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Previous studies have applied theories of European integration to interpret crisis-led policymaking processes and integration outcomes in the EU. However, there has been little attempt to appraise the analytical leverage offered by major integration theories as a function of different crisis pressures. We theorize that diverse combinations of crisis pressures generate four decision-making scenarios in the EU, each of which can be ascribed to different combinations of analytical insights from neofunctionalism, intergovernmentalism, postfunctionalism, and federalism. We illustrate the value of our framework in relation to four EU crises concerning the euro area, refugees, Brexit and Covid-19. Overall, the paper makes a theoretical contribution to advance the debate on crisis-led integration in the EU.

Does the framing of crises shape public support for inter-state solidarity? We focus on three dimensions that have been salient in the characterisation of European Union crises and may affect public support for solidarity more generally: (a) how country-specific or common a crisis is; (b) whether policymakers are seen as responsible for the crisis or not; and (c) how existential or manageable the threat posed by a crisis appears. We employ a pre-registered factorial vignette experiment conducted in 15 European Union countries to assess how characterising a hypothetical crisis affects voter support for fiscal and financial solidarity. Our results show that exposure to different crises frames shapes public support for risk-sharing in the European Union. Changes in solidaristic attitudes vary significantly with the means of fiscal risk-sharing proposed.

Does culture have a causal effect on institutional trust? We answer this question by assessing the non-economic determinants of public trust in the European Central Bank. To analyse institutional trust, we employ a novel dataset of citizen perceptions and knowledge about the European Central Bank. Cultural traits are measured by indicators of social trust at the level of Euro area sub-national regions. We show that individuals living in regions with lower social trust systematically exhibit less trust in the European Central Bank. An instrumental variable approach based on historical variables of education and political institutions supports a causal interpretation of our findings. These results are robust across different model specifications and measures of trust.

AbstractTechnocracy has come to be increasingly regarded as a threat to representative democracy. Significant attention has thus been recently devoted to exploring public preferences towards technocratic institutions. Elected policy‐makers' attitudes have instead not been investigated as systematically. This article fills this gap by examining politicians' views on central banks. Based on an original elite survey of the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), we gauged elected policy‐makers' attitudes towards the mandate and policy conduct of the European Central Bank (ECB). Our findings show that the political orientation of politicians largely drives attitudes towards the ECB's institutional mandate. Interestingly, the findings from two experiments embedded in the survey also show that the attitudes of MEPs are not as static as ideological orientations would lead us to expect. The information set to which politicians are exposed significantly shapes their views on both the ECB's mandate and its policy conduct, but less on ECB independence.

Previous scholarship on central bank accountability has generally focused on monetary authorities' deeds and words while largely ignoring the other side of the accountability relationship, namely politicians' voice on monetary policy. This raises a fundamental question: what are central banks held accountable for by elected officials? To answer this question, we employ structural topic models on a new dataset of the Monetary Dialogues between the Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) and the President of the European Central Bank (ECB) from 1999 to 2019. Our findings are twofold. First, we uncover differences in how MEPs keep the ECB accountable for its primary, price stability objective. We show that European politicians also attempt to keep the central bank accountable for a broader set of issues that are connected with, but distinct from, the central bank's primary goal. Second, we show that unemployment is a key explanatory variable for the political voice articulated by individual MEPs in accountability settings. In particular, higher rates of domestic unemployment lead MEPs to devote less voice on issues related to the ECB's primary mission. These findings reveal the existence of a "political" Phillips curve reaction function, which enriches our understanding of the principal–agent accountability relationship between politicians and central bankers.