Suchergebnisse

Enduring violent conflict is the flip side of the coin of a weak state. In this article, I propose some political economy underpinnings for the persistence of conflict (and the weak state). Focusing on the case of Colombia, I discuss three broad sets of mechanisms that are also relevant elsewhere. First, a "public goods trap" implies that allow supply of public goods (including security and order) produces a low demand for public goods, and vice versa. This trap is grounded on, and reproduces, political and economic inequality. Second, conflict and a weak state create economic and political rents, producing vested interests in the status quo. I argue that political rents are a particularly strong obstacle, partly because reformers face a sort of curse of dimensionality: many things have to work well for state capacity and stable peace to consolidate. Politically powerful groups take advantage of any weak spot to defend their rents, producing countervailing negative effects following state building efforts. Finally, the very clientelistic pattern of political exchange in many societies consolidates a weak state, and weak states are fertile ground for clientelism to flourish. This vicious circle of clientelism and state weakness is another reason for persistence. I conclude discussing some lessons for reformers, though the very nature of the argument implies that there are no easy recipes for success. ; El conflicto persistente es la otra cara de la moneda de un estado débil. En este artículo, propongo algunos fundamentos de economía política para la persistencia del conflicto (y el estado débil). Concentrándome en el caso colombiano, propongo tres grandes grupos de mecanismos que también son relevantes en otros lugares. Primero, una "trampa de los bienes públicos" implica que una baja oferta de bienes públicos (incluyendo la seguridad y el orden) produce una baja demanda de bienes públicos, y vice versa. Esta trampa se apoya, y reproduce, la desigualdad política y económica. Segundo, el conflicto y un estado débil crean rentas económicas y políticas, produciendo grupos de interés comprometidos con sostener el status quo. Argumento que las rentas políticas son un obstáculo especialmente fuerte, en parte porque los reformadores enfrentan una especie de maldición de dimensión: muchas cosas tienen que funcionar bien para que se consoliden la paz estable y un estado capaz. Los grupos políticamente fuertes aprovechan cualquier punto débil para defender sus rentas, produciendo efectos contrarios negativos tras los esfuerzos por construir un estado. Finalmente, la naturaleza clientelista del intercambio político en muchas sociedades consolida el estado débil, y un estado débil es a su turno tierra fértil para que el clientelismo florezca. Este círculo vicioso de clientelismo y debilidad estatal es otra razón de persistencia. Concluyo discutiendo algunas lecciones para los reformadores, aunque la naturaleza misma del argumento implica que no hay una receta simple para el éxito.

This paper examines the role of mass media in countering special interest group influence. I use the concentration of campaign contributions from Political Action Committees to proxy special interests' capture US Senate candidates from 1980 to 2002, and compare the reaction of voters to increases in concentration in two different types of media markets - in-state media markets and out-of-state media markets. Unlike in-state media markets, out-of-state markets focus on neighboring states' politics and elections. Thus, if citizens punish political capture, increases in concentration of special interest contributions to a particular candidate should reduce his vote share in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties, where the candidate receives less coverage. I find that a one standard deviation increase in concentration of special interest contributions to incumbents reduces their vote share by about 0.5 to 1.5 percentage points in in-state counties relative to the out-of-state counties. Results are similar in specifications that rely solely on variation in concentration across time within the same county, and when the sample is limited to in-state counties that are contiguous to out-of-state counties and have similar demographic structures. A placebo test where in-state counties bordering out-of-state ones are compared to other in-state counties shows no effect, confirming the identification hypothesis that the results are not driven by geographic characteristics or distance from the media center of the state. ; En este documento estudio la capacidad de los medios masivos de comunicación para contrarrestar la influencia de los grupos de interés. Para ello, calculo el grado de concentración de las contribuciones a las campañas electorales para el Senado de los Estados Unidos entre 1980 y 2002, y comparo la reacción de los electores frente a incrementos en la concentración en dos tipos de mercados de medios ¿los mercados -en-el-estado y mercados fuera-del-estado. Contrario a los mercados de medios en-el-estado, los mercados fuera-del-estado se enfocan en la política y elecciones de estados vecinos. Así, si los ciudadanos castigan la captura política, incrementos en la concentración de las contribuciones por parte de grupos de interés a un candidato en particular deben reducir su votación en los condados con mercados en-el-estado en comparación con aquellos fuera-del- estado, donde se da menos cubrimiento al candidato. Los resultados indican que un incremento de una desviación estándar en el índice de concentración reduce la votación por el senador de turno en aproximadamente 0,5a1,5 puntos porcentuales en los condados en-el-estado relativo a los condados fuera-del-estado.

