Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Contents -- Preface -- 1. Capitalist Diversity in Open Economies -- 2. Governments, Business, and the Design Problem -- 3. Three Models of Open Governance -- 4. Britain: From Replacing to Reinforcing a Liberal Market Economy -- 5. France: The Centralized Market Economy and Its Alternatives -- 6. Germany: Stability and Redesign in a Coordinated Market Economy -- 7. Lessons from Capitalist Diversity and Open Governance -- Appendix -- Notes -- References -- Index.

AbstractThe global governance institutions that structure economic relations between industrialized and developing countries have been contested since their inception. This contribution revisits elements of the struggle over the 'new international economic order', or NIEO, in the 1970s. Contemporaneous observers and political leaders saw the initiative as part of the first major shift in global power after 1945. Using strategies of rhetorical coercion and persuasion that aimed to radically reform global economic governance, a large coalition of developing nations proposed a reform agenda designed to expand the authority of the United Nations and reduce the importance of Bretton Woods institutions. In response, a small coalition of industrialized countries adopted strategies of cooptation that entailed 'case‐by‐case' cooperation with developing countries with the goal of limiting overall reforms. The contribution uses historical archives from deliberations within and among industrialized countries to reveal the sources behind their response to the NIEO and follow‐up initiatives. It shows that industrialized countries chose to deemphasize strategies of argumentation in favor of strategies of cooptation in their efforts to limit transformative change in global economic governance.

International organisations have considered national unity a necessary prerequisite to maintaining political stability and restoring economic growth in countries facing severe economic crisis. The European Union and the International Monetary Fund promoted such unity in Greece when making stabilisation packages available during the country's sovereign debt crisis in 2011-2012. Focused on the conditions under which diverse political groups can credibly coordinate their economic and political strategies, this article examines domestic and international factors that impact the prospect of political unity in Greece and small European economies. Anchored in the historical institutionalism tradition, it finds that political unity in small European economies has been consolidated during periods of economic growth and when complementary international institutions existed, but has regularly been undermined in countries experiencing the opposite conditions, including Greece. National unity in Greece over the long term requires domestic reforms, but such reforms will not be sustainable without external economic growth and a multilateral architecture that incentivises economic groups to share the benefits and costs of structural reform. Since the latter conditions are not ones that a small country itself can produce, sustained political unity rests as much with the actions of big economies as it does with Greece overcoming the historic legacies of its particular model of capitalism. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article reviews recent contributions to International Relations (IR) that engage the substantive concerns of historical institutionalism and explicitly and implicitly employ that tradition's analytical features to address fundamental questions in the study of international affairs. It explores the promise of this tradition for new research agendas in the study of international political development, including the origin of state preferences, the nature of governance gaps, and the nature of change and continuity in the international system. The article concludes that the analytical and substantive profiles of historical institutionalism can further disciplinary maturation in IR, and it proposes that the field be more open to the tripartite division of institutional theories found in other subfields of Political Science.