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In recent years, populism has attracted a lot of scholarly attention. In this article, I investigate the relationship between structural and subjective dimensions of social isolation and populist attitudes. In particular, I account for individuals' emotional responses to social isolation that link social isolation to populist attitudes. Analyses based on original survey data show that both forms of social isolation are positively related to populist attitudes in six European countries. More importantly, mediation analyses reveal that in line with the proposed mediation argument, anger correlated both with isolation and populist attitudes. By offering a comparative test of the relationship between social isolation and populist attitudes and the mediating role of anger, I advance the understanding of how social isolation in a globalized world relates to populist attitudes. In this vein, the study underpins that emotional reactions to social changes are particularly important in understanding how these social changes affect political attitudes.

Recent ethnographic research has argued that subjective impressions of disadvantage are important to explain support for radical populist parties. Yet, the question of how such perceived disadvantages relate to populist attitudes as an expression of populist ideas has received less attention. In this regard, this study sets out to investigate the relationship between subjective group relative deprivation and populist attitudes. I argue that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. Going beyond previous research, I account for the possibility that populist attitudes also positively affect feelings of disadvantage, resulting in a vicious circle of disadvantage and populism. Results from three original cross-sectional surveys in six European countries show that subjective group relative deprivation is positively related to populist attitudes. More importantly, analyses of original panel data show that fully understanding the relationship between populism and disadvantage requires taking both directions of causality into account.

While analysis of the impact of threatening events has moved from bit player to center stage in political science in recent decades, the phenomenon of pandemic threat is widely neglected in terms of a systematic research agenda. Tying together insights from the behavioral immune system hypothesis and standard political science models of emotional processing, we evaluate whether exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic threat is related to authoritarian attitudes and which emotions do the work. Using 12 samples with over 12,000 respondents from six European countries at two time points (2020 and 2021), we argue that pandemic threats can generate disgust, anger, and fear. Our analyses indicate that exposure to the COVID-19 pandemic threat particularly activates fear, which in turn is linked to authoritarian attitudes.

The Corona crisis is an unprecedented challenge for societies. Lockdowns and physical distancing orders have generated economic, social and health-related consequences in many countries. In this regard, we evaluate how information about positive economic expectations during the crisis affects citizens' attitudes. Using a real-world survey experiment, our analyses indicate that information about a positive economic outlook and governmental support to mitigate the crisis actually promote people's subjective feelings of disadvantage rather than reducing them. Interestingly, it seems that information about economic recovery that opens up opportunities may backfire due to increased upward comparisons and perceived competition. Structural equation analyses suggest that this relationship is mediated by critical views about democratic institutions during the crisis. Citizens lose confidence in their governments and democratic decision-makers to uphold principles of fairness after the crisis ends. Our results have important implications on how to communicate measures that aim to deal with the crisis.

The Corona crisis is an unprecedented challenge for societies. Lockdowns and physical distancing orders have generated economic, social and health-related consequences in many countries. In this regard, we evaluate how information about positive economic expectations during the crisis affects citizens' attitudes. Using a real-world survey experiment, our analyses indicate that information about a positive economic outlook and governmental support to mitigate the crisis actually promote people's subjective feelings of disadvantage rather than reducing them. Interestingly, it seems that information about economic recovery that opens up opportunities may backfire due to increased upward comparisons and perceived competition. Structural equation analyses suggest that this relationship is mediated by critical views about democratic institutions during the crisis. Citizens lose confidence in their governments and democratic decision-makers to uphold principles of fairness after the crisis ends. Our results have important implications on how to communicate measures that aim to deal with the crisis.

