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Executive Summary: Lessons for the EU 1. Accommodating diversity by balancing the claims of constituent political entities and citizens This report builds on the results of WP4 and provides a succinct summary of the deliverables D4.1 to D4.9 focussing on the lessons they contain for the European Union. The EU has followed a process that is similar to our case studies (Switzerland, Canada, Spain, Czechia, Turkey, Estonia, Croatia, Israel) yet a few things have to be borne in mind before drawing conclusions: - There is no broad consensus on EU integration as state-building - The time-span in which the EU has evolved is much shorter than our case studies - The speed at which the EU has integrated is also much faster than our case studies Our case studies reveal two fundamentally different paths of addressing diversity and delivering solutions to respond to the rivalling claims of different communities. A first path consists of emphasizing and protecting differences, while at the same time building a common set of values that encompasses all communities within the territory. This is done either by a symmetrically federal (Switzerland) or asymmetrically decentralized constitutional design of statehood (Canada, Spain). The second path consists of emphasizing and protecting unity and homogeneity, whereas at the same time trying to minimize differences. Again with different degrees of success, the Czech Republic, Croatia, Estonia, Israel and Turkey are examples from our case studies. As for the EU, it seems that the model that comes closer to the integration process is the one that accepts and tries to protect diversity, while building a common set of values, a common identity and common political institutions. The common identity can only be a civic or political meta-identity and it needs to be embedded in a political model in which the EU is designed and perceived as the guarantee and not source of threat to the existence and identity of constituent communities. The resulting federal system must attach great value to ...

AbstractObjectiveThis article reassesses the gender differences in COVID‐19 attitudes and behavior found in previous studies by examining to what extent the gender gap in the adoption of COVID‐19 preventive behaviors is dependent on women's and men's perceptions of risk.MethodsThe data utilized in this study were obtained from the "Understanding America Study Coronavirus in America ('COVID') Survey," conducted by the Center for Economic and Social Research (CESR), at the University of Southern California.ResultThis study shows that women are more risk averse than men, but that the gender gap in risk behavior depends on the level of risk that is associated with COVID‐19.ConclusionRisk perception is a stronger driver of risk behavior for men than for women, who generally tend to adopt safe measures to protect themselves and others. Different messages should be delivered to women and men to increase compliance with norms.

Defence date: 26 November 2012 ; Examining Board: Professor Alexander Trechsel, European University Institute (supervisor); Professor Hanspeter Kriesi, European University Institute; Professor José Ramón Montero, Universidad Autonóma de Madrid; Professor Bernhard Wessels, Social Science Research Centre Berlin. ; The object of this thesis is Europeans' orientations to democracy. It is argued in this dissertation that an important variable has been missed in the literature, namely, citizens' cognitive support for democracy. By including this concept in the analysis of Europeans' support for democracy, a number of aspects which had been much uncertain until now are inspected. First, conceptual clarification of support for democracy is possible, by distinguishing different types of orientations to democracy. Second, and from an empirical perspective, classical indicators of support for democracy are examined, in order to assess for validity. Interesting results have emerged from the analysis: 1. Determining the structure and the levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The classic churchillian indicator ('democracy best') overstates levels of affective support for democracy in Europe. The structure of affective support for democracy is in fact not homogeneous across Europe, but differs substantially from one group of countries to the others. 2. Mapping types of democrats across Europe. There are different types of democrats across Europe, depending on their cognitive orientations to democracy. These are not evenly spread within each country, but there is correspondence between the structure and levels of affective support and the predominant type of democrats in a country. 3. Studying why people are dis-satisfied with democracy in Europe. The congruence hypothesis (are citizens' orientations to democracy meaningfully related among them?) is tested. Most citizens are indeed fairly congruent: cognitive and affective supports have an impact on the evaluations of their democratic systems. As such, not only is it possible to determine some of the causes of dis-satisfaction with democracy, but also to claim that the indicator of satisfaction with democracy does reasonably well as a measure of general support for the performance of the regime.

Switzerland as a model for the EU / Francis Cheneval and Mónica Ferrin -- The EU and the Canadian mirror : citizenship, multinationalism and multiculturalism / Clara ISabel Velasco Rico and Marc Sanjaume-Calvert -- Linguistic policies and citizens' claims in a multinational state : the case of Spain / Andrea C. Bianculli, Jacint Jordana and Siresa Lopez -- The Czech Republic : minority rights since the days of the Hapsburg Empire / Vit Hloušek -- Minority policy and social rights : the case of Estonia / Gaabriel Tavits -- Turkey : minorities and citizenship claims / Hakan Yılmaz, section 6.1 with the assistance of Çaǧdan Erdoǧan -- Accomodating rivalling claims to citizenship in federations : lessons from the EU / Marc Sanjaume-Calvert -- Nation building process versus community claims : taking stock of analyzed examples of unitary states / Vit Hloušek

Recent studies emphasise gender attitudes as an explanation for the gender gap in the radical-right vote. However, little is known on whether the (mis)match between the issues that are given the most salience by radical-right parties and (wo)men's issue priorities accounts for the gender gap in the radical-right vote. Merging a large series of barometers conducted in Spain, including more than 9,000 radical-right voters from January 2020 to March 2023, we find that issue priorities are gendered and that VOX's support is mainly driven by male issues. Also, importantly, regional nationalism and gender – two of VOX's flagship issues – affect women's and men's probability of voting for VOX differently. These findings indicate that the main determinants of voting for VOX are largely driven by men, not women.

