In a model with endogenous fertility and labor supply three instruments of family policies are analyzed: child benefits, subsidies for external child care, and parental leave payments. We compare the impact on the quantity and quality of children, the secondary earner's labor supply and welfare. Child benefits and subsidies for external child care are more effective in balancing family and work than parental leave payments. The welfare analysis shows that the introduction of subsidies for external child care into a welfare program with child benefits makes families better off.
Die hohe Verschuldung der öffentlichen Haushalte in Deutschland – bedingt durch Krisen, aber letztlich auch eine leichtfertige Ausgabenpolitik in Zeiten hoher Steuereinnahmen – hat zu einer Debatte über die Abschaffung der Schuldenbremse geführt. Robert Fenge, Universität Rostock, diskutiert verschiedene wohlfahrtsökonomische Argumente, die dafür geltend gemacht werden. Ein wesentliches Argument für die Schuldenbremse ergibt sich aber aus der Erfahrung, die man mit der Schuldenpolitik in den letzten Jahrzehnten gemacht hat.
Robert Fenge, Universität Rostock, weist in seinem Kommentar darauf hin, dass der rentensystematische Grundsatz – wer mehr einzahlt, bekommt auch mehr Rente heraus – mit den Vorschlägen für steuerfinanzierte oder beitragsfinanzierte Zusatzrenten aufgegeben würde. Seiner Ansicht nach ist auch deshalb die Weiterentwicklung des bestehenden Rentensystems dem Umbau mit Hilfe von Zusatzrenten vorzuziehen.
The contrasting trends toward earlier retirement and greater longevity have resulted in steadily increasing retirement costs over the last forty years. One important factor influencing early retirement decisions is the expansion of retirement benefits; but studies predict that most countries, particularly those with early retirement incentives, will be unable to meet future pension and social security obligations. In this timely CESifo volume, Robert Fenge and Pierre Pestieau examine empirical and theoretical evidence that explains why early retirement has become such a burden for social security systems and suggest pension system reforms that will reverse the trend. - Drawing on evidence from the European Union (with comparisons to other industrialized countries including the United States and Canada), the authors demonstrate that the effective retirement age is influenced by social security regulations (such as a change in eligibility age) and discuss ways of measuring these embedded incentives. Fenge and Pestieau examine the implicit taxes on prolonged working life from normative and political economy perspectives. They discuss optimal payroll tax rates that minimize distortions of labor supply and retirement decisions and consider alternative ways to finance benefits, including consumption and capital income taxation. They discuss why policies are designed to discourage employment among older workers and why reforms to counter this often meet resistance. They demonstrate, contrary to the belief of many European governments, that pushing older workers into retirement does not free jobs for young unemployed workers. They show that the gap between salaries and productivity is an incentive for employers to rid themselves of older workers and argue that governments should not support this behavior by compensating older workers for the difference between severance payments and salaries in early retirement programs.
This paper compares the decentral organization of unemployment insurance in member states of a state union with the central organization at the upper union' level. In a model of two countries the labor force and the firm owners can migrate between the states. Labor markets exhibit unemployment due to trade union's bargaining about the wage rate. In a decentral scenario the states organize independently unemployment insurance and decide about the rate on wages contributed to the insurance budget. Due to open borders they have to take account of migration effects. However, with perfect mobility between the states each government chooses a socially optimal contribution rate such that workers are fully insured against unemployment. In the central scenario the governments overestimate the costs of insurance when bargaining about the contribution rate and observing the common insurance budget of both countries. This leads to a less than socially optimal contribution rate.
The paper analyses the impact of demographic developments on the German pension system until the year 2060. The projections are simulated for a range of assumptions on the latest demographic trends and on the labour market and comprise the latest pension legislation. As a central innovation we present a decomposition approach which allows to identify the isolated effects of mortality, fertility and migration developments on the dynamics of the German pension system. We show that the past population structure - driven by past fertility changes - and future mortality improvements will be the most important factors shaping the development of the German pension system. The results have a number of implications for effective and sustainable pension reforms.
