Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This paper examines the relationship between green bonds (that is, bonds whose proceeds are committed to financing green projects) and carbon emissions at the aggregate level. Using data for US states, I find that the issuance of $1,000 of green bonds per capita is associated with a subsequent decrease in state-level emissions by 0.9–1.4 per cent. I obtain similar magnitudes using cross-country data. These results are stronger for green bonds that are certified by independent third parties, suggesting that certification is an important governance mechanism in the green bond market.

It is often argued that corporations are too focused on the short term (i.e., they are "short-termist"). For example, during the 2016 U.S. presidential campaign, candidate Hillary Clinton urged companies to escape the tyranny of short-termism. Similarly, in the recent policy debate in the United Kingdom on the need to reform corporate governance and executive compensation, Bank of England's Chief Economist Andy Haldane stated that "[e]xecutive pay is a matter of profound and legitimate public interest. Pay practices can encourage short-term behaviour in ways which harm both firms and the economy." In this context, a recent article by Flammer and Bansal (FB) published in the Strategic Management Journal argues that long-term executive compensation can help mitigate short-termism. More precisely, FB show that the (quasi-random) adoption of long-term executive compensation leads to an increase in firm value, an increase in long-term profits, and is conducive to long-term investments such as investments in innovation and stakeholder relationships. In this Article, I briefly review the core arguments and main results of FB.