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Unprecedented economic interdependence and the extensive legalization of international commerce have created unique opportunities for states to exercise power in world politics. Yet, while international relations (IR) scholars have revealed much about how interdependence conditions the ability of states to leverage economic relationships to influence other actors, the equivalent role of law has received less systematic attention. This article explains the logic and dynamics that inform how, why, and under what conditions states may use law as a sword or shield in the realm of international commerce. Drawing upon the IR literature on economic statecraft and the international law literature on lawfare, the article conceptualizes "economic lawfare" and uses it to elucidate how law may shape the use of economic power. It outlines a typology of pathways through which economic lawfare can be employed and their associated opportunities and constraints, before presenting a simple model of key dynamics that shape their use. That model's plausibility is probed and the pathways are empirically illustrated in two case studies of recent episodes in which the Chinese government has sought to manipulate international commerce for strategic purposes. The article clarifies the distinction between legal and nonlegal instruments of economic statecraft, offers a theoretically explicit account of key mechanisms through which law may condition the use of economic power, and provides new conceptual foundations for emerging research on how institutions shape the ability of states to intervene in markets to achieve strategic objectives.

2017 saw an unusually high degree of coordination between the European Union (EU) and its Member States on external energy security policy. This is puzzling not only because it defies the expectations of critics who have long highlighted the failure of Member States to adopt coherent policies on the question of external energy security, but because individual Member States have strong incentives to adopt individualistic policies that undermine collective action in this policy area. This article seeks to answer two questions: how can coherence in EU external energy security policy be explained, and what does it suggest about the conditions under which the EU will be able to 'speak with one voice' in other contested external policy areas? In order to do so, I mine the existing literature for plausible explanations and identify and evaluate three separate narratives that rely on different causal mechanisms to explain greater coherence as a consequence of: (1) the gradual centralization of EU energy policy competence; (2) exogenous shocks to EU energy supply and; (3) institutional innovation under the Juncker Commission. I argue that none are independently sufficient to explain the phenomenon observed and present a novel 'synergetic account' that argues it was the unique interaction of each of the aforementioned factors that provided the conditions necessary for coherence, before concluding with a discussion of the implications of my findings for theory and policy.

2017 saw an unusually high degree of coordination between the European Union (EU) and its Member States on external energy security policy. This is puzzling not only because it defies the expectations of critics who have long highlighted the failure of Member States to adopt coherent policies on the question of external energy security, but because individual Member States have strong incentives to adopt individualistic policies that undermine collective action in this policy area. This article seeks to answer two questions: how can coherence in EU external energy security policy be explained, and what does it suggest about the conditions under which the EU will be able to 'speak with one voice' in other contested external policy areas? In order to do so, I mine the existing literature for plausible explanations and identify and evaluate three separate narratives that rely on different causal mechanisms to explain greater coherence as a consequence of: (1) the gradual centralization of EU energy policy competence; (2) exogenous shocks to EU energy supply and; (3) institutional innovation under the Juncker Commission. I argue that none are independently sufficient to explain the phenomenon observed and present a novel 'synergetic account' that argues it was the unique interaction of each of the aforementioned factors that provided the conditions necessary for coherence, before concluding with a discussion of the implications of my findings for theory and policy.

The 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper emphasises the importance of 'maximising' Australia's power and influence. However, the White Paper and much of the commentary on Australian foreign policy do not clearly conceptualise 'power' or indicate how it ought to be increased. The Lowy Institute's recent Asia Power Index implies one possible strategy via its resource-based approach to measuring power. We outline a different approach and argue that power should be conceptualised and evaluated as a specific relationship causing behavioural change, rather than as a general attribute of its wielder. To complement the Lowy Institute's carefully catalogued database, and facilitate a more focused conversation about maximising power and influence in Australian foreign policy, we offer a typology identifying five pathways through which states can translate their material and non-material resources into outcomes that serve the national interest.

For nearly four decades, Australia's domestic and international economic policies were anchored by the promotion of open, transparent, and rules-based market exchange. This was considered the best way to increase both Australia's prosperity and its security, and that belief guided Canberra's approach to economic statecraft. However, emerging concerns about the vulnerabilities arising from economic interdependence, and the increasingly blurry line between economics and security amid great power rivalry between China and the United States, have placed Australian policy orthodoxy in a difficult position. In this paper, we investigate how these dynamics are shaping change and continuity in Australia's economic statecraft, and in doing so offer three contributions. First, to advance the emerging comparative economic statecraft research agenda, we propose a modified concept of economic statecraft that captures a wider range of activities undertaken by non-great powers and a distinction between state-based and market-based actions which allows for within- and cross-case comparisons. Second, empirically, we sketch the historical evolution of Australia's approach and examine three salient domains in which it has recently pursued new economic statecraft initiatives. Finally, in evaluating recent change and continuity, our third contribution is to identify new variables that may illuminate the conditions under which states adapt their prevailing approach to economic statecraft. (Pac Rev/GIGA)

China's growing economic strength provides Beijing with potent instruments of economic statecraft to pursue political and strategic objectives. Yet studies of economic power and Chinese economic statecraft tend to concentrate on trade in goods, outbound investment, and international institutions. This article broadens this research program into trade in services by focusing on China's outbound tourism sector. Drawing on a variety of Chinese and English language sources, the authors describe the history and structure of the domestic regulatory framework governing Chinese outbound tourism, before studying instances where the government has apparently intervened for strategic purposes. By unpacking how Chinese consumers arrange overseas holidays, this article provides insights into how the market structure of this service industry creates both opportunities for and constraints on China's economic power. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

Abstract
Recent developments suggest that the international economic order is transitioning away from the Neoliberal Order that has flourished for much of the post-Cold War period toward a new Geoeconomic Order. The shift to this new order, which is characterized by a growing 'securitisation of economic policy and economisation of strategic policy', will likely see the rules, norms, and institutions of international trade and investment law undergoing significant change. We expose the differences in the underlying logic of these orders, explore how this shift is being driven by the emerging USA–China tech/trade war, and consider the consequences of this transition for global economic governance.