to escape from political deadlocks each time a question is at stake. Two studies [Baldwin, Felsenthal1] suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting behavior, that the EU could only take a decision in 2% of the cases with its current voting mechanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been criticized from a theoretical point of view [Feix], a political one [Moberg] and does not fit with experimental data [Gelman]. The generalized Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we consider in this paper is an improvement of this first model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, first for the asymptotic case (reached when the number of countries $N$ goes to infinity), and next with computer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with 27 members. We consider both the Treaty of Nice and some proposals for the European Constitution.

An important question for the European Union is to know whether its institutions will permit it to escape from political deadlocks each time a question is at stake. Two studies [Baldwin, Felsenthal1] suggest, by using the Impartial Culture assumption to model the voting behavior, that the EU could only take a decision in 2% of the cases with its current voting mechanisms. The Impartial Culture model has been criticized from a theoretical point of view [Feix], a political one [Moberg] and does not fit with experimental data [Gelman]. The generalized Impartial Anonymous Culture assumption we consider in this paper is an improvement of this first model. We here study the probability of approval under this assumption, first for the asymptotic case (reached when the number of countries $N$ goes to infinity), and next with computer enumerations and Monte Carlo simulations for the European Union with 27 members. We consider both the Treaty of Nice and some proposals for the European Constitution.