If property rights in land are so beneficial, why are they not adopted more widely? I propose a theory based on the idea that limited property rights over peasants' plots may be supported by elite landowners (who depend on peasants for labour) to achieve two goals. First, like other distortions such as taxation, limited property rights reduce peasants' income from their own plots, generating a cheap labour force. Second, and unlike taxation, they force peasants to remain in the rural sector to protect their property, even if job opportunities appear in the urban sector. The theory identifies conditions under which weak property rights institutions emerge, providing a specific mechanism for the endogenous persistence of inefficient rural institutions as development unfolds. It also predicts a non-monotonic relationship between the quality of rural property rights and land in the hands of peasants. ; Si los derechos de propiedad sobre la tierra son tan benéficos, ¿Por qué no se establecen con mayor frecuencia? Este documento propone una teoría en la que derechos de propiedad limitados para las parcelas de los campesinos pueden ser defendidos por una elite terrateniente (que depende del trabajo de los campesinos) con dos objetivos en mente. Primero, como otras distorsiones como la tributación, los derechos de propiedad incompletos reducen el ingreso de los campesinos en sus parcelas, generando una mano de obra barata. Segundo, y contrario a la tributación, obligan a los campesinos a quedarse en el sector rural para cuidar su propiedad, inclusive si aparecen oportunidades de trabajo en el sector urbano. La teoría identifica condiciones bajo las cuales surgen instituciones débiles de derechos de propiedad, sugiriendo un mecanismo específico para la persistencia endógena de instituciones rurales ineficientes a medida que se da el desarrollo económico. También predice una relación no monótona entre la calidad de los derechos de propiedad rurales y la cantidad de tierra en manos de los campesinos.

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on con- flict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence.

This paper studies the effect of strengthening democracy, as captured by an increase in voting rights, on the incidence of violent civil conflict in nineteenth-century Colombia. Empirically studying the relationship between democracy and conflict is challenging, not only because of conceptual problems in defining and measuring democracy, but also because political institutions and violence are jointly determined. We take advantage of an experiment of history to examine the impact of one simple, measurable dimension of democracy (the size of the franchise) on conflict, while at the same time attempting to overcome the identification problem. In 1853, Colombia established universal male suffrage. Using a simple difference-indifferences specification at the municipal level, we find that municipalities where more voters were enfranchised relative to their population experienced fewer violent political battles while the reform was in effect. The results are robust to including a number of additional controls. Moreover, we investigate the potential mechanisms driving the results. In particular, we look at which components of the proportion of new voters in 1853 explain the results, and we examine if results are stronger in places with more political competition and state capacity. We interpret our findings as suggesting that violence in nineteenth-century Colombia was a technology for political elites to compete for the rents from power, and that democracy constituted an alternative way to compete which substituted violence. ; Este artículo estudia el efecto de fortalecer la democracia, a través de una extensión en el derecho al voto, sobre la incidencia del conflicto violento en Colombia en el siglo XIX. Estudiar empíricamente la relación entre democracia y conflicto es difícil, no sólo por los problemas conceptuales al definir y medir democracia, sino porque las instituciones políticas y la violencia están simultáneamente determinadas. En este trabajo, aprovechamos un experimento histórico para examinar el impacto de una dimensión simple y medible de la democracia, el tamaño de la población con derecho al voto, sobre el conflicto, a la vez que intentamos superar el problema de identificación. En 1853, Colombia estableció el sufragio universal masculino. Utilizando una especificación sencilla de diferencias-en-diferencias a nivel municipal, encontramos que los municipios en los que una fracción mayor dc la población obtuvo el derecho al voto, tuvieron menos violencia mientras la reforma estuvo vigente. Los resultados son robustos a incluir numerosos controles adicionales. Además, investigamos los posibles mecanismos que explican el resultado. Concretamente, revisamos qué componentes de los votantes explican los resultados, y examinamos si son más fuertes en lugares con más competencia política y capacidad estatal. Interpretamos los resultados como sugestivos de que la violencia en Colombia en el siglo XIX era una tecnología mediante la cual las élites políticas competían por las rentas del poder, y que la democracia constituyó una manera alternativa de competencia que sustituyó a la violencia.

Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which politicians running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal that exposes these candidates increases their coercion effort to offset the negative popularity shock. This may result in the tainted politicians actually increasing their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia, the 'parapolitics' scandal featuring politicians colluding with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes. We show that colluding candidates not only get more votes than their clean competitors, but also concentrate them in areas where coercion is more likely (namely, areas with more paramilitary presence, less state presence, and more judicial inefficiency). Harder to reconcile with other explanations and as a direct test of the effects of media exposure, we compare tainted candidates exposed before elections to those exposed after. We find that those exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed once elected, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated in places where coercion is more likely. Our re

Development outcomes come in `clusters' that seem difficult to exit. Using original data from Colombia, we present evidence of the interconnection between two critical political components: state weakness and clientelism. State weakness creates the right environment for clientelism to ourish. Clientelism sets in place a structure of incentives for politicians and citizens that is detrimental to building state capacity. We show that vote buying, as a measure of clientelism, and tax evasion, as a measure of state weakness, are highly correlated at the individual level. We also report evidence that both practices are widely accepted in society, a result consistent with a deeply entrenched relationship of mutually reinforcing in uences. Finally, we propose a set of mechanisms that underlie the hypothesis that a weak state and widespread clientelism are part of a political equilibrium with multiple feedback loops. Our results suggest that state weakness is a trap that is likely hard to exit.

Describimos algunas características del ambiente político en Colombia, a partir de una base de datos panel única con cerca de 10,000 hogares. Comparando respuestas en 2013 y 2016, documentamos una persistente falta de interés en política y un clientelismo prevaleciente, con vínculos personales dominando a las afinidades partidistas. El involucramiento en la compra clientelista de votos, en cambio, es bastante variable en el tiempo, y los hogares entran y salen de estas relaciones. Contradiciendo las más simples y optimistas teorías de la modernización, no encontramos que incrementos en la riqueza del hogar estén correlacionados con el abandono del clientelismo. En cambio, los cambios en la debilidad del estado (medida con la evasión tributaria) sí se correlacionan fuertemente con cambio en el clientelismo. Fortalecer el estado parece, por lo tanto, una tarea prioritaria. Entendiendo los esfuerzos de construcción de paz como un paso en esta dirección nos conduce a examinar las actitudes hacia el reciente proceso de paz entre el gobierno y las FARC. ; We describe some features of the political environment in Colombia, drawing from a unique panel dataset of about 10,000 households. Contrasting responses in 2013 and 2016, we document a persistent lack of interest in politics and prevailing clientelism, with personalistic links dominating partisan affinity. Engagement in clientelistic vote buying, instead, is quite variable in time, with households getting into and out of these exchanges. Rejecting the simplest and more optimistic theories of modernization, we do not find that increases in household wealth correlate with the abandonment of clientelism. Instead, changes in the weakness of the state (as proxied with tax evasion) correlate strongly with changes in clientelism. Strengthening the state therefore seems a priority. Viewing peace-building efforts as one key step in this direction naturally leads to the examination of the attitudes towards the recent peace process between the government and the Farc.

