Access to water has played a pivotal role in the Israel-Palestine dispute. Israel has diverted the River Jordan via pipes and canals to build a successful modern state. But this has been at the expense of the region's cohabitants. Gaza is now so water-stressed that the United Nations has warned it could soon become uninhabitable; its traditional water source has been ruined by years of over-extraction and mismanagement, the effects exacerbated by years of crippling blockade.
Concerns about the future of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) have forever dominated Canadian policy considerations regarding participation in the US missile defence program. Yet, fears that a Canadian decision not to participate could lead to the "demise" or marginalization of NORAD appear entirely unfounded in the wake of the formal Canadian refusal in 2005. This article identifies the reasons behind these fears relative to the nature and future of NORAD, and explains why they are both understandable and misplaced. Since the United States neither has, nor has ever had, a significant system requirement for Canadian participation, Washington has separated missile defence from the NORAD question. While this change in approach and legitimate concerns about NORAD's marginalization have been managed through a Canadian military space contribution, it is likely that missile defence and military space cooperation will be managed on a bilateral basis largely outside of, and in support of, existing NORAD missions. This process reflects the reality of Canada–US North American defence cooperation, and NORAD's limited place within it.
The 2008 economic crisis spawned a wealth of speculation, academic and otherwise, on the future status of the US in the international system. After approximately 20 years of America's unprecedented status as the sole dominant global power, the financial crisis, US' growing debt and deficit, polarization and gridlock within congress, and far-flung military commitments raised significant doubts that the US would be able and willing to maintain its status. Like all major debates, there is little consensus on the ability of the US to maintain its dominant global status; the likelihood that China, or any other potential competitor, will actually emerge as a peer equal; or when the system is likely to transform. Adapted from the source document.