Die Bundesrepublik Deutschland hat in den letzten Jahren einen starken Anstieg der Zuwanderung verzeichnet. Obgleich in der öffentlichen Debatte Migration oft mit innen- und sicherheitspolitischen Fragen verknüpft wird, müssen Migration und Integration immer auch im Zusammenhang mit Sozialpolitik gesehen werden (Busemeyer et al. 2013). So entstehen durch Migration Kosten für die Migrierenden, aber auch für die aufnehmende Gesellschaft (Filsinger 2017a). Dementsprechend kann der lokale Sozialstaat diese sozialen Härten bearbeiten und im Idealfall mildern. Dies gilt umso mehr als die Fluchtmigration mit besonderen Härten verbunden ist (Filsinger 2017a). Migrations- und Integrationspolitik ist somit immer auch Sozialpolitik. Nichtsdestotrotz ist der kommunale Sozialstaat in einem Dilemma: Lokale Herausforderungen müssen bewältigt werden, ohne dass die großen Linien der Politik maßgeblich mitbestimmt werden können. Kommunen sind auch Adressaten einer Bundespolitik, die sie nicht immer beeinflussen können. Allerdings sollte das Potential der kommunalen Akteure nicht unterschätzt werden, sind sie doch für die Ausgestaltung der Programme verantwortlich und können darüber hinaus auch eigene Programme auflegen (Filsinger 2018a). Folglich sollte der "kommunale Sozialstaat" im Bereich der Migrationspolitik besonders in den Blick genommen werden, muss dieser doch unmittelbar Zuwanderung und Integration bearbeiten. Hier knüpft der vorliegende Beitrag an. Wir argumentieren, dass Kommunen Integrationskonzepte nutzen, um die kommunalen Problemstellungen im Bereich Integration anzugehen und somit ihren Handlungsspielraum im Rahmen des Mehrebenensystems nutzen. Unsere empirische Analyse zeigt, dass ca. 40 Prozent der Landkreise und kreisfreien Städte ein kommunales Integrationskonzept verabschiedet haben. Insbesondere urbane Landkreise und Städte scheinen im Feld der Integrationspolitik besonders aktiv zu sein. Erste inhaltliche Analysen der Konzepte und qualitative Fallstudien zeigen darüber hinaus, dass Integrationspolitik als Querschnittsaufgabe erkannt wird und somit viele verschiedene Politikfelder beinhaltet. Kommunale Integrationspolitik scheint zunehmend als Teil der kommunalen Sozialpolitik verstanden zu werden. Es lässt sich zunehmend beobachten, dass das Ziel der Politik eine zunehmend integrierte Stadtgesellschaft ist. Ferner wird deutlich, dass die Vorreiterstädte sich in einem Übergang von einer spezialisierten Integrationspolitik zu einer allgemeinen Sozialpolitik befinden.

AbstractWhile conventional wisdom connects crises and external threats to increasing support for populism, several questions remain unanswered. Following insights of affective intelligence theory (AIT), we posit that anger and fear elicited by pandemic threat relate differently to populist attitudes. While such relations have already been explored in the context of other hazards (such as financial turmoil, terrorism, or immigration), our study allows us to evaluate the emotional bedrocks of populism in the context of a threat that is not apparently connected to the classical political grievances underlying populism. Expanding the literature on psychological underpinnings of populism and on the political consequences of the pandemic, our analyses of original survey data support our contentions that pandemic threat-induced anger is positively related to populist attitudes while fear is negatively linked to populist stances. This holds in particular for anti-elitism and the Manichean outlook inherent in populism. Altogether, we provide new comparative evidence to the puzzle about the emotional bedrocks of populism by illuminating a domain that has not been systematically explored before.

AbstractDrawing on the behavioural immune system hypothesis, we argue that the prevalence of the Covid‐19 pandemic threat in an individual's respective environment relates to exclusive, ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Referring to the affective intelligence theory, we maintain that specific negative emotions are prompted by the perception of being exposed to a pandemic threat, and these emotional states in turn structure political preferences regarding national belonging. Using an original survey in six European countries during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze both the impact of individual Covid‐19 experiences and the contextual exposure to a pandemic threat through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to the pandemic is linked to stronger ethnic national identities for both levels of analysis. We also find that anger substantially mediates this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioural immune system appears as a pervasive obstacle to inclusive orientations.

Drawing on the behavioural immune system hypothesis, we argue that the prevalence of the Covid‐19 pandemic threat in an individual's respective environment relates to exclusive, ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Referring to the affective intelligence theory, we maintain that specific negative emotions are prompted by the perception of being exposed to a pandemic threat, and these emotional states in turn structure political preferences regarding national belonging. Using an original survey in six European countries during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze both the impact of individual Covid‐19 experiences and the contextual exposure to a pandemic threat through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to the pandemic is linked to stronger ethnic national identities for both levels of analysis. We also find that anger substantially mediates this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioural immune system appears as a pervasive obstacle to inclusive orientations.

Drawing on the behavioural immune system hypothesis, we argue that the prevalence of the Covid-19 pandemic threat in an individual's respective environment relates to exclusive, ethnic conceptions of nationhood. Referring to the affective intelligence theory, we maintain that specific negative emotions are prompted by the perception of being exposed to a pandemic threat, and these emotional states in turn structure political preferences regarding national belonging. Using an original survey in six European countries during the first peak of the pandemic in late April and early May 2020, we analyze both the impact of individual Covid-19 experiences and the contextual exposure to a pandemic threat through hierarchical analyses of 105 European regions. Our empirical analysis shows that exposure to the pandemic is linked to stronger ethnic national identities for both levels of analysis. We also find that anger substantially mediates this relationship and has primacy over feelings of fear. Taken together, our results indicate that the behavioural immune system appears as a pervasive obstacle to inclusive orientations.