Suchergebnisse

Abstract
In November 2019, the icc's Pre-Trial Chamber authorized the Prosecutor to proceed with an investigation based on a previous decision that the Court may exercise jurisdiction over the alleged deportation of Rohingya from Myanmar to Bangladesh. While the crime of deportation occurred in Myanmar, which is not a State party to the icc and therefore not within the jurisdiction of the Court without unsc referral, the deportation ended in Bangladesh, which is a State party. Once the Court determined that the State that receives the forcibly displaced can confer jurisdiction, the ground seemed to shift drastically in regards to the possible jurisdictional reach of the icc. This paper explores how this Pre-Trial Chamber decision, reasonably read as extending the Court's geographic jurisdiction beyond what was intended by the drafters of the Rome Statute, could have negative implications, particularly how this extension could further threaten some of the world's most vulnerable.

While there is an acknowledged overlap of transitional justice and jus post bellum, there has been no real attention to delineating a clear relationship between the two or addressing the significant differences regarding aims, scope and audience. These differences must be acknowledged and a clear relationship between the two fields needs to be demarcated for both intellectual clarity and practical reasons. It seems right to question not only where these fields of inquiry fall in relation to each other but how the two can co-exist and inform each other in a meaningful way that works to the benefit of victims of conflict and mass atrocity. Done correctly, this overlap can be ushered into a coherent research agenda where the two perspectives can be brought together in a careful and concise manner. This article aims to start to address this gap.

AbstractGiven the history of the International Criminal Court in Africa, the relationship between African states and the Court is particularly significant to its legitimacy. If the power of the Court is grounded in international political support and the perception that it transcends international and national politics to deny impunity for 'atrocity' crimes, the Court's perceived legitimacy and normative legitimacy are so intertwined that charges of illegitimacy from significant regional stakeholders hold particular weight. More importantly, criticisms voiced by African actors point to a valid challenge to the Court's legitimate moral standing as an arbiter of global justice: the international power imbalance that seems to be becoming more entrenched and apparent in the Court's work. Tactics adopted by some African leaders of prioritising the issue of heads-of-state immunity, however, minimise the broader issue of power differentials and reduce the chance that African states will find allies in their cause to challenge the Court's operations.