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Literature on punctuated equilibrium theory has aimed to explain the causes of policy punctuations. What remain unknown are the consequences of those punctuations (and other size changes) for organizations. Specifically, this study analyzes how budgetary changes affect organizational performance. While the connection between financial resources and organization outcomes has been examined before, the analyses here expand upon previous work by considering the full spectrum of budgetary changes from negative punctuations to positive punctuations. This topic is important given today's fiscal uncertainty. For managers and bureaucrats, they are expected to stabilize organization outputs no matter what policy inputs are established in the organization. At times, inputs can be erratic and unstable—successful organizations can find a way to maintain performance despite these obstacles. In the context of school districts, this study examines the performance consequences (measured by annual changes in the statewide standardized test pass rate) of different size alterations in instructional expenditures. Results indicate that, generally, organizations are able to dampen the impact of negative financial changes and improve upon budgetary increases in the translation to outcomes.

What stimulates policy change in organizations? Punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) posits that over time policy moves slowly, but also experiences large, rapid changes. Explanations for punctuations have centered on institutional friction and disproportionate information processing. Lacking in PET literature is a theoretical understanding of policy change aside from structural and cognitive limitations. Other organizational features can create friction to slow or accelerate the policy process. This study utilizes both public policy and public administration theory by applying a public administration approach to studying budgetary change. Leveraging this approach, this work analyzes the pattern and explanations of budgetary changes. Centering on two concepts understudied in PET literature—policy feedback and endogenous organizational change—data from hundreds of organizations are used to demonstrate how organization performance and personnel instability contribute to budgetary changes for core organization activity. Results indicate that high levels of performance and low levels of personnel instability lead to incremental changes.

Conflict is part of every organization. Scholars have studied the effects of conflict on organization dynamics and their outputs. Literature suggests that not all conflict is detrimental for organizations—some conflict actually helps bolster and refresh organizations. One concern for organizations is the vertical strategic alignment of management strategies. Vertical cohesion or conflict impacts an organization's ability to reach optimal performance. In the setting of English local governments, this study uses vertical strategic differences among two levels of management as the measure of conflict in organizations to examine, one, how it impacts organization performance, and two, if conflict has a nonlinear relationship with performance. Results indicate that conflict on single strategies has no bearing on organization performance. Total strategy or multidimensional conflict, however, negatively impacts performance. There is little support for a nonlinear relationship between conflict and performance. Further analyses indicate that the negative impact of conflict is amplified for smaller organizations.

AbstractExisting punctuated equilibrium theory (PET) literature identifies the causes of policy punctuations. However, there are a lack of theoretical and empirical studies on the effects of policy punctuations on organizational performance. This study extends PET from policy formulation to policy outcomes and explores how public agencies transfer budgetary inputs to organizational performance outcomes in the policy context of American state highway transportation infrastructure. Based on a longitudinal research design, the research employs a panel two‐way fixed effects regression model to analyze the performance consequences of budgetary changes for 50 states during an almost 20‐year period (1995–2013). The key findings indicate that state expenditure (highway maintenance) changes experience much more friction and volatility over time than performance (acceptable roads) changes. In addition, state highway transportation agencies can mitigate the impact of large budgetary cuts on organizational performance, but do not seem to capitalize on large budgetary gains to improve performance.

AbstractPunctuated equilibrium theory seeks to explain policy volatility and stability in government attention. In previous research into the temporal dynamics of punctuations, scholars found that punctuations occur in clusters – a recent budgetary punctuation increases the likelihood of a subsequent punctuation. This article examines the direction, positive or negative, of budgetary punctuations over time. Are budgetary punctuations corrective, grouping positive and negative changes? Or, do budgetary punctuations occur in cumulative trends of positive or negative changes? These questions address the heart of the theoretical metaphor for punctuated equilibrium. In an analysis of over 1,000 Texas school districts for nearly a 20-year-period, results support the notion of reactive patterns of budgetary punctuations – positive and negative budgetary punctuations pair up at a rate much higher than expected by chance. The findings demonstrate that even though it is likely to see consecutive positive and negative punctuations, they are not always fully corrective.

We develop and test a theoretical account of the effect of management tenure on the strategic behavior of the chief justice of the United States. Substantial evidence from literatures on learning models and public management indicate that tenure (length of service) is positively related to management performance in public organizations. This suggests that the chief justice's tenure in office should be positively related to efficiency in the use of the chief justice's formal powers. We assess this hypothesis by replicating and extending Johnson et al.'s study of chief justice Burger's conference voting behavior. The data support our management tenure hypothesis, showing that Burger used greater discretion in reserving his conference vote over time as he became more adept at discriminating between circumstances when the tactic was strategically valuable and when it was not.

In this article, we draw on a prominent model of public management to develop a preliminary theoretical approach to understanding the role of the chief justice in Supreme Court decision-making. In particular, we argue that the Court may seek legitimacy through greater unanimity and discuss how the leadership of the chief justice can facilitate that effort. We assess a hypothesis derived from this theory, showing greater agreement among the justices as the incumbent chief justice's tenure in office increases. We argue that these results provide support for further attention to and development of a public administration-based approach to the study of Supreme Court decision-making. The application of public administration to judicial politics provides further evidence of management dynamics in American institutions.

What drives budgetary support for minority-targeted policies? This question is increasingly salient because the public sector serves numerous minority clientele. One perspective suggests that budgetary decisions are grounded in need or demand, while another contends that political pressures will result in the allocation of resources to those with political power. This article presents a theory of budgetary allocation based on the interaction between politics and professionalism, two seemingly disparate perspectives. Furthermore, we separate professionalism into two dimensions—demand and need. Through an analysis of budgeting decisions for bilingual education, we find that political representation leads to more positive budgetary changes for low-demand and, conversely, high-need environments. These findings support not only the interaction between politics and professionalism as a driver of budgetary outcomes but also the theory of two dimensions of professionalism.

The basic dynamics of punctuated policy change have been found to be present in a wide variety of political institutions from a range of countries. The presence-even commonality- of punctuated change has been clearly and persuasively demonstrated. A key challenge in the literature is now to identify the conditions and institutional arrangements that make punctuated change more likely. This article investigates the role of organizational history in punctuated budgetary change. An error-accumulation model of punctuation suggested by the institutional friction framework contends that budgetary punctuation results from a built-up need for budgetary change that had been prevented by slow-moving institutions. The need builds up until the institutions give way in the form of a budgetary punctuation. This explanation suggests that the probability of a punctuation in a given year is negatively related to having experienced such a punctuation in previous years. An alternative model-which we will call the institutional model-contends that the propensity for budgetary punctuation is endemic to specific organizations. These organizations possess inherent characteristics that predispose them to punctuated change. The institutional model suggests that the probability of a punctuation occurring in a given year is positively related to the organization having experienced such a punctuation in previous years. The article uses data from Texas public school districts during an 18-year period to test these competing models of policy punctuation. The results indicate that recent punctuated changes raise the probability of additional punctuated changes, supporting the institutional hypothesis. Adapted from the source document.