Suchergebnisse

A Resolução 1325 do Conselho de Segurança da ONU, aprovada em 2000 marcou um importante passo dado pela comunidade internacional na relação entre mulheres, paz e segurança. De modo a materializá-la, os Estados desenvolveram Planos de Ação Nacionais que abordassem a temática da Resolução. O presente artigo busca explicar os motivos pelos quais a maioria desses Planos fracassaram com a contribuição teórica dos Estudos Feministas de Segurança e conclui, a partir do estudo de caso da Dinamarca, que a perspectiva Estadocêntrica e a metodologia top-down adotadas no texto da Resolução são alguns dos motivos que comprometem a viabilidade desses NAPs.

This paper analyses the effects of tariffs on an international economy with a monopolistic sector with two firms, located in two countries, each one producing a homogeneous good for both home consumption and export to the other identical country. We consider a game among governments and firms. First, the government imposes a tariff on imports and then we consider the two types of moving: simultaneous (Cournot-type model) and sequential (Stackelberg-type model) decisions by the firms. We also compare the results obtained in each model. ; ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto

Este livro é o nº 103 da Coleção Ensaios da Fundação, a qual é dedicada à divulgação e reflexão sobre temas relevantes do nosso tempo, no caso, Cuidados Paliativos. A sua importância é sublinhada pelo prefácio escrito pelo Presidente da República, Professor Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa.

Lisbon is one of the European Union cities that has one of the highest growth in the number of hotels. With the digital revolution, travelers can easily not only compare prices but also get information about the experience of other guests which can influence prices. The aim of this paper is to analyze how prices for a hotel stay can be influenced by some quality signaling factors, as star rating and online consumer's ratings (location, cleanliness, comfort, facilities, staff and value for money, available on Booking.com), the volume of consumer's comments and the availability of rooms in Lisbon. For 151 hotels in Lisbon, from 3 to 5 stars, through a multiple regression model, the results suggest that hotel category, location and facilities ratings have a positive influence on hotel room rates, but higher trade-off between what clients pay and the guest hotel stay experience has a negative impact on the consumer's willingness to pay, as well as the number of comments. Among different hotel categories, the influent factors are different. Our main findings provide signs to hoteliers to take corrective actions towards the attributes most valuable for consumers and that can provide a higher room rate premium. ; Lisboa é uma das cidades da União Europeia onde o número de hotéis tem tido uma das maiores taxas de crescimento. Com a revolução digital os turistas podem facilmente comparar preços bem como obter informações acerca da experiência dos hóspedes, o que pode influenciar os preços. O objetivo deste artigo é o de analisar de que forma os preços podem ser influenciados por fatores sinalizadores de qualidade, como a categoria (número de estrelas), avaliações online (localização, limpeza, conforto, comodidades, funcionários e relação qualidade/preço, disponíveis no booking.com), o número de comentários dos hóspedes e a disponibilidade de quartos em Lisboa. Para 151 hotéis, de 3 a 5 estrelas, através de um modelo de regressão múltipla, os resultados sugerem que a categoria do hotel, os ratings de localização e comodidades têm uma influência positiva no preço, mas um maior trade-off entre o que os clientes pagam e a experiência que usufruem tem um impacto negativo na vontade de pagar, assim como o número de comentários. Verifica-se, ainda, que os fatores influentes diferem entre hotéis com diferentes categorias. Os resultados fornecem pistas para os hoteleiros promoverem ações corretivas relativamente aos atributos mais valorizados e que podem proporcionar um maior prémio no preço dos quartos. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

In this paper, we will analyse the relationship between privatization of a public firm and tax revenue for the domestic government in an international competition, with import tariffs. We consider a duopoly model where a domestic public firmand a foreign private firmcompete in the domesticmarket, asCournot players. Furthermore, the domestic government imposes a tariff to regulate an imported good, and may have a higher preference for tariff revenue than for social welfare. We compute the outputs at equilibrium and we show that privatization (i) will increase the profits of both domestic and foreign firms; (ii) will increase the tariff imposed to the imported good; and (iii) will decrease the domestic welfare. Furthermore, we demonstrate that a rise in the government's preference for tariff revenues raises the social welfare in both mixed and private models. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

