This article examines the relationship of pragmatism to the theory of deliberative democracy. It elaborates a dilemma in the latter theory, between its deliberative or epistemic and democratic or inclusive components, and distinguishes responses to this dilemma that are internal to the conception of deliberation employed from those that are external. The article goes on to identify two models of pragmatism and critically examines how well each one deals with the tension identified in deliberative democracy.
The core, and arguably constitutive, problem confronted by an international political theory is that of the status of borders. This paper argues that pragmatism possesses useful resources for thinking about this issue, if understood in the right way. I begin by positing pragmatism as defined by four core commitments: holism, fallibilism, anti-scepticism, and the primacy of practice. The paper then examines four ways of endowing these basic commitments with more determinate political content: anti-revisionism, social holism, Richard Rorty's `ethnocentric' conception of political philosophy, and Deweyan democratic inquiry. The article rounds off by outlining a well hedged defence of this last perspective, as both normatively attractive and capable of addressing some of the problems posed by boundaries.