We describe some features of the political environment in Colombia, drawing from a unique panel dataset of about 10,000 households. Contrasting responses in 2013 and 2016, we document a persistent lack of interest in politics and prevailing clientelism, with personalistic links dominating partisan affinity. Engagement in clientelistic vote buying, instead, is quite variable in time, with households getting into and out of these exchanges. Rejecting the simplest and more optimistic theories of modernization, we do not find that increases in household wealth correlate with the abandonment of clientelism. Instead, changes in the weakness of the state (as proxied with tax evasion) correlate strongly with changes in clientelism. Strengthening the state therefore seems a priority. Viewing peace-building efforts as one key step in this direction naturally leads to the examination of the attitudes towards the recent peace process between the government and the Farc, Colombia's largest guerrilla group. With a special set of questions included in 2016, we also study households' perspectives on this topic. The data reveals a rare combination of indifference and polarization towards the peace process. ; Describimos algunas características del ambiente político en Colombia, a partir de una base de datos panel única con cerca de 10,000 hogares. Comparando respuestas en 2013 y 2016, documentamos una persistente falta de interés en política y un clientelismo prevaleciente, con vínculos personales dominando a las afinidades partidistas. El involucramiento en la compra clientelista de votos, en cambio, es bastante variable en el tiempo, y los hogares entran y salen de estas relaciones. Contradiciendo las más simples y optimistas teorías de la modernización, no encontramos que incrementos en la riqueza del hogar estén correlacionados con el abandono del clientelismo. En cambio, los cambios en la debilidad del estado (medida con la evasión tributaria) sí se correlacionan fuertemente con cambio en el clientelismo. Fortalecer el estado parece, por lo tanto, una tarea prioritaria. Entendiendo los esfuerzos de construcción de paz como un paso en esta dirección nos conduce a examinar las actitudes hacia el reciente proceso de paz entre el gobierno y las Farc, el grupo guerrillero más grande en Colombia. Con unas preguntas especiales incluidas en el 2016, evaluamos las opiniones de los hogares sobre estos temas.

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urab´a, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation.

Despite a growing body of literature on how environmental degradation can fuel civil war, the reverse effect, namely that of conflict on environmental outcomes, is relatively understudied. From a theoretical point of view this effect is ambiguous, with some forces pointing to pressures for environmental degradation and some pointing in the opposite direction. Hence, the overall effect of conflict on the environment is an empirical question. We study this relationship in the case of Colombia. We combine a detailed satellite-based longitudinal dataset on forest cover across municipalities over the period 1990-2010 with a comprehensive panel of conflict-related violent actions by paramilitary militias. We first provide evidence that paramilitary activity significantly reduces the share of forest cover in a panel specification that includes municipal and time fixed effects. Then we confirm these findings by taking advantage of a quasi-experiment that provides us with an exogenous source of variation for the expansion of the paramilitary. Using the distance to the region of Urabá, the epicenter of such expansion, we instrument paramilitary activity in each cross-section for which data on forest cover is available. As a falsification exercise, we show that the instrument ceases to be relevant after the paramilitaries largely demobilized following peace negotiations with the government. Further, after the demobilization the deforestation effect of the paramilitaries disappears. We explore a number of potential mechanisms that may explain the conflict-driven deforestation, and show evidence suggesting that paramilitary violence generates large outflows of people in order to secure areas for growing illegal crops, exploit mineral resources, and engage in extensive agriculture. In turn, these activities are associated with deforestation. ; A pesar del auge reciente de la literatura empírica sobre efecto del deterioro ambiental en la guerra civil, el efecto inverso ha sido menos estudiado. Desde un punto de vista teórico este efecto ambiguo. Hay argumentos a favor de que el conflicto acelera la degradación ambiental, y argumentos; que sugieren el efecto opuesto. Así, el efecto del conflicto sobre el medio ambiente es una pregunta empírica. Este trabajo estudia esta relación para el caso de Colombia. Para ello se usa una base de datos longitudinal sobre el porcentaje con área boscosa de cada municipio entre 1990 y 2010, estimado mediante fotos satelitales. Así mismo, se usa un panel municipal de variables relacionadas con la violencia paramilitar. Los resultados apuntan a que la actividad paramilitar reduce de manera significativa el porcentaje de área boscosa de los municipios. Esto se concluye, primero, de estimaciones de panel que incluyen efectos fijos de municipio y de tiempo. Segundo, esto se confirma a partir de regresiones de variables instrumentales que utilizan como fuente de variación exógena la expansión paramilitar de finales de los años noventa. Instrumentamos la actividad paramilitar en cada corte transversal para el cual hay datos disponibles de boscosidad, con la distancia a la región de Urabá, el epicentro de dicha expansión. El trabajo muestra, a manera de falsificación, que el instrumento no es relevante después de la desmovilización generalizada de grupos paramilitares. Además, después de dicha desmovilización, el efecto de la actividad paramilitar sobre la deforestación desaparece. El trabajo explora varios mecanismos potenciales que pueden explicar la deforestación causada por la violencia paramilitar. Hay evidencia de que la actividad paramilitar genera flujos de desplazamiento interno que anteceden el uso de esos territorios para usos económicos legales e ilegales como los cultivos ilícitos, la explotación minera y la agricultura extensiva. As su vez, estas actividades causan deforestación.

