Suchergebnisse

This article builds on existing studies of the long-run persistence of geographical variation in tolerance towards other ethnicities. Using English data, the study tests whether the persistent characteristic is an attitude towards a specific ethnic group, or is an underlying cultural trait of which the attitude towards a specific group is just one expression. It finds evidence for the latter, identifying geographical variation in anti-immigrant sentiment in the twenty-first century that is correlated with patterns of immigrant settlement in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, despite the fact that modern immigrant groups are quite different from those in the Middle Ages.

Recent theoretical and empirical work indicates that incumbent governments are likely to attempt to influence election outcomes by violent means (rather than by bribery and fraud) when their level of popular support is relatively low. However, evidence also suggests that in some countries electoral violence can be quite easy to thwart through peaceful means. This may seem surprising when the incumbent has control over an extensive and well-equipped state security apparatus. The analysis of Zimbabwean data in this paper suggests an explanation: the incumbent prefers to avoid the direct involvement of the state security apparatus when intimidating voters (perhaps because such involvement would undermine the incumbent's legitimacy abroad), and relies instead on informal groups with very limited organizational capacity. One consequence in Zimbabwe is that the intimidation is heavily focused in places where the incumbent is relatively popular, ceteris paribus.

Time-series data from Israel are used to investigate the dynamics of the causal links between the intensity of the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and capital flight. A number of dimensions of the conflict are considered, including Israeli and Palestinian fatalities, the incidence of Green Line border closures and growth of Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. Capital flight is measured as (the growth of) the fraction of their physical capital wealth that Israelis hold overseas. The fraction of Israeli capital wealth held outside the country exhibits considerable variation over time; so do indicators of the intensity of the Palestinian–Israeli conflict, even before the upturn in violence in September 2000. Using quarterly time-series data, the article shows that there is a high correlation between the two, conditional on economic conditions. This correlation is a consequence of a causal link that runs in both directions: more violence leads to more capital flight, but more capital flight is also a predictor of higher future levels of violence. Both effects are evident in the data even before September 2000. Under certain assumptions about the properties of the economic time-series, it is possible to infer from these results the amount of income that Israel would gain as a result of a complete cessation of violence.

I construct a model of investment in Israel that incorporates both standard economic factors and indicators of political instability and unrest. The model is used to estimate both the extent to which the Intifada has depressed Israeli investment in different kinds of capital good, and the size of the corresponding 'peace dividend'.