Like several other countries in Latin America, after 2003 Argentina took considerable steps to distance itself from the neoliberal policies it had followed for almost 30 years. Yet there have also been critical continuities from the neoliberal era. Our argument is that these continuities manifest themselves most clearly in the nature of economic growth and in the endurance of some of the most troubling trends in labor markets over the last 30 years. JEL classification: J21, J83, O54
O trabalho analisa os déficits de capacidade institucional dos entes do governo argentino responsáveis pela regulamentação do fornecimento de serviços públicos oferecidos por entidades privadas, após o maciço processo de privatização que aconteceu nos anos 90. Oferece uma interpretação dos desafios institucionais que implica substituir as funções tradicionais de produção, financiamento e prestação de serviços do setor público por funções de regulamentação e controle. O objetivo principal do artigo é estabelecer quais são as relações requeridas entre responsabilidades reguladoras e capacidades institucionais disponíveis. Isto implica um exame sistemático de seis tipos de déficits que podem afetar o desempenho dos entes reguladores: 1) as regras de jogo que governam as relações entre agentes envolvidos no processo regulador (p. ex, agências, fornecedores e cidadãos); 2) a natureza das redes inter-institucionais estabelecidas entre os agentes; 3) as conciliações estruturais e funcionais criadas para desempenhar funções reguladoras; 4) as políticas de incentivos e sanções fixadas para os entes reguladores desempenhem seu papel; 5) os recursos materiais e humanos disponíveis; e 6) as capacidades individuais requeridas para cumprir com as funções de uma forma eficaz. O trabalho chega à conclusão de que os entes reguladores criados pelo governo argentino apresentam deficiências significativas no tocante à capacidade institucional para cumprir sua missão com o alcance e profundidade necessários, especialmente tendo em conta que nisto se encontram comprometidos o interesse público e o bem-estar dos consumidores.
The crisis Argentina faced in the late 1980s legitimized a diagnosis that linked the country's poor economic performance to an inward-looking economy, excessive fiscal spending, unwarranted state regulations, a misguided set of incentives that failed to boost competitiveness and the "economic populism" that privileged political goals over economic efficiency. Alternatively, the solution was sought in policies that privileged deregulation, the free flow of commodities and capital, privatization and a selective intervention of the state in the economy. In this article we will account for the shape of neoliberal restructuring in Argentina by drawing attention to the heavy costs stabilization imposed on the country as the decade progressed. We will emphasize the costs the workers were called on to bear and the responses that emerged from them to challenge neoliberalism. La crise qui a frappé l'Argentine à la fin des années 1980 a justifié un diagnostic qui liait la faible performance économique à plusieurs facteurs : le caractère endogène de son économie, les dépenses excessives de l'État, les réglementations mal avisées, les stimulants mal ciblés qui ne sont pas parvenus à soutenir la compétitivité et le « populisme économique » qui privilégiait les finalités politiques plutôt que l'efficacité économique. En réponse à ce diagnostic, les solutions privilégiées visaient la déréglementation, la libre circulation des marchandises et du capital, les privatisations et l'intervention ciblée de l'État dans l'économie. Cet article présente la configuration des réformes néolibérales en Argentine en insistant sur les coûts élevés que la stabilisation a entraînés au cours de la décennie. Nous soulignons l'importance du fardeau imposé aux travailleurs et travailleuses ainsi que leurs réactions pour contrer le néolibéralisme.
The crisis Argentina faced in the late 1980s legitimized a diagnosis that linked the country's poor economic performance to an inward-looking economy, excessive fiscal spending, unwarranted state regulations, a misguided set of incentives that failed to boost competitiveness and the "economic populism" that privileged political goals over economic efficiency. Alternatively, the solution was sought in policies that privileged deregulation, the free flow of commodities and capital, privatization and a selective intervention of the state in the economy. In this article we will account for the shape of neoliberal restructuring in Argentina by drawing attention to the heavy costs stabilization imposed on the country as the decade progressed. We will emphasize the costs the workers were called on to bear and the responses that emerged from them to challenge neoliberalism. La crise qui a frappé l'Argentine à la fin des années 1980 a justifié un diagnostic qui liait la faible performance économique à plusieurs facteurs : le caractère endogène de son économie, les dépenses excessives de l'État, les réglementations mal avisées, les stimulants mal ciblés qui ne sont pas parvenus à soutenir la compétitivité et le « populisme économique » qui privilégiait les finalités politiques plutôt que l'efficacité économique. En réponse à ce diagnostic, les solutions privilégiées visaient la déréglementation, la libre circulation des marchandises et du capital, les privatisations et l'intervention ciblée de l'État dans l'économie. Cet article présente la configuration des réformes néolibérales en Argentine en insistant sur les coûts élevés que la stabilisation a entraînés au cours de la décennie. Nous soulignons l'importance du fardeau imposé aux travailleurs et travailleuses ainsi que leurs réactions pour contrer le néolibéralisme.
This article argues that exchange rate regimes established by the Mexican peso currency band and the Argentinean Convertibility Plan were key dimensions of the political strategies of neoliberal structural reform through which discipline was imposed on workers and the state. By subordinating wage struggles and state spending to the maintaining of currency pegs, the stabilisation programmes helped to redefine the balances between capital and labour and the conditions of integration of each country within the global economy. This in turn allows for an understanding of the performance of the managed exchange regimes in each country and the states' divergent economic responses to their exhaustion.
Our article engages with discussions about the implications of precarious work and its impact on workers' capacity to organise by analysing the case of Argentina's Confederation of Popular Economy Workers (CTEP, Confederación de Trabajadores de la Economía Popular). The organisation was created in 2011 with the aim of representing a broad and heterogeneous group of workers in varying conditions of informality, precarious self-employment and workfare programmes. We trace the history of the organisation and analyse its development by focusing on the role of social assistance as a crucial expression of the changing relations between precarious workers and the state. Social assistance has provided some resources for addressing the reproduction needs of precarious workers and of the territories in which they live, and also the material means through which an organisation like CTEP has sought to consolidate its political work among precarious workers. Nonetheless, social assistance has also worked as a means to circumscribe broader demands for change into issues to be addressed through social policy. Our argument is that central to CTEP's trajectory as an organisation of precarious workers was its attempt to break away from the narrow confines of social assistance, pushing for changes that would allow its members to gain some autonomy both materially and institutionally. KEYWORDS: Argentina; precarious worker organisations; CTEP; social assistance policy