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I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a "public goods trap" rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism.

I propose three broad sets of political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict and the weak state. First, a "public goods trap" rooted in inequality implies that a low supply of, and demand for, public goods reinforce each other. Second, economic and political rents create vested interests in the status quo. Political rents are particularly problematic, partly because reformers face a curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Finally, a very clientelistic pattern of political exchange consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism. ; Propongo tres conjuntos amplios de pilares de economía política para la persistencia del conflicto y el Estado débil. Primero, una "trampa de bienes públicos" arraigada en la desigualdad implica que la amplia oferta y demanda de bienes públicos se refuerzan entre sí. Segundo, las rentas económicas y políticas crean interés en el status quo. Las rentas políticas son particularmente problemáticas, en parte porque los reformadores enfrentan una maldición de dimensionalidad: muchas cosas tienen que funcionar bien para que la capacidad del Estado y la paz estable se consoliden. Por último, un patrón muy clientelista de intercambio político consolida un Estado débil, y los Estados débiles son un terreno fértil para el clientelismo. ; Proponho três conjuntos amplos de pilares da economia política para a persistência do conflito e do Estado fraco. Primeiro, uma "armadilha de bens públicos" enraizada na desigualdade implica que a ampla oferta e demanda de bens públicos se reforçam mutuamente. Segundo, as rendas econômicas e políticas criam interesse no status quo. As rendas políticas são particularmente problemáticas, em parte porque os reformadores enfrentam uma maldição de dimensionalidade: muitas coisas têm que funcionar bem para que a capacidade do Estado e a paz estável sejam consolidadas. Finalmente, um padrão muito clientelista de intercâmbio político consolida um Estado fraco, e os Estados fracos são um terreno fértil para o clientelismo.

Códigos JEL: D72, D74, P48 ; Colombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia¿s puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia¿s independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms¿ ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia¿s current peace-building efforts.

Colombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia's puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia's independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms' ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia's current peace-building efforts.