Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Table of Contents -- Preface -- Definition and Acronyms -- A Freedoms of the Air -- B Acronyms -- Acknowledgements -- Introduction -- I Overview -- II Outline of Book Chapters -- III Methodology -- 1 The Composition and Regulation of International Commercial Aviation -- 1.1 Who Regulates the Airline Industry? -- 1.2 What Is Regulated -- 1.3 Why Regulate? Aviation as a Potential Public Good -- 1.3.1 What Is a Public Good? -- 1.3.2 Market Failure: The Basis of Regulation of Public Goods -- 1.3.3 Are Airlines a Public Good? -- 1.3.3.1 Airlines as Infrastructure -- 1.3.3.2 Connectivity -- 1.3.3.3 Attracting State Financial Support -- 1.3.4 Airlines Are de facto Public Goods -- 1.4 The How of Regulation -- 1.4.1 Forms of Intervention -- 1.4.2 Factors in Choosing Regulatory Tools -- 1.4.2.1 Directness -- 1.4.2.2 Automaticity -- 1.4.2.3 Publicity -- 1.4.2.4 Relativity of State Capacity -- 1.4.3 Regulatory Tools -- 1.4.3.1 State Ownership or Direct Provision -- 1.4.3.2 Subsidy/State Aid -- 1.4.4 Statutory Regulation -- 1.4.4.1 Economic Regulation -- 1.4.4.2 Security Regulation -- 1.4.4.3 Safety Regulation -- 1.4.4.4 Social Regulation: Consumer Rights -- 1.4.4.5 Environmental Regulation -- 1.5 Conclusion -- 2 Metamorphosis of the Airline Industry from 1992 to 2013 -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 The Development of the International Airline Industry Prior to 1992 -- 2.2.1 Australia -- 2.2.2 Canada -- 2.2.3 Europe -- 2.2.4 New Zealand -- 2.2.5 United States -- 2.2.6 Pre-1992 Liberalization Trends -- 2.3 The Regulation of International Air Routes: BASAs -- 2.3.1 Negotiating Bilateral Air Service Agreements -- 2.3.2 Allocating Traffic Rights -- 2.4 World Travel Patterns Circa 1992 -- 2.5 The Evolution of Global Aviation: 1992-2012 -- 2.5.1 Open Skies -- 2.5.2 Operational Flexibility -- 2.5.3 Equity Alliances and Anti-Trust Immunity -- 2.5.4 New Routes.

The extraterritorial application of U.S. economic sanctions and trade controls is a perennial topic of discussion among international trade practitioners and a frequent cause for concern abroad. While long present in one form or another as part of several U.S. trade and export control programs, there has been a resurgence in the use of unilateral extraterritorial trade regulation by the United States following the unraveling of widespread international consensus on who should be the targets for such controls and sanctions as a result of the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the demise of the international Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls. Moreover, the pressures created by rapidly developing new means of conducting domestic and international commerce online and over the Internet now exacerbate the problems created with these types of controls, by vastly increasing both the number of international transactions and the speed with which they are conducted. The most recent focus of the discussion of unilateral extraterritorial controls in the popular and academic press has been the Helms-Burton Act, which revised the terms of the U.S. embargo of Cuba. The amendments to the Cuban embargo controls that the Helms-Burton Act introduced have generated significant opposition from other countries, such as Canada and the United Kingdom. Additionally, the European Union has expressed its opposition through the initiation of a complaint with the World Trade Organization. Rather than the novel changes brought about by the Helms-Burton Act alone, however, it is the long-standing use of traditional "blacklisting" tools as part of the government's trade regulation and sanctions programs that most clearly highlights the difficulties inherent in unilateral extraterritorial controls. Using the Cuban embargo program as an example, this Article explores the question of the legitimacy of these "blacklisting" measures under international standards, including those advocated and espoused by the United States itself ...

As we have seen in chapter 3, political life of the Republic of Ireland is overshadowed by two figures: the President of Ireland, who is the head of state and a mainly symbolic figure, and the Taoiseach, who is the head of government and is responsible for political leadership. This chapter explores the foundations of executive power in the Republic. It begins by assessing the role of the President. Why is the presidency such a weak institution and should the office be reformed or even abolished? It then considers the dominant position of the Taoiseach. What resources can the Taoiseach mobilise and what obstacles are placed in the way of individualised political leadership?

In this article we examine the opinion structure of Irish Labour party members and supporters. Our purpose is to test May's law of curvilinear disparity by dividing party members into two groups as outlined by Kitschelt. By focusing on ideological differences within political parties Kitschelt identifies two types of members: ideologues and pragmatists. We use two individual-level data sets: the Labour Leadership Election Study (LLES) and the Irish National Election Study (INES), to test May's law. We find some limited support for May's law and Kitschelt's extensions to this model.