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This article reviews recent contributions addressing the following questions: Under what circumstances is monetary policy delegated to politically independent central banks? What effects do these politically independent institutions have, and how do they interact with their macroeconomic institutional environment? What explains the variation in their behavior? And finally, to what extent has the recent economic crisis altered the role of these institutions? In answering these questions, this article advances two arguments. First, even though central banks' activities involve a great deal of technical knowledge, they are unavoidably political institutions: They make distributional choices informed by ideas, preferences, and the political context in which they operate. Second, the economic crisis, by expanding the type of activities that monetary authorities undertake, further contributes to the politicization of these institutions. The final section of the article speculates about the implications of these developments for economic policy making in contemporary democracies.

En las democracias modernas, el instrumento esencial a través del cual las preferencias de la población se trasmiten a las decisiones políticas es el voto. Mediante el voto se selecciona para el próximo mandato a los gobernantes cuyas políticas sean las más cercanas a los deseos del electorado (voto prospectivo), o bien se reparten premios y castigos a los gobernantes del período inmediatamente anterior en función de su rendimiento con el fin de incentivarlos a que actúen de la forma más preferida por el electorado (voto retrospectivo). Paradójicamente, en las mismas democracias modernas se han ido estableciendo diferentes tipos de mecanismos con el fin de aislar la toma de decisiones políticas de la influencia del voto, por ser ésta considerada como perniciosa. ; Peer reviewed

What is the impact of economic suffering on support for euro membership and austerity policies in the Eurozone periphery? This article uses original public opinion and firm surveys conducted in Spain in the midst of the great recession to describe the structure of preferences toward the euro as a common currency and austerity policies, focusing on the specific impact of crisis exposure. We find that in spite of the depth and the duration of the economic crisis, support for Spain's membership in the Eurozone is strong. However, while economic suffering divides the electorate on support for the euro and austerity, it does not do so for firms. Surprisingly, individuals who have suffered due to the crisis in terms of higher income loss are more skeptical of tax and spend programs but are more critical of the euro. Moreover, individuals who are skeptical of the euro and austerity are demographically distinct groups of people. One implication of our joint individual and firm-level findings is that a coalition to seriously challenge the status quo policy coalition remains difficult.