Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Dedication Page -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- 1 Introduction -- 2 The Moral Community -- 3 Animal Minds -- 4 Welfare and Death -- 5 Moral Theory -- 6 Animal Agriculture and Aquaculture -- 7 Production and Consumption Ethics -- 8 Fishing -- 9 Institutional Animal Care and Use Committees -- 10 Animal Research -- 11 Zoos -- 12 Pests -- 13 Companion Animals -- 14 Activism -- 15 Conclusion -- Index.

Many mainline Protestant communities want to be welcoming while preserving their identities; they want to be shaped by the central claims of the faith while making room for those who doubt. And crucially, they want to do this in a way that leads to vibrant, growing communities, where more and more people gather to worship, encourage one another, and live out the Gospel. How should the Episcopal Church—and other mainline Protestant denominations, insofar as they're similar—try to achieve these goals? I suggest that local churches borrow some resources from John Rawls's Political Liberalism. On the view I outline, it's valuable for local churches to see themselves as akin to political bodies composed of reasonable citizens. The idea, in essence, is that the relevant kind of reasonableness would make congregations more unified even while tolerating more diversity, and would accomplish all this without giving up their distinctly Christian identity.

If many wild animals have net negative lives, then we have to consider how likely it is that the good for animals, considered as individuals, aligns with the good for species, or the climate, or the preservation of wild spaces.

If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Contents -- Foreword -- Factory Farming -- Opening Statements -- 1. Opening Statement -- 2. Opening Statement -- First Round of Replie -- 3. Reply to Bob Fischer's Opening Statement -- 4. Reply to Anja Jauernig's Opening Statement -- Second Round of Replies -- 5. Second Reply to Bob Fischer -- 6. Second Reply to Anja Jauernig -- Further Reading -- Glossary -- Bibliography -- Index.

Every year, billions of animals are raised and killed by human beings for human consumption. What should we think of this practice? In what ways, if any, is it morally problematic? This volume collects twelve essays by leading moral philosophers examining some of the most important aspects of this topic.

Treves et al. (2019) argue that policy making should include the interests and well-being of present and future generations of humans and nonhumans. There are deep and abiding conflicts of interest both between and within these groups. Trying to factor in so many considerations is likely to generate political gridlock. The authors need to explain how to avoid this.

Abstract
Animal welfare is often ignored in decision-making, despite widespread agreement about its importance. This is partly because of a lack of quantitative methods to assess the impacts of policies on humans and nonhumans alike on a common scale. At the same time, recent work in economics, philosophy, and animal welfare science has made progress on the fundamental theoretical challenge of estimating the well-being potential of different species on a single scale. By combining these estimates of each species' well-being potential with assessments of how various policies impact the quality of life for these species, along with the number of animals affected, we can arrive at a framework for estimating the impact of policies on animal health and well-being. This framework allows for a quantifiable comparison between policies affecting humans and animals. For instance, it enables us to compare human QALYs to animal QALYs tailored to specific species. Hence, the intrinsic value of animal welfare impacts of policies can be monetized on the same scale as market and non-market impact for humans, facilitating benefit–cost analysis. Many challenges remain though, including issues of population ethics, political feasibility, and new complexities in addressing equity and uncertainty.

Faced with the choice between supporting industrial plant agriculture and hunting, Tom Regan's rights view can be plausibly developed in a way that permits a form of hunting we call "dignitarian." To motivate this claim, we begin by showing how the empirical literature on animal deaths in plant agriculture suggests that a non-trivial amount of hunting would not add to animal harm. We discuss how Tom Regan's miniride principle appears to morally permit hunting in that case, and we address recent objections by Jason Hanna to environmentally-based culling that may be seen to speak against this conclusion. We then turn to dignity, which is especially salient in scenarios where harm is necessary or justifiable. We situate "dignitarian" hunting within a larger framework of adversarial ethics, and argue that dignitarian hunting gives animals a more dignified death than the alternatives endemic to large-scale plant agriculture, and so is permissible based on the kinds of principles that Regan endorses. Indeed, dignitarian hunting may actually fit better with Regan's widely endorsed animal rights framework than the practice of many vegans, and should only be rejected if we're just as willing to condemn supporting conventional plant agriculture.