Suchergebnisse

The Hague Conference of 1907 is over and the delegates return to their respective countries. Aspirations for the pacific settlement of international disputes have been voiced and a list of possible arbitrators has been drawn up described by the formal name of the Permanent Court of Arbitration. Well and good! No obligation was accepted to have recourse to the Court, but at least the Conference went so far as to declare its acceptance of "the principle of compulsory arbitration" and its applicability to international agreements. At the same time the Conference declared that the divergencies of opinion in respect to compulsory arbitration "have not exceeded the bounds of judicial controversy," and that the delegates, in the course of their long collaboration, had succeeded "in evolving a very lofty conception of the common welfare of humanity."

Some sixty-five years ago, when on April 14, 1890, the Union of American Republics was established, the great hope for world peace, the great promise of bringing international relations under the rule of law, lay in the development of arbitration. The Plan of Arbitration proposed by the Conference was for its time a radical one. Arbitration was to be obligatory for all disputes except those which in the judgment of a state might peril its independence; and the example thus set by the American States was not without its effect at the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907. The limitation of armaments was obviously beyond the plans of practical statesmen. But even so, that was not ground for discouragement. If only the procedure of arbitration could be given greater authority and extended into ever-widening fields, it might be possible to look forward to an agreement upon the limitation of armaments when there was no longer the same need of them.

So great has been the progress of the inter-American regional system over the past fifty years that it is difficult for a later generation to understand how hesitant and faltering the statesmen of an earlier day could have been in their approach to problems for which we have now found, if not the solution, at least the basis upon which to construct a solution. States were sovereign then, and sovereignty, as the term was practically applied, meant that states were not so much above the law but rather outside its scope in respect to the fundamental and recurrent issue of the defense of national interests.