Suchergebnisse

The Presumption of innocence constitutes a procedural principle which organizes the penal lawsuit, by indicating which of the parts will have to support the burden of proof, and by sending back the defendant of the end of the proceedings as soon as there is a doubt. Devoted on the international level, and more recently, on the national level, by the laws of January 4th, 1993, and June 15 th, 2000, this principe, closely related to the problem of the penal proof, went through a slow and difficult emergence. Indeed, the criminal Ordinance as well as the system of the penal proof which is consubstantial with the criminal Ordinance impose on the judge to condemn as soon as the proof is put together. The doubt cannot exist for a defendant who was supposed guilty. The Revolution was going however to register the Presumption of innocence in a Declaration of the Right of and of the Citizen, and who not only intended to release men from the obsolete framework of the Ancient Regime, but also to protect it from its rigours. When they voted the article 9 of this text, the Settiors were not aware of its procedural dimension. The consecration of the jury and of the intimate conviction, as well by the law of September 16-29 1791 as by the directive of the criminal code, maintains this blindness. In spite of the revival of the criminal law which is freed from the weight represented by the power of the civil law, the 19th century stays almost quiet on this principe. We will have innocence. However, its reception remains imperfect. It is criticized in its application and the criminal law created presumptions of culpability. The recent legislative interventions do not enable to stop the erosion of this principle since they bring a confusion between the procedural principle and a principle contributing to the freedom of the defence and the rights of the person. The presumption of innocence then remains fragile in spite of its recognition. ; La Présomption d'innocence constitue un principe procédural qui organise le procès pénal, en désignant celle des parties qui aura à supporter la charge de la preuve, et en renvoyant l'accusé des fins de la poursuite dès lors qu'il existe un doute. Consacré sur le plan international, et plus récemment, au plan national, par les lois des 4 janvier 1993 et 15 juin 2000, ce principe, intimement lié au problème de la preuve pénale, connut une émergence lente et laborieuse. En effet, l'Ordonnance criminelle ainsi que le système de la preuve légale qui lui est consubstantiel imposent au juge de condamner dès que la preuve est réunie. Le doute ne peut exister pour un accusé que l'on supposait coupable. La Révolution allait cependant inscrire la présomption d'innocence, dans une Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen, et qui entendait libérer les hommes des cadres obsolètes de l'Ancien régime, mais aussi le protéger de ses rigueurs. Quand ils votèrent l'article 9 de ce texte, les Constituants en ignorèrent la dimension procédurale. La consécration du jury et de l'intime conviction, tant par la loi du 16-29 septembre 1791 que par le Code d'instruction criminelle, maintient cette cécité. Malgré le renouveau du droit pénal qui s'affranchit du poids représenté par la toute puissance du seul droit civil, le XIXème reste presque silencieux sur ce principe. Il faudra attendre le XXème pour voir clairement exposé le mécanisme procédural de la présomption d'innocence. Toutefois, sa réception demeure imparfaite. Il est critiqué dans son application et la loi pénale créa des présomptions de culpabilité. Les récentes interventions législatives ne permettent pas d'enrayer l'érosion de ce principe puisqu'elles installent une confusion entre le principe procédural et un principe concourant à la liberté de la défense et des droits de la personne. La présomption d'innocence reste donc d'une fragilité certaine malgré sa pleine reconnaissance.

The Presumption of innocence constitutes a procedural principle which organizes the penal lawsuit, by indicating which of the parts will have to support the burden of proof, and by sending back the defendant of the end of the proceedings as soon as there is a doubt. Devoted on the international level, and more recently, on the national level, by the laws of January 4th, 1993, and June 15 th, 2000, this principe, closely related to the problem of the penal proof, went through a slow and difficult emergence. Indeed, the criminal Ordinance as well as the system of the penal proof which is consubstantial with the criminal Ordinance impose on the judge to condemn as soon as the proof is put together. The doubt cannot exist for a defendant who was supposed guilty. The Revolution was going however to register the Presumption of innocence in a Declaration of the Right of and of the Citizen, and who not only intended to release men from the obsolete framework of the Ancient Regime, but also to protect it from its rigours. When they voted the article 9 of this text, the Settiors were not aware of its procedural dimension. The consecration of the jury and of the intimate conviction, as well by the law of September 16-29 1791 as by the directive of the criminal code, maintains this blindness. In spite of the revival of the criminal law which is freed from the weight represented by the power of the civil law, the 19th century stays almost quiet on this principe. We will have innocence. However, its reception remains imperfect. It is criticized in its application and the criminal law created presumptions of culpability. The recent legislative interventions do not enable to stop the erosion of this principle since they bring a confusion between the procedural principle and a principle contributing to the freedom of the defence and the rights of the person. The presumption of innocence then remains fragile in spite of its recognition. ; La Présomption d'innocence constitue un principe procédural qui organise le procès pénal, en ...