Free media may not favor political accountability when other democratic institutions are weak, and may even bring undesirable unintended consequences. We propose a simple model in which candidates running for office may engage in coercion to obtain votes. A media scandal exposing these candidates entices them to increase their coercion effort to offset the negative shock on their popularity, potentially minimizing or even counteracting the effect of the scandal on their vote share. We provide empirical evidence from one recent episode in the political history of Colombia in which politicians seeking a seat in Congress colluded with illegal armed paramilitary groups to obtain votes, and this collusion was ultimately brought to light by a media scandal. We find that paramilitary-backed candidates exposed before elections get as many votes as those exposed after elections, but their electoral support is more strongly concentrated where coercion is cheaper: in areas with paramilitary presence and weak state capacity. Our results highlight the complementarity between different dimensions of democratic institutions. ; La libertad de prensa puede no favorecer la rendición de cuentas política cuando otras instituciones democráticas son débiles, y puede incluso tener consecuencias negativas no intencionadas. En este artículo, proponemos un modelo simple en el que los candidatos que participan en elecciones pueden ejercer coerción para obtener votos. Un escándalo medí ático que expone a estos candidatos los incentiva a incrementar sus esfuerzos por compensar el resultante choque negativo de popularidad con mayor coerción electoral, lo que puede minimizar, o inclusive compensar, el efecto del escándalo en su votación. En el artículo presentamos evidencia empírica de un episodio reciente en la historia política de Colombia, en el que políticos se aliaron con grupos armados paramilitares para obtener votos, alianza que eventualmente fue revelada por un escándalo medí ático. Encontramos que los candidatos aliados con los paramilitares que fueron expuestos por la prensa antes de las elecciones reciben tantos votos como los que fueron expuestos después, pero su apoyo electoral se concentra mayoritariamente en los lugares en donde la coerción es más barata. Es decir, en áreas con presencia paramilitar y capacidad estatal débil. Nuestros resultados destacan la complementariedad entre diferentes dimensiones de las instituciones democráticas

The study of budgetary institutions has long been an important topic in the economic literature. Nonetheless, the degree of rigidity or inflexibility in budget preparation, a prime preoccupation for policy makers and in particular for finance ministers since a long time ago, has been relatively unexplored. In this paper we show that budget inflexibility can take several forms and argue that it is likely to be closely related to various types of political conflict present in the budget process. Moreover, we study one particular form of budget inflexibility and its connection with one specific (but perhaps the most important) political force driving the budget process. More specifically, we discuss some of the consequences of "expenditure inflexibility," defined as the existence of transfers to special interests enjoying constitutional or legal protection which impede their modification in the short run, in a simple model of legislative bargaining that captures the Tragedy of the Commons present in public budget allocation. ; El estudio de las instituciones presupuestales ha sido por mucho tiempo un tema importante en la literatura económica. Sin embargo, el grado de rigidez o flexibilidad en la preparación del presupuesto, una preocupación vieja y primordial para las autoridades de política y, en particular, para los ministros de Hacienda, ha sido relativamente inexplorada. En este documento se muestra que la inflexibilidad presupuestal puede tomar diversas formas y que está estrechamente relacionada con diversos tipos de conflicto político presentes en el proceso presupuestal. Adicionalmente, se estudia una forma particular de inflexibilidad presupuestal y su conexión con una fuerza política específica (pero quizá la más importante) tras el proceso presupuestal. Más concretamente, se presenta un modelo simple de negociación legislativa que captura la Tragedia de los Comunes que está presente en la distribución del presupuesto público para discutir algunas de las consecuencias de la "inflexibilidad en el gasto", definida como la existencia de transferencias que benefician a grupos de interés particulares y que gozan de protección legal o constitucional que impiden su modificación en el corto plazo.

