Suchergebnisse

The unequal distribution of refugees across countries could unravel the international refugee protection system or, in the case of the EU, hinder a common policy response to refugee crises. A way to distribute refugees efficiently, while respecting their rights, is to combine two market mechanisms. First, a market for tradable refugee admission quotas that allows refugees to be established wherever it is less costly to do so. Second, a matching system that links refugees to their preferred destinations, and host countries to their preferred types of refugees. The proposal is efficient but has yet to be tested in practice. ; Support from the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grant MDM 2014-0431, and Comunidad de Madrid, grant MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444), is gratefully acknowledged

The unequal distribution of refugees across countries could unravel the international refugee protection system or, in the case of the EU, hinder a common policy response to refugee crises. A way to distribute refugees efficiently, while respecting their rights, is to combine two market mechanisms. First, a market for tradable refugee admission quotas that allows refugees to be established wherever it is less costly to do so. Second, a matching system that links refugees to their preferred destinations, and host countries to their preferred types of refugees. The proposal is efficient but has yet to be tested in practice.

25 pages.-- JEL Classification Number: F22. ; Unilateral migration policies impose externalities on other countries. In order to try to internalize these externalities, countries sign bilateral migration agreements. One element of these agreements is the emphasis on enforcing migration policies: immigrant-receiving countries agree to allow more immigrants from their emigrant-sending partner if they cooperate in enforcing their migration policy at the border. I present a simple theoretical model that justifies this behavior in a two-country setting with welfare maximizing governments. These governments establish migration quotas that need to be enforced at a cost. I prove that uncoordinated migration policies are inefficient. Both countries can improve welfare by exchanging a more "generous" migration quota for expenditure on enforcement policy. Contrary to what could be expected, this result does not depend on the enforcement technology that both countries employ. ; Peer reviewed

Although the EU's asylum system needs reform, there has not yet been much progress. Most proposals involve mandatory quotas, which distribute refugees according to GDP, population size, and other measures of reception capacity. More flexibility can be achieved through two market elements: tradable quotas and matching. The opportunity to trade quotas minimizes countries' overall costs of providing asylum. The matching system improves refugees' integration outcomes by respecting their preferences over host countries, and vice versa. Beyond the EU, the proposal can be applied to other international efforts, such as refugee resettlement via the UNHCR. ; Support from the Ministerio de Ciencia e Innovación (Spain), grant PID2019-111095RB-I00 and Comunidad de Madrid (Spain), grant EPUC3M11 (V PRICIT)

The Syrian Civil War gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. The crisis evidenced the deficiencies of the European Union Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. We draw on previous theoretical work to simulate how a system of tradable refugee-admission quotas coupled with a matching mechanism assigning refugees to their preferred destinations and destinations to their preferred types of refugees would give more flexibility to Member States while respecting refugee rights and preferences.

Abstract The Syrian Civil War gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. The crisis evidenced the deficiencies of the European Union Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. We draw on previous theoretical work to simulate how a system of tradable refugee-admission quotas coupled with a matching mechanism assigning refugees to their preferred destinations and destinations to their preferred types of refugees would give more flexibility to Member States while respecting refugee rights and preferences. JEL codes: F22, F5, H87, I3, K33, 019.

The scale of international migration flows depends on moving costs that are, in turn, influenced by host-country policies. This paper shows how to estimate the influence of policies upon bilateral migration flows to multiple destinations. We rely on a Poisson pseudo-maximum likelihood estimator to derive estimates that are consistent under more general distributional assumptions on the underlying RUM model than the ones commonly adopted in the literature. We derive bounds for the estimated direct and indirect effects of migration policies that reflect the uncertainty connected to the use of aggregate data, and we show that bilateral migration flows can be highly sensitive to the immigration policies set by other destination countries, an externality that we are able to quantify ; This research was supported by the Agence Nationale de la Recherche of the French government through the program "Investissements d'avenir" (ANR-10-LABX-14-01) and by the FERDI (Fondation pour les études et recherches sur le développement international). Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga received financial support from the ECO2008-04785 and ECO2012-39412 projects funded by the Spanish Ministry for Economics and Competitiveness

The current EU Asylum policy is widely seen as ine ective and unfair. We propose an EU-wide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum-seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries' and migrants' preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta (EUREMA) program. ; Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga received financial support from the ECO2008-04785 and ECO2012-39412 projects funded by the Spanish Ministry for Economics and Competitiveness. Hillel Rapoport acknowledges support from the Paris School of Economics \Appel a projets 2013" and from CEPREMAP.

The Syrian Civil War gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. The crisis evidenced the deficiencies of the European Union Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. We draw on previous theoretical work to simulate how a system of tradable refugee-admission quotas coupled with a matching mechanism assigning refugees to their preferred destinations and destinations to their preferred types of refugees would give more flexibility to Member States while respecting refugee rights and preferences. ; Jesús Fernández-Huertas Moraga received financial support from the ECO2012-39412 project funded by the Spanish Ministry for Economics and Competitiveness.

The Syrian Civil War gave rise to the largest refugee flight reaching Europe since the Yugoslavian wars in the 1990s. The crisis evidenced the deficiencies of the European Union Asylum Policy, which struggled both to offer solutions to Syrian refugees and to efficiently allocate costs across Member States. We draw on previous theoretical work to simulate how a system of tradable refugee-admission quotas coupled with a matching mechanism assigning refugees to their preferred destinations and destinations to their preferred types of refugees would give more flexibility to Member States while respecting refugee rights and preferences.

The current EU Asylum policy is widely seen as ineffective and unfair. We propose an EU-wide market for tradable quotas on both refugees and asylum-seekers coupled with a matching mechanism linking countries' and migrants' preferences. We show that the proposed system can go a long way towards addressing the shortcomings of the current system. We illustrate this claim using the recent problems regarding relocation faced by the European Relocation from Malta (EUREMA) program.