Heterogeneous preferences and investments in energy saving measures
In: Research paper series 95
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In: Economic Inquiry, Band 58, Heft 4, S. 1813-1829
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In: Economic Inquiry, Volume 58, Issue4, October 2020, Pages 1813-1829. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecin.12898
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In: Public choice, Band 160, Heft 3, S. 411-428
ISSN: 0048-5829
In: Public choice, Band 160, Heft 3-4
ISSN: 1573-7101
Comprehensive reforms often fail, despite being beneficial to society. Politicians may block comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions in which they benefit from a piecemeal reform at the expense of others. Because formal commitment devices for vote trading are frequently missing, trust and reciprocity among legislators can play an important role for vote trading. We investigate in a laboratory experiment whether legislators will impede comprehensive reforms in an attempt to form vote trading coalitions even if formal commitment devices for vote trading after reform failure are missing. We find that open ballots allow for vote trading without commitment, based on trust and reciprocity. In turn, legislators frequently reject efficient comprehensive reforms in such institutions. Adapted from the source document.
In: Public choice, Band 160, Heft 3-4, S. 411-428
ISSN: 1573-7101
SSRN
Working paper