El gobierno colombiano tiene un escaso margen de maniobra al preparar el Presupuesto General de la Nación ya que un alto porcentaje de los gastos que debe hacer cada año está predeterminado por un numeroso conjunto de leyes y de artículos constitucionales. En este trabajo se hace un diagnóstico sobre la magnitud y origen de la "inflexibilidad" presupuestal, y se discuten posibles soluciones. La inflexibilidad compromete la capacidad de los representantes elegidos para ejecutar sus planes de gobierno, puede poner en peligro la estabilidad macroeconómica, favorece el exceso de apropiaciones por parte de grupos de interés, dificulta la posibilidad de llevar a cabo ajustes en situaciones fiscales deficitarias, dificulta la definición de prioridades, favorece la duplicidad de erogaciones para un mismo fin y le resta transparencia al proceso presupuestal. En buena medida, las inflexibilidades surgen del interés del legislativo de garantizar rentas específicas para determinados sectores y regiones, contrarrestar su falta de acceso formal al presupuesto y limitar la discrecionalidad del ejecutivo. Las medidas orientadas hacia la flexibilización aplicarían sanos principios presupuestales, reconocidos a lo largo de cien años de historia de hacienda pública en Colombia. Para solucionar estos problemas, se sugiere modificar el esquema actual de asignación de transferencias y rentas de destinación específica, aplicar cabalmente el principio de unidad de caja en el presupuesto, establecer reglas de ahorro contingente para algunos fondos especiales, promover. ; The Colombian government has limited discretionality over its budget since a high proportion of its yearly expenses are predetermined by a set of laws and constitutional articles. This paper studies the problem of "budget inflexibility", assesses its origins and magnitude, and discusses possible solutions. Budget inflexibility limits the ability of elected representatives to carry over their policy programs, threatens macroeconomic stability, favors the capture of expenditure by interest groups, impedes the definition of priorities, facilitates the duplication of expenses for a single objective, and makes the budget process less transparent. Inflexibilities are largely due to the legislators' interest of granting rents for specific regions and sectors, to limit the discretion of the Executive and to countervail their lack of formal access to the budget. The paper shows that actions aimed at increasing flexibility would be aligned with sound budget principles, acknowledged for over a century of public finance history in Colombia. To solve these problems, the paper suggests modifying the current system of allocation of transfers and specific rents, fully applying the principle of "Unidad de Caja" (i.e. abolishing earmarking) , establishing contingent saving rules for special funds, promoting.

Exchanging one's vote for particularistic benefits - practices usually grouped under 'clientelism' - is often thought to weaken programmatic links between citizens and politicians and disincentivize public good provision, as well as undermine voter autonomy and the ideal role of elections. However, empirically analyzing this key phenomenon for the working of democracies entails formidable challenges. We conduct list experiments on a large sample of households to estimate the incidence of clientelistic vote buying, as well as the extent to which respondents refrain from openly recognizing this behavior. Nearly one out of every five respondents engage in clientelism and, surprisingly, they do not feel ashamed to admit it. Using the literature to guide our analysis, we examine the robust correlates of clientelism, finding that vote buying increases with poverty, reciprocity, disregard for the rule of law and, challenging several theories, interest in politics. ; Con frecuencia se argumenta que intercambiar el voto por beneficios particulares - practicas usualmente agrupadas como 'clientelismo' - debilita los vínculos programáticos entre ciudadanos y políticos y desincentiva la provisión de bienes públicos para el bienestar general, además de atentar contra la autonomía del elector y el papel ideal de las elecciones. Sin embargo, es difícil analizar empíricamente este crucial comportamiento para la democracia. Para superar este reto, aplicamos experimentos de lista a una muestra grande de hogares para estimar la incidencia de la venta de votos y calcular qué tanto los encuestados se abstienen de reconocer abiertamente este comportamiento. Casi uno de cada cinco encuestados se involucra en el clientelismo y, sorprendentemente, no se sienten avergonzados de admitirlo. Usando la literatura existente como guía, examinamos la incidencia y correlaciones más sobresalientes del clientelismo, encontrando que la compra de votos aumenta con la pobreza, la reciprocidad, el desconocimiento del imperio de la ley y, desafiando varias teorías, el interés por la política.