AbstractThis article analyzes individuals' preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals' position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals' position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals' position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey.

Financiado para publicación en acceso aberto: Universidade da Coruña/CISUG ; [Abstract] This article analyzes individuals' preferences for a consensus or a majoritarian type of democracy. We theorize that variation in these preferences is a function of both institutional learning (long term) and individuals' position as a political minority or majority (short term). First, as a result of institutional learning, we expect that individuals living in democracies characterized by coalition governments will favor consensus democracy. Conversely, those living in countries characterized by single-party executives will favor majoritarian democracy. Second, we expect that individuals' position as an electoral minority or majority will affect these beliefs. Those who vote for small parties will favor a consensus democracy, while those who vote for large parties will support a majoritarian system. However, whether institutional learning or individuals' position as a political minority or majority prevail in influencing these preferences about the ideal model of democracy will be a function of the democratic trajectory of each country. We test these arguments drawing on data from the European Social Survey. ; This research has received financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science, Innovation, and Universities through research grant CSO2017-83086-R

AbstractOn the basis of a combined examination of normative claims and empirical evidence this paper discusses minimal criteria for the institutional design of referendums on EU‐internal issues. These criteria concern the mandatory (vs. optional), the simultaneous (vs. serial) and binding (vs. consultative) nature of referendums. The proposed criteria are demanding, both for the Member States and the European Union, but experiences show that the EU is in fact participating actively in EU‐issues referendums and Member States as well as the EU need to surpass the current arbitrary use of plebiscites by governments. On a broader scale the paper contributes to the insight that it might be time to fully address the use of direct democracy at the national and EU levels.

AbstractThere is much concern today about the spread of fake news and the misinformation it can produce among the public. In this article, we investigate how the American public interprets accurate and inaccurate statements from the news. Moving beyond partisanship, we theorize that ideological and ethnoracial identities also shape individuals' interpretations of the news. We argue that people have incentives to interpret information they encounter in ways that favor their ideological and ethnoracial ingroups and that these incentives are particularly strong when ideological and ethnoracial identities align. Using a survey that asks respondents to classify statements from news stories as facts or opinions, we find support for these hypotheses. Liberals and conservatives, and white, Black, and Hispanic respondents, more often classify as factual statements that favor their ingroup's interests while classifying information opposing their ingroup's interests as opinions. Holding cross-cutting ethnoracial and ideological identities diminishes these effects, while identities that align produce stronger ingroup biases in information processing, particularly among whites. Our study reveals that it is not only partisanship but also ideological and ethnoracial identities that shape how Americans interpret the news, and therefore how informed, or misinformed, they are.

[Abstract] There is much concern today about the spread of fake news and the misinformation it can produce among the public. In this article, we investigate how the American public interprets accurate and inaccurate statements from the news. Moving beyond partisanship, we theorize that ideological and ethnoracial identities also shape individuals' interpretations of the news. We argue that people have incentives to interpret information they encounter in ways that favor their ideological and ethnoracial ingroups and that these incentives are particularly strong when ideological and ethnoracial identities align. Using a survey that asks respondents to classify statements from news stories as facts or opinions, we find support for these hypotheses. Liberals and conservatives, and white, Black, and Hispanic respondents, more often classify as factual statements that favor their ingroup's interests while classifying information opposing their ingroup's interests as opinions. Holding cross-cutting ethnoracial and ideological identities diminishes these effects, while identities that align produce stronger ingroup biases in information processing, particularly among whites. Our study reveals that it is not only partisanship but also ideological and ethnoracial identities that shape how Americans interpret the news, and therefore how informed, or misinformed, they are.

There is much concern today about the spread of fake news and the misinformation it can produce among the public. In this article, we investigate how the American public interprets accurate and inaccurate statements from the news. Moving beyond partisanship, we theorize that ideological and ethnoracial identities also shape individuals' interpretations of the news. We argue that people have incentives to interpret information they encounter in ways that favor their ideological and ethnoracial ingroups and that these incentives are particularly strong when ideological and ethnoracial identities align. Using a survey that asks respondents to classify statements from news stories as facts or opinions, we find support for these hypotheses. Liberals and conservatives, and white, Black, and Hispanic respondents, more often classify as factual statements that favor their ingroup's interests while classifying information opposing their ingroup's interests as opinions. Holding cross-cutting ethnoracial and ideological identities diminishes these effects, while identities that align produce stronger ingroup biases in information processing, particularly among whites. Our study reveals that it is not only partisanship but also ideological and ethnoracial identities that shape how Americans interpret the news, and therefore how informed, or misinformed, they are.