Suchergebnisse

The spread of intrastate war has gained increasing prominence, especially in the recent past. This paper studies the spread of intrastate war as a result of another intrastate war in a neighboring country using a system dynamics modeling approach. The model employed is a modification of the SIR, a spread of disease model taken from epidemiology. Revising the SIR model with relevant political and economic variables, the model seeks to explain the mechanism through which an intrastate conflict is spread from an "infected" country to a "susceptible" country. Although diffusion and contagion of civil wars have been widely examined in the past, a dynamic modeling approach has not been adequately used in this area. Consistent with the existing literature, the results of the model suggest that refugees are a means to carry the conflict disease from the initial country by disturbing economic and social dynamics of the host whereas political capacity acts as the immune system, reducing the likelihood of conflict contagion. The results of the simulations, obtained using theoretical parameters, are mainly consistent with the expectations.

AbstractStates that grant their leaders extraordinary powers in times of emergency do so to protect the nation against dramatic shocks. Implicit in this choice is the assumption that the government will better retain its capacity when confronted with an emergency situation if the leader can invoke emergency powers. This remains an untested proposition. In this article, we challenge this assumption and argue that the relationship between emergency powers and political capacity depends on both the nature of the emergency itself and the type of capacity in question. We find that emergency powers better allow the government to extract resources from the public during periods of emergency. However, it is only in national political emergencies where these resources are well allocated. After extra‐territorial emergencies, increased emergency power strength leads to inefficient government allocation. This suggests that emergency powers are not a panacea guarding against the ills of crisis.

AbstractIn the wake of the Syrian civil war, more than three million people have fled to Turkey, which now hosts the largest refugee population on earth. Making up 4.42 per cent of the total population in Turkey as of February 2018, Syrian refugees are nevertheless spread unevenly within its borders. The ratio of refugees to the local population ranges from as high as 99per cent in the city of Kilis to as low as 0.05per cent in Sinop. This article presents findings from the empirical study of the effect of this geographical variation on election outcomes in Turkey, after the arrival of major refugee populations in 2012. Drawing on a unique subnational dataset and ordinary least squares (OLS), generalized least squares (GLS), and difference‐in‐differences (DiD) regressions, the study compares cities hosting few refugees (control group) with cities with large refugee populations (treatment group) to determine whether significant differences in voting patterns emerged. Our findings show a negative, but insignificant, impact on the incumbent party. The findings have policy implications for Turkey as well as any country that experiences a considerable flow of refugees.