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How May Virtual Communication Shape Cooperation in a Work Team?: A Formal Model Based on Social Exchange Theory
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 26, Heft 1, S. 258-278
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
This paper addresses theoretically the question how virtual communication may affect cooperation in work teams. The degree of team virtualization, i.e. the extent to which interaction between team members occurs online, is related to parameters of the exchange. First, it is assumed that in online interaction task uncertainties are higher than in face-to-face contacts. Second, the gratifying value of peer rewards is assumed to be lower in online contacts. Thirdly, it is assumed that teams are different in the extent to which members depend on their peers for positive affections, operationalized by the extent to which team members are interested in social relationships for their own sake, independently from their work interactions. Simulation results suggest both positive and negative effects of team virtualization on work-cooperation.
The rational weakness of strong ties: Failure of group solidarity in a highly cohesive group of rational agents
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 26, Heft 3, S. 189-216
ISSN: 1545-5874
The double edge of networks: an analysis of the effect of informal networks on cooperation in social dilemmas
In: ICS dissertation series
Samenvatting
Befreiende Männerpastoral: Männer in Deutschland auf befreienden Wegen der Umkehr aus dem Patriarchat ; Gegenwartsanalyse - theologische Optionen - Handlungsansätze
In: Tübinger Perspektiven zur Pastoraltheologie und Religionspädagogik 10
SSRN
Working paper
Differentiation without Distancing. Explaining Bi-Polarization of Opinions without Negative Influence
In: Maes , M & Flache , A 2013 , ' Differentiation without Distancing. Explaining Bi-Polarization of Opinions without Negative Influence ' , PLoS ONE , vol. 8 , no. 11 , e74516 . https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0074516 ; ISSN:1932-6203
Explanations of opinion bi-polarization hinge on the assumption of negative influence, individuals' striving to amplify differences to disliked others. However, empirical evidence for negative influence is inconclusive, which motivated us to search for an alternative explanation. Here, we demonstrate that bi-polarization can be explained without negative influence, drawing on theories that emphasize the communication of arguments as central mechanism of influence. Due to homophily, actors interact mainly with others whose arguments will intensify existing tendencies for or against the issue at stake. We develop an agent-based model of this theory and compare its implications to those of existing social-influence models, deriving testable hypotheses about the conditions of bi-polarization. Hypotheses were tested with a group-discussion experiment (N = 96). Results demonstrate that argument exchange can entail bi-polarization even when there is no negative influence.
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Reply: Collective Action and the Empirical Content of Stochastic Learning Models: See the comment associated with this reply
In: The American journal of sociology, Band 112, Heft 5, S. 1546-1554
ISSN: 1537-5390
WHEN WILL THEY EVER MAKE UP THEIR MINDS? THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF UNSTABLE DECISION MAKING
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 28, Heft 3, S. 171-196
ISSN: 1545-5874
Rational and Adaptive Playing: A Comparative Analysis for All Possible Prisoner's Dilemmas
In: Analyse & Kritik: journal of philosophy and social theory, Band 22, Heft 1, S. 75-97
ISSN: 2365-9858
Abstract
In this paper we compare two micro foundations for modelling human behaviour and decision making. We focus on perfect strategic rationality on the one hand and a simple reinforcement mechanism on the other hand. Iterated prisoner's dilemmas serve as the play ground for the comparison. The main lesson of our analysis is that in the space of all possible 2 × 2 PDs different micro foundations do matter. This suggests that researchers can not safely rely on the assumption that implementing simple models of decision making will yield the same results that may be obtained when more sophisticated decision rules are built into the agents.
Small Worlds and Cultural Polarization
In: The journal of mathematical sociology, Band 35, Heft 1-3, S. 146-176
ISSN: 1545-5874
Local Convergence and Global Diversity: From Interpersonal to Social Influence
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 6, S. 970-995
ISSN: 1552-8766
How can minority cultures resist assimilation into a global monolith in an increasingly "small world"? Paradoxically, Axelrod found that local convergence can actually preserve global diversity if cultural influence is combined with homophily, the principle that "likes attract." However, follow-up studies showed that this diversity collapses under random cultural perturbation. The authors discovered a new source of this fragility—the assumption in Axelrod's model that cultural influence is interpersonal (dyadic). The authors replicated previous models but with the more empirically plausible assumption that influence is social—people can be simultaneously influenced by several network neighbors. Computational experiments show that cultural diversity then becomes much more robust than in Axelrod's original model or in published variations that included either social influence or homophily but not both. The authors conclude that global diversity may be sustained not by cultural experimentation and innovation but by the ability of cultural groups to discourage those activities.
Local Convergence and Global Diversity: From Interpersonal to Social Influence
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 55, Heft 6, S. 970-996
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
Stochastic Collusion and the Power Law of Learning: A General Reinforcement Learning Model of Cooperation
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 46, Heft 5, S. 629-653
ISSN: 1552-8766
Concerns about models of cultural adaptation as analogs of genetic selection have led cognitive game theorists to explore learning-theoretic specifications. Two prominent examples, the Bush-Mosteller stochastic learning model and the Roth-Erev payoff-matching model, are aligned and integrated as special cases of a general reinforcement learning model. Both models predict stochastic collusion as a backward-looking solution to the problem of cooperation in social dilemmas based on a random walk into a self-reinforcing cooperative equilibrium. The integration uncovers hidden assumptions that constrain the generality of the theoretical derivations. Specifically, Roth and Erev assume a "power law of learning"—the curious but plausible tendency for learning to diminish with success and intensify with failure. Computer simulation is used to explore the effects on stochastic collusion in three social dilemma games. The analysis shows how the integration of alternative models can uncover underlying principles and lead to a more general theory.