We will consider a mixed Bertrand duopoly model (that means, two firms decide simultaneously their prices for a substitutable good) to study the relationship between the privatization of a state-owned public firm and government preferences for tax revenue. In the model, we assume that the government imposes a specific tax rate on the quantity produced by each firm. Furthermore, the public firm aims to maximize social welfare, whereas the government's objective function is a weighted sum between social welfare and tax revenue. Of course, the private firm aims to maximize its own profit. We also present comparative static results. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

Studies of mixed oligopoly models have been increasingly popular in recent years. We can say that the main concerns of the privatization studies are the welfare effect and the method of privatization. Ferreira and Ferreira (2014) analysed the relationship between the privatization of a public firm and government preferences for tax revenue in a duopoly model, by assuming that the government payoff is given by a weighted sum of tax revenue and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. In this paper, we study the relationship between the partial privatization of the public firm and the government preferences for tax revenue. We consider a duopoly model with one semi-public firm and one private firm competing à la Cournot, that is choosing their outputs simultaneously. The private firm aims to maximize its own profit and we the objective function of the semi-public firm is a weighted sum between its own profit and the sum of consumer and producer surplus. The government imposes a specific tax on the production, and, furthermore, it chooses the level of privatization of the semi-public firm. The government payoff is the weighted sum between the sum of consumer and producer surplus and the tariff revenue. The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the government sets the tax rate and the level of privatization of the semi-public firm. In the second stage, each firm simultaneously chooses its output to the market. We compute the outputs at equilibrium and we show that full privatization will decrease (i) the specific tax rate; (ii) the aggregate output in the market; and (iii) the government's payoff. In addition, full privatization will increase the profits of both firms. Furthermore, we show that as the government preference for the tax revenue becomes large, (i) the optimal tax rate increases, (ii) the output of both firms decrease; and (iii) the government payoff decreases. This paper contributes to the framework of partial privatization in a market with a specific tax on the production. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

In this paper, we study the effects of environmental and privatization in a mixed duopoly, in which the public firm aims to maximize the social welfare. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the government sets the environmental tax. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot competition, choosing output and pollution abatement levels. ; ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto

In this paper, we study an international market model in which the home government imposes a tariff on the imported goods. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize a function that cares about the home firm's profit and the total revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms. ; ESEIG and Polytechnic Institute of Porto

Published also at Lecture Notes in Engineering and Computer Science ; In this paper, we study an international duopoly market where firms set prices. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import Tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a price-setting competition. We study three different roles: (i) simultaneous decisions (Bertrand model); (ii) sequential decisions with home firm as the leader; and (iii) sequential decisions with home firm as the follower. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decisions make of the firms.

In this paper, we study an international market with demand uncertainty. The model has two stages. In the first stage, the home government chooses an import tariff to maximize the revenue. Then, the firms engage in a Cournot or in a Stackelberg competition. The uncertainty is resolved between the decisions made by the home government and by the firms. We compare the results obtained in the three different ways of moving on the decision make of the firms. ; ESEIG / Instituto Politécnico do Porto, Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior.

The purpose of this paper is to study the effects of environmental and trade policies in an international mixed duopoly serving two markets. We suppose that the firm in the home country is a welfare-maximizing public firm, while the firm in the foreign country is its own profit-maximizing private firm. We find that the environmental tax can be a strategic instrument for the home government to distribute production from the foreign private firm to the home public firm. An additional effect of the home environmental tax is the reduction of the foreign private firm's output for local consumption, thereby expanding the foreign market for the home public firm. ; ESEIG - Instituto Politecnico do Porto, Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto and the Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and MCTES.

This paper considers an international trade under Bertrand model with differentiated products and with unknown production costs. The home government imposes a specific import tariff per unit of imports from the foreign firm. We prove that this tariff is decreasing in the expected production costs of the foreign firm and increasing in the production costs of the home firm. Furthermore, it is increasing in the degree of product substitutability. We also show that an increase in the tariff results in both firms increasing their prices, an increase in both expected sales and expected profits for the home firm, and a decrease in both expected sales and expected profits for the foreign firm. ; Programs POCTI and POCI by FCT and Ministério da Ciência, Tecnologia e do Ensino Superior. ESEIG/IPP and Centro de Matemática da Universidade do Porto.