Suchergebnisse

Im Rahmen des Zulassungsverfahrens für Pflanzenschutzmittel stellt sich in der Praxis das Problem: In welchem Umfang dürfen die nationalen Zulassungsbehörden den Stand von Wissenschaft und Technik eigenständig vorantreiben? Ausgehend von einer Analyse des deutschen und europäischen Pflanzenschutzrechts werden die behördlichen Handlungsspielräume ausgeleuchtet sowie inhaltliche und verfahrensrechtliche Anforderungen entwickelt, die bei einer Fortschreibung und praktischen Umsetzung des Standes von Wissenschaft und Technik zu beachten sind

For many years, the EU's legislation on animal testing and marketing bans regarding cosmetic products and their ingredients has been giving rise to controversy. First, the bans were introduced under the regime of the Cosmetics Directive, which was subsequently replaced by Regulation (EC) No. 1223/2009 on cosmetic products (hereinafter "EU Cosmetics Regulation"). In this process, the animal testing and marketing bans of Article 4a of the Cosmetics Directive were transferred – with identical content and largely with the same wording – to Article 18 of the EU Cosmetics Regulation, so that the legal issues connected with the bans have basically remained the same. Since the transitional periods for the application of the bans ended on 11 March 2009 and 11 March 2013 (for details, see Article 18(2) of EU Cosmetics Regulation), and the bans as provided by Article 18(1) of the EU Cosmetics Regulation are binding and directly applicable in the EU Member States, they must be observed by the affected businesses as of now. Violations are to be sanctioned in the Member States in an effective, proportionate and dissuasive manner (Article 37 of EU Cosmetics Regulation).

A controversial arms control issue in the 1980s was the US-Soviet dispute concerning new or modernized radars which were claimed to violate the ABM Treaty. The new US Large Phased-Array Radar at Thule, Greenland, became a major issue in the Danish security policy debate, particularly in early 1987, when several claims were made in the Danish media and the Danish Parliament concerning the radar's function and potential capabilities. As the US military facilities in Greenland have rarely been at the forefront of the political debate in Denmark, it is not surprising that both the political and media debate have been riddled with speculations and contradictory assertions. The political debate in Denmark resulted in a resolution adopted by a broad majority in the Danish Parliament, stressing that the radar should not be used in a future SDI or ABM system. This article discusses the strategic rationale behind the modernization decision as expressed by the US Air Force in testimony before the US Congress. I argue that the purpose of the modernization was to enhance the quality of attack warning and attack assessment data so crucial to a nuclear warfighting strategy. Various claims which were aired in the Danish debate are assessed; and I maintain that the radar is unlikely to be of substantial utility in a future ABM or SDI system, that the modernization did not violate the spirit of the ABM treaty; that the radar is able to perform certain spacetracking missions; and that data collected from the Thule array could be relevant for a potential future US ASAT system.