Suchergebnisse

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- 1 The Forms of Justice -- 2 The Social and Political Foundations of Adjudication -- 3 The Right Degree of Independence -- 4 The Bureaucratization of the Judiciary -- 5 Against Settlement -- 6 The Allure of Individualism -- 7 The Political Theory of the Class Action -- 8 The Awkwardness of the Criminal Law -- 9 Objectivity and Interpretation -- 10 Judging as a Practice -- 11 The Death of Law -- 12 Reason vs. Passion -- 13 The Irrepressibility of Reason -- 14 Bush v. Gore and the Question of Legitimacy -- Afterword -- Notes -- Index -- Acknowledgments -- About the Author

Este ensayo se centra en la amenaza a nuestro sistema constitucional – la restricción de la libertad de expresión en nombre de la lucha contra el terrorismo. Específicamente, mi objeto de estudio es la decisión de la Corte Suprema en Junio de 2010 en el caso Holder contra Humanitarian Law Project, que confirmó la autoridad del Congreso para tipificar como delito la promoción política en nombre de organizaciones terroristas extranjeras. Al igual que las intervenciones telefónicas sin orden judicial, el riesgo de enfrentar un proceso penal por efectuar una defensa política – como sería por ejemplo, las expresiones de un ciudadano estadounidense en un foro en su país, donde señale que una organización terrorista extranjera tiene una justa causa – constituye una amenaza para nuestra democracia, aunque el peligro es mayor que eso. El riesgo de escuchas telefónicas sin orden judicial inhibe la libertad de expresión, pero el riesgo de enfrentar un proceso penal puede detenerla por completo.

Desde 1967, la Corte Suprema de los Estados Unidos ha buscado proteger la privacidad de las llamadas telefónicas, requiriendo que el Gobierno obtenga de un juez una orden judicial autorizando la intercepción de una llamada. Para obtener esa orden judicial, el gobierno debía aportar las razones para creer que el objetivo de la intercepción había iniciado o iba a iniciar una actividad delictiva. Este artículo analiza los desarrollos de la era post 11 de septiembre –primero con una Orden del Ejecutivo y luego con una ley del Congreso– que eliminó este requisito y así comprometió la protección de la privacidad ; Starting in 1967, the Supreme Court of the United States has sought to protect the privacy of telephone calls by requiring the Government to obtain from a judge a warrant authorizing the interception of a call. To obtain such a warrant, the Government would have to set forth the reasons for believing that the target of the interception has engaged or was about to engage in criminal activity. This article traces the developments in the post-9/11 era – first by Executive Order and then by a Congressional Statute – that abrogated this requirement and thus compromised the protection of privacy.

Human rights trials now abound in Africa. These trials are being conducted almost exclusively by international tribunals, most notably the International Criminal Court, without—so this article maintains—proper regard for the power and duty of national courts to protect their citizens from human rights abuses. Not every atrocity calls for an international tribunal.

El autor examina en el presente artículo las tensiones existentes entre el Capitalismo y la Democracia. Para ello, describe el proceso de resquebrajamiento de la estructura socialista de Europa Oriental y el paulatino desplazamiento de estos países hacia los ideales del Capitalismo; incitados, especialmente, por el contraste de su propia miseria con las riquezas de Occidente. Asimismo, identifica a la Democracia como la motivación política subyacente en el proceso de transición hacia el Capitalismo. La convivencia de los valores democráticos y capitalistas no es, sin embargo, siempre pacífica, por lo que el autorpropone una actitud más escéptica en torno al nuevo orden en la escena mundial.

In Why We Vote, renowned legal scholar Owen Fiss offers a bold and daring reconstruction of judicial doctrine that underscores the US Constitution's commitment to the expansion of democracy. Each chapter points to landmark Supreme Court decisions that have either enhanced the citizens' enjoyment of the right to vote or guaranteed feasible access to the ballot for independent candidates and new political parties. Fiss also shifts the focus from equal protection of the laws to the freedom that democracy generates--the right of those who are ruled to choose their rulers.

"Why We Vote is a bold and sometimes daring reconstruction of judicial doctrine giving expression to the democratic aspirations of the Constitution. It shifts the focus from equal protection to the freedom that democracy generates-the right of those who are ruled to choose their rulers. It explains why the protection of that right requires the extension of the franchise to all citizens. It provides the grounds for the rules that facilitate, as a purely practical matter, the exercise of the right to vote, ensure that the vote of one is equal to that of another, and guarantees feasible access to the ballot for independent candidates and new political parties"--

Pillars of Justice explores the purpose and possibilities of life in the law through moving accounts of thirteen lawyers who shaped the legal world during the past half century. Some, such as Thurgood Marshall, were Supreme Court Justices. Others, like John Doar and Burke Marshall, set the civil rights policies of the federal government during the 1960s. Some, including Harry Kalven and Catharine MacKinnon, have taught at the greatest law schools of the nation and nourished the liberalism rooted in the civil rights era. Jurists from abroad--Aharon Barak, for example--were responsible for the rise of the human rights movement that today carries the burden of advancing liberal values. These lawyers came from diverse backgrounds and held various political views. What unites them is a deep, abiding commitment to Brown v. Board of Education as an exceptional moment in the life of the law--a willingness to move mountains, if need be, to ensure that we are living up to our best selves. In tracing how these lawyers over a period of fifty years used the Brown ruling and its spirit as a beacon to guide their endeavors, this history tells the epic story of the liberal tradition in the law. For Owen Fiss, one of the country's leading constitutional theorists, the people described were mentors, colleagues, and friends. In his portraits, Fiss tries to identify the unique qualities of mind and character that made these individuals so important to the institutions and legal principles they served--