Government Size, Government Debt and Economic Performance with Particular Application to New Zealand
In: Economic Record, Band 90, Heft 290, S. 365-381
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In: Economic Record, Band 90, Heft 290, S. 365-381
SSRN
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 487-501
ISSN: 1911-9917
In this paper I quantify the effect of the tightening of the security precautions post-9/11 on the volume of cross-border shopping from Canada into the United States. Using an extended version of the cross-border shopping model of Ferris (2000) , the results suggest that the events of September 11th, 2001, precipitated a drop of between 300,000 and 600,000 same-day cross-border travellers per month or roughly a quarter of the previous volume.
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 36, Heft 4, S. 487-503
ISSN: 0317-0861
In: Public choice, Band 135, Heft 3-4, S. 449-468
ISSN: 1573-7101
In: The journal of economic history, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 918-919
ISSN: 1471-6372
In: International review of law and economics, Band 25, Heft 2, S. 290-310
ISSN: 0144-8188
In: Organization science, Band 15, Heft 1, S. 22-37
ISSN: 1526-5455
We utilize research on alliance governance structures and on new product development to study how partners working under an existing alliance governance structure will organize a new product development project. Initially, we consider a contractual alliance doing multiple projects and argue that the critical organization decisions for any project are whether one or both partners should be involved, whether the partners should work with little or considerable interaction, and whether decision-making authority should reside in a project manager or be consensual. Based on the answers to these questions, we identify at least four viable project organization options. We next examine the option that would be selected under conditions involving the alliance's newness, whether a cooperative history exists, and the distribution of skills for the project. Under each condition, we compare the costs and benefits of the options with respect to the underlying transaction costs, potential for learning, and the ability to contribute to developing a social relations network. By allowing variations in time-to-market pressures, the tacit knowledge that a partner can obtain from the project, and the partners' need to work closely together on future projects, we can determine the points at which costs and benefits indicate a switch from one organization option to another. Finally, we indicate how to adjust the theory for it to apply to a contractual alliance doing only one project and to an institutional alliance such as a joint venture.
In: The journal of development studies: JDS, Band 39, Heft 4, S. 84-111
ISSN: 0022-0388
In: Cambridge elements : Elements in public economics
Why is an understanding of political competition essential for the study of public economics and public policy generally? How can political competition be described and understood, and how does it differ from its strictly economic counterpart? What are the implications of the fact that policy proposals in a democracy must always pass a political test? What are the strengths and weaknesses of electoral competition as a mechanism for the allocation of economic resources? Why are tax structures in democratic polities so complicated, and what implications follow from this for normative views about good policy choice? How can we measure the intensity of political competition, why and how does it vary in mature democracies, and what are the consequences? This Element considers the approach to answer these questions, while also illustrating some of the interesting theoretical and empirical work that has been done on them.
In: European journal of political economy, Band 77, S. 102313
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 27, Heft 6, S. 1105-1119
ISSN: 1460-3683
The consequences of variations in economic growth for vote volatility are analyzed on a panel of 14 Indian states between 1957 and 2013. Two measures of volatility are used: changes in party vote shares at the assembly level and changes in the state average of vote volatilities constructed at the constituency level. While the results find that both vary inversely with income growth rates, volatility at the constituency level is found to be more sensitive to growth rates. Examination of the periodicity of income growth's impact finds that growth in the final year of governance has a stronger effect on volatility than does the average growth rate arising over the incumbent's tenure. We confirm for Indian states that vote volatility responds more to negative changes than positive changes in the growth rate and, by decomposing volatility we find, contrary to most studies, that growth rates affect internal vote shifting more than shifting between exiting parties and newcomers. The responsiveness of volatility to economic and political characteristics of the state reinforces the hypothesis that theories of economic voting have an important role to play in understanding electoral volatility and may provide a more insightful way of approaching the political business cycle.
In: Party politics: an international journal for the study of political parties and political organizations, Band 26, Heft 5, S. 543-554
ISSN: 1460-3683
Two margins of political party life in Canada since Confederation (1867) are analyzed—the extensive margin involving entry and exit (together with party turnover or churning) and the intensive margin determining survival length. The results confirm many hypotheses advanced to explain entry and exit—the importance of social and religious cleavage, election institutions, and economic circumstance. More novel are the findings that public election funding and periods with larger immigration flows have reinforced established parties at the expense of entrants and smaller sized parties. The intensive margin uses a discrete hazard model with discrete finite mixtures to confirm the Duverger-type presence of two distinct long-lived political parties surrounded by a fringe of smaller parties. Both parametric and semi-parametric models concur in finding that public funding and higher immigration flows are as successful in extending the life of established parties as in discouraging entry and exit.
We investigate the extent to which the intensity of political competition moderates the governance issues that arise in relation to Canada's fiscal structure. By fiscal structure we mean three distinct but interrelated fiscal dimensions of the state: financial stability, long run size and short run interventions into the private economy with respect to the business cycle. The paper is distinctive in focusing on four measures of political competitiveness that reflect the degree of competition in and between national parliamentary elections: the size of the majority of the governing party in the House; the distribution of the volatility adjusted winning margins of the governing party; the proportion of electorally marginal constituencies adjusted for asymmetry between parties; and a multiparty measure of the competitiveness of elections at the constituency level. The analysis accounts for the differing time series properties of the political and economic variables and the comingling of long and short term fiscal policies in the time series data. Estimation using a sequence of ARDL models indicates that greater political competition enhances fiscal stability, speeds up convergence of government size from above on fundamentals, and helps to align fiscal deficits better with the business cycle. The potential quantitative impact of more intense electoral competition is analyzed by applying the deficit model to the period of fiscal instability that arose in the 1980's and early 1990's.
BASE
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 7220
SSRN
In: Journal of institutional and theoretical economics: JITE, Band 173, Heft 4, S. 723
ISSN: 1614-0559