Search results

Abstract
Despite some improvement to the lives of Palestinians through human rights activism, this article argues that the legal regime governing Occupied Territories, combined with a rigid legalized conception and application of human rights, limits the ability to achieve human rights protections for those living under prolonged military occupations. Drawing on a critique of liberal legalism, this article will identify four key barriers to change through an analysis of court cases and human rights reports in the Israeli military occupation of the Palestinians. It will trace key shifts in human rights organizations in Israel and Palestine, which seek to overcome these limitations in an effort to secure long-term human rights for Palestinians.

AbstractWhen a non-violent resistance campaign does not have leverage to challenge powerful opponents, third-party intervention has been shown to assist. While the role of external third-party interveners – foreign activists – has been documented, less attention has been given to intervention from members of the dominant population. Drawing from the literature on civil resistance and through the study of Israeli Jews who intervene in Palestinian resistance campaigns against the Israeli military occupation, I argue that intervention from members of the dominant population is strategically desirable. Through an analysis of three Palestinian campaigns, this article identifies that the physical presence of Israeli Jews was needed to ensure the Palestinians could maintain their resistance efforts and presence on the land, despite the repression they faced. Furthermore, the skills and knowledge of the Israelis were needed to help the Palestinians achieve some of their goals, at least in the short term.

This article looks at the transformation of Israeli peace activism since the Second Intifada. It does this by focusing on the collective action frames of Israeli peace activism, using framing processes from social movement theory to identify and explain shifts in the ideas and beliefs surrounding the Israeli–Palestinian conflict. It argues that, contrary to conventional wisdom, Israeli peace activism did not reach a "dead‐end point" following the Second Intifada but instead took on a new trajectory. While the moderate component of Israeli peace activism may have become paralyzed, unable and unwilling to respond to the prevailing realities, the radical and alternative components continued to act, transforming their ideas and presenting new ways to challenge the conflict. This article suggests that although these groups have not had an impact in the policy arena, their influence comes in the realm of norm entrepreneurship and therefore their efforts should not be overlooked.

The eruption of the 2010 Arab uprisings has generated a great deal of academic scholarship. However, the foreign policy of Israel, a key power in the Middle East, amid the Arab uprisings, has received limited attention. Furthermore, as we demonstrate, the conventional wisdom purported by the current debate, which is that Israel adopted a "defensive, non-idealist" realist foreign policy posture (Magen 2015, 114) in the wake of the Arab uprisings, is wrong. Rather, utilizing an innovative approach linking foreign policy analysis (FPA) and the literature on framing, we demonstrate that Israel adopted a foreign policy stance of entrenchment. This posture is predicated on peace for peace not territory, reinforcing Israel's military capabilities, and granting limited autonomy to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Thus, the article demonstrates how framing can usefully be operationalized to uncover how binary discourse does not merely reflect foreign policy but is, in fact, constitutive of it. We demonstrate that diagnostic and prognostic frames helped to create a direct connection between the images held by a leader, his/her worldview, ideas, perceptions and misperceptions, and foreign policy actions. These frames constituted action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspired and legitimated certain foreign policy options and instruments while restricting others.

AbstractThe eruption of the 2010 Arab uprisings has generated a great deal of academic scholarship. However, the foreign policy of Israel, a key power in the Middle East, amid the Arab uprisings, has received limited attention. Furthermore, as we demonstrate, the conventional wisdom purported by the current debate, which is that Israel adopted a "defensive, non-idealist" realist foreign policy posture (Magen 2015, 114) in the wake of the Arab uprisings, is wrong. Rather, utilizing an innovative approach linking foreign policy analysis (FPA) and the literature on framing, we demonstrate that Israel adopted a foreign policy stance of entrenchment. This posture is predicated on peace for peace not territory, reinforcing Israel's military capabilities, and granting limited autonomy to the Palestinians under Israeli occupation. Thus, the article demonstrates how framing can usefully be operationalized to uncover how binary discourse does not merely reflect foreign policy but is, in fact, constitutive of it. We demonstrate that diagnostic and prognostic frames helped to create a direct connection between the images held by a leader, his/her worldview, ideas, perceptions and misperceptions, and foreign policy actions. These frames constituted action-oriented sets of beliefs and meaning that inspired and legitimated certain foreign policy options and instruments while restricting others.