Perpetual decline or persistent dominance?: Uncovering Anglo-America's true structural power in global finance
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Volume 43, Issue 1, p. 3-28
ISSN: 0260-2105
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In: Review of international studies: RIS, Volume 43, Issue 1, p. 3-28
ISSN: 0260-2105
World Affairs Online
In: Review of international political economy, Volume 23, Issue 6, p. 1034-1063
ISSN: 1466-4526
In: Review of international studies: RIS, Volume 43, Issue 1, p. 3-28
ISSN: 1469-9044
AbstractThe prediction of America's decline is a regularly recurring phenomenon; this also pertains to the pivotal field of global finance. This article argues that, first we have to consider the United States together with the other Anglophone countries. The English-speaking countries and territories – Anglo-America – have deep common political and socioeconomic roots, of which the unique global Five Eyes intelligence cooperation is merely one manifestation. In finance, New York and London (NY-LON) constitute the decision-making core of this transnational formation. Second, to analyse the highly complex phenomenon of structural power in the globalised international political economy we have to dig deeper to uncover truly meaningful data. Thus, this article evaluates data for nine central segments of global finance from around the year 2000 to 2014. Contrary to the assertions of many declinists, these data show that Anglo-America's dominant structural power has been persistent during this period. Moreover, four novel visualisations show that the US-UK axis is the fulcrum of the international financial system. However, contemporary global finance is characterised by a high degree of latent fragility; significant imbalances, inequalities and contradictions persist and are even likely to grow, potentially undermining the legitimacy and the stability of the whole system.
In: CITYPERC Working Paper Series 2015/02
SSRN
Working paper
In: Politische Ökonomie der Finanzialisierung, p. 115-129
In: Politische Ökonomie der Finanzialisierung, p. 115-129
In: Economy and society, Volume 49, Issue 4, p. 493-515
ISSN: 1469-5766
In: Regulation & governance, Volume 18, Issue 2, p. 479-498
ISSN: 1748-5991
AbstractEnvironmental, social, and governance (ESG) funds are among the fastest‐growing investment styles. ESG investing thereby has a governing effect, and a key open question is whether ESG merely reduces risks for investors or whether it can have a sustainability impact and actively contribute to climate transition. This governance through ESG is characterized by three potential transmission mechanisms: ratings, shareholder engagement, and capital allocation. These can create sustainability impact or constitute "ESG gaps" if transmission mechanisms remain ineffective/unutilized. Based on financial data, an investigation of ESG methodologies and expert interviews, we provide a novel ESG market analysis, focusing on the standard‐setting role of a handful of ESG index providers in capital allocation. Our findings highlight that while "Dark Green" indices could have an impact, currently "Broad ESG" indices, which do not meaningfully facilitate sustainability, dominate investing: we call this the "ESG capital allocation gap." This has important implications, because effective transmission mechanisms are crucial for ESG funds to achieve sustainability impact in the real economy.
In: Review of international political economy, Volume 28, Issue 1, p. 152-176
ISSN: 1466-4526
SSRN
In: The international spectator: journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Volume 52, Issue 4, p. 20-43
ISSN: 1751-9721
In: The international spectator: a quarterly journal of the Istituto Affari Internazionali, Italy, Volume 52, Issue 4, p. 20-43
ISSN: 0393-2729
World Affairs Online
In: Business and politics: B&P, Volume 19, Issue 2, p. 298-326
ISSN: 1469-3569
AbstractSince 2008, a massive shift has occurred from active toward passive investment strategies. The passive index fund industry is dominated by BlackRock, Vanguard, and State Street, which we call the "Big Three." We comprehensively map the ownership of the Big Three in the United States and find that together they constitute the largest shareholder in 88 percent of the S&P 500 firms. In contrast to active funds, the Big Three hold relatively illiquid and permanent ownership positions. This has led to opposing views on incentives and possibilities to actively exert shareholder power. Some argue passive investors have little shareholder power because they cannot "exit," while others point out this gives them stronger incentives to actively influence corporations. Through an analysis of proxy vote records we find that the Big Three do utilize coordinated voting strategies and hence follow a centralized corporate governance strategy. However, they generally vote with management, except at director (re-)elections. Moreover, the Big Three may exert "hidden power" through two channels: First, via private engagements with management of invested companies; and second, because company executives could be prone to internalizing the objectives of the Big Three. We discuss how this development entails new forms of financial risk.
In: Business and Politics, April 2017, DOI: 10.1017/bap.